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THE AVAILABLE MEANS OF IMAGINATION: 
PERSONAL NARRATIVE, PUBLIC RHETORIC, AND CIRCULATION 
Stephanie D. Weaver 
July 18, 2016 
 
This dissertation examines the digital circulation of personal narratives by non-
celebrity individuals that become part of larger public and political debates. I posit the 
“available means of imagination” to describe the ways that narratives – cultural, fictional, 
and personal – influence our ability to understand the many facets of a given public 
debate before tracing the interactions among narrative, emotion, and circulation in a 
series of case studies using new materialist methods. I argue that emotion plays a key role 
in structures of participation of social media and in how we subsequently engage with 
contemporary political issues, especially with regards to what we choose to circulate. 
The dissertation is divided into five chapters, including three case studies. Chapter 
1 offers an overview of rhetorical approaches to the public debate, circulation – digital or 
otherwise – and narrative. The second chapter, which covers Liza Long’s article “I Am 
Adam Lanza’s Mother,” establishes the relationship between emotion and circulation, 
arguing that Long’s post traveled widely because of the wide range of emotions it 
evoked. Chapter 3 analyzes the circulation of the story of Savannah Dietrich, a teenage 
sexual assault victim who violated a court order by posting the names of her underage 
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attackers on Twitter, via its uptake into preexisting ideologics, demonstrating the ways 
rhetors may adapt another’s personal narrative to serve as evidence of their own claims 
while also having their own interpretations of the story mitigated by their worldviews. 
Chapter 4 examines the case of GamerGate, a movement purportedly devoted to ethics in 
games journalism which began with programmer Eron Gjoni’s blog post about his 
relationship and break-up with game designer Zoe Quinn. This case provides further 
insights into how a personal narrative may be interpreted to fit a preexisting world view, 
as well as demonstrating how competing narratives develop surrounding the same event, 
including accounts of the motivations of participants, critiques of opponents, and moves 
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 Shortly after the school shooting in Newtown, Connecticut, in December 2012, 
mother and blogger Liza Long wrote an article regarding her experiences with her own 
mentally ill and sometimes violent son, Michael. This article appeared initially on both 
her personal blog, The Anarchist Soccer Mom, and The Blue Review, “a journal of 
popular scholarship published by the Boise State University College of Social Sciences 
and Public Affair,” but was soon republished on sites like The Huffington Post, Salon, 
and Slate. Over the course of a couple of days, the article attained “viral” status, 
saturating social media feeds and prompting a wide number of responses; while some 
complained that Long’s post further demonized persons with mental illness, including her 
own son, others argued that a focus on mental illness detracted from the more pressing 
debate regarding gun control. These latter responses suggest that Long’s article, with its 
argument for more facilities and treatment options for mentally ill and sometimes violent 
people besides incarceration, offered a position in the discourse surrounding the Sandy 




 Long’s case is both typical and unusual. Writing about one’s reaction to a national 
news event like the Sandy Hook Shooting is nothing new for the genre of the blog. 
However, most personal narratives on blogs go largely unnoticed apart from the select 
readership a blog may have cultivated. That Long was able to catapult her concerns into 
the national spotlight speaks to a unique set of circumstances, a kairotic combination of 
content, circulation, and audience. As personal narratives from marginalized positions are 
often able to introduce audiences to unfamiliar perspectives but frequently suffer from a 
lack of circulation, Long’s case, and other examples of non-celebrity individuals attaining 
this level of notoriety, deserve attention from rhetoricians as examples of successful 
circulation. While wide circulation may not be enough to establish political change, it is 
the first step in incorporating these non-dominant positions into a public’s available 
means of imagination – that is, the variety of narratives and associated subject positions 
that one can imagine in a given situation. In this dissertation, I propose a theory of the 
available means of imagination that offers a new way of approaching the circulation of 
narrative texts online and their potential influence on public rhetoric by allowing 
rhetorician’s to side-step questions of agency in political change in favor of examining 
the characteristics of successfully circulated texts through new materialist methods. After 
reviewing relevant scholarship in the areas of public and political rhetoric, circulation, 
and personal narrative, I examine three case studies in which personal narratives by 
relatively unknown individuals influenced mainstream media and public debate after 
attaining wide circulation. But before we can examine these kairotic combinations of 
content, circulation, and audience, we must first consider the multiple facets of public 
rhetoric and circulation in the time of social media, especially the complicated nature of 
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emotion and emotional appeals in relation to political positions rhetors view as viable for 
creating political change. 
 
Public and Political Rhetoric 
 As has been pointed out by numerous scholars, the history of public rhetoric is, by 
and large, the history of rhetoric: ancient rhetoricians were primarily concerned with 
issues of the polis, while nineteenth century rhetorical education – as limited as we may 
now perceive it to be – focused on developing young men into suitable gentlemen for 
civic engagement. Consequently, most theories of rhetoric have some bearing on public 
discourse, and as such, I cannot hope to offer a comprehensive account of public rhetoric 
scholarship. Instead, I have selected to focus on those areas of inquiry most important for 
understanding the role of personal narrative and circulation in public rhetoric: theories of 
publics and audiences, the role of emotion in public and political rhetoric, and public 
rhetoric online.  
 
Publics and Audiences in Public Rhetoric 
The term public is fraught with complications, as scholars have struggled to 
define its parameters since Jürgen Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere. Rather than engage in these discussions, I instead focus on the aspects of 
publics pertinent to questions of circulation, beginning with the role of attention in 
forming publics. Both Michael Warner and Gerard Hauser argue that attention is a 
constitutive feature of publics; "Publics,” Warner writes, “lacking any institutional being, 
commences with the moment of attention, must continually predicate renewed attention, 
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and cease to exist when attention is no longer predicated" (88). Likewise, membership in 
a public commences at the moment the individual extends her attentions: "Whenever 
attention to social exchange alters or reinforces personal views, collective participation in 
rhetorical processes constitute individuals as a public” (Hauser 34; emphasis in original). 
The level of engagement can be minimal, as "our willingness to process a passing appeal 
determines which publics we belong to and performs their extension," and arguably 
“sharing” via social media is more than enough to indicate this cursory processing 
(Warner 89). 
Warner argues that "writing to a public helps to make a world insofar as the object 
of address is brought into being partly by postulating and characterizing it" (92). 
However, a rhetor may not simply call a public into being but must work with a 
preexisting social identity that is "recognized as a real path for the circulation of 
discourse." As "that path is then treated as a social entity" (Warner 92), a particular route 
or means of circulation becomes recognized and reified as a social identity (Fraser 68). 
As Warner writes, "there is no speech or performance addressed to a public that does not 
try to specify in advance, in countless highly condensed ways, the lifeworld of its 
circulation […] its circulatory fate is the realization of that world" (114). For rhetoric 
scholars, Warner’s argument resonates with many of our theories regarding audience, 
insofar as we might understand the imagined path of circulation as the imagined audience 
while the “circulatory fate” defines the addressed audience. What Warner does not 
address is the recursive construction of these imagined and actual circulatory paths; as 
rhetors construct texts for imagined publics, the history of the circulation of previous 
texts shapes their understanding of the needs, values, and ideologies of their intended 
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public. Thus, the “lifeworld” of circulation is also an understanding of how a public 
characterizes its world. These worlds, however, are not without contention; rather it is 
through conflict that these worlds are negotiated. As Nancy Fraser puts it, “There is no 
way to know in advance whether the outcome of a deliberative process will be the 
discovery of a common good in which conflicts of interest evaporate as merely apparent 
or, rather, the discovery that conflicts of interest are real and the common good is 
chimerical,” indicating that there are many kinds of worlds that public may come to agree 
on (72). Hauser agrees that "disagreement is inevitable in serious and enriching 
conversation," but notes that interlocutors must agree that "they are in the same world," 
demonstrating one possible manifestation of the stasis of definition and suggesting that 
shared commonplaces may be a key feature of a public (66). The need for shared 
commonplaces is supported by Warner’s argument that no single text creates a public but 
rather "the concatenation of texts through time": "Only when a previously existing 
discourse can be supposed, and when a responding discourse can be postulated, can a text 
address a public" (90). However, a single text can serve to manifest a public; publics 
often become apparent through their responses to a single text, event, or individual. Over 
time, these manifestations may reveal the evolution of a public as its responses to texts 
adapt to shifting ideologies, values, and topoi.  
 As we adopt these theories of publics into public rhetoric, one important issue for 
rhetoricians to consider is the relationship between publics and our heretofore theorized 
audiences. Warner’s characterization of the relationship between publics and those who 
would address them brings to mind Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford’s argument regarding 
the recursive and cross-constituting nature of the audience invoked and the audience 
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addressed. Arguably, the move away from audiences to publics mirrors the shift from 
rhetorical situation to rhetorical ecologies as a result of the rise of circulation studies 
outlined below. However, I argue that it is productive to consider publics through the lens 
of our theories regarding audience, namely Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s universal audience and Kenneth Burke’s identification. 
 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s universal audience theorizes the inventional 
role of the invoked audience in the composition process, indicating that “this refers […] 
not to an experimentally proven fact, but to a universality and unanimity imagined by the 
speaker” (31). They explain, “Philosophers always claim to be addressing such an 
audience, not because they hope to obtain the effective assent of all men – they know 
very well that only a small minority will ever read their works – but because they think 
that all who understand the reasons they give will have to accept their conclusions.” 
Rhetors, then, construct what they presume to be best reasons based on what they 
imagine the universal audience accepting as best reasons, and each universal audience is 
unique to its rhetor: “Everyone constitutes the universal audience from what he knows of 
his fellow man, in such a way as to transcend the few oppositions he is aware of. Each 
individual, each culture, has thus its own conception of the universal audience” (33). It is 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s explanation of the interaction between concrete 
audiences and the concept of universal audience that is most useful when considering 
publics: “We believe, then, that audiences are not independent of one another, that 
particular concrete audiences are capable of validating a concept of the universal 
audience which characterizes them” (35). When rhetors find that their conception of the 
universal audience has led to success with a concrete audience, they more staunchly 
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adhere to that conception. Similarly, a rhetor who wishes to address a public may find 
that her conception of the social identity of this public leads to an amenable circulatory 
fate for her argument, reifying the social identity of this public in her own mind as well as 
among its members. 
 Burke’s theory of identification also helps us understand the relationship between 
a public’s social identity and a rhetor wishing to persuade members of that public. Burke 
argues that “you persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language, by speech, 
gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his […] And you 
give the ‘signs’ of such consubstantiality by deference to an audience’s ‘opinions’” (55). 
Because this demonstration of consubstantiality is necessary to persuasion, “the 
rhetorician may have to change an audience’s opinion in one respect; but he can succeed 
only insofar as he yields to that audience’s opinions in other respects” (56). However, 
these displays of consubstantiality, as Burke calls it, are only part of the nature of 
identification, as his example of the shepherd and the butcher demonstrates. Through this 
example, Burke argues that identification can happen through material means if not 
ideological ones; while the shepherd may care for the sheep until they are sold to the 
butcher and find what the butcher does distasteful, as long as the shepherd profits from 
the butcher’s practices, the shepherd and the butcher are both identified with the slaughter 
of sheep. As Jenny Rice explains, “Though the shepherd and the butcher have very 
different goals, they identify with a common act. The obvious difference is that the 
shepherd and the butcher do not feel the same way about their relations” (48). Warner's 
conception of attention as the only requirement for joining a public seems to work 
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similarly: no matter how one feels about what one is paying attention to, one has, for 
better or worse, joined the public of that text. 
 While other scholars may find it productive to continue to maintain the distinction 
between publics and audiences, I find it more useful to consider the two in tandem as it 
opens up new ways of understanding the interactions between individuals and groups, 
especially in an online context. Warner initially argues that online discourse moved too 
rapidly for any kind of meaningful public to be generated. Byron Hawk argues that 
publics may emerge online “but this process requires some alterations to Warner's sense 
of time, especially punctuality, in order to make the case” (168). Additionally, 
understanding how publics emerge online requires rethinking attention as well as 
punctuality; Internet users are inundated with texts vying for information often before 
they can reach or as part of the texts they want to see. For example, Facebook gives a list 
of “Trending” topics as a sidebar on each user’s homepage. If I glance at this list to see an 
entry on Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie, is this enough attention to make me part of the 
celebrity news public for which entries like this are intended? Or must I actually click on 
the link? Furthermore, as we will see in the next section, the giving of attention is an 
emotionally and ideologically determined act, suggesting that this most basic requirement 
for joining a public is more complex than publics scholars have given it to be. 
 
Emotion in Public Rhetoric 
One recent development in public rhetorical theory is a renewed interested in the 
role of emotion in public deliberation beyond surface appeals to pathos. While appeals to 
pathos continue to play in important role in political texts, scholars have begun to inquire 
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into the emotional positions that are at work prior to the reception of a text that interact 
with these pathetic appeals in persuasion, noting that these emotional states are often 
identified with particular ideologies held by individuals. As Laura Micciche puts it, 
Isn't the very process of deliberation already an emotioned one, already 
bound up with attachments we have to a way of seeing or conceptualizing 
an issue? In other words, how we think about what constitutes evidence 
and grounds for an argument -- indeed, how we come to decide that an 
issue deserves to be “argued” – already shaped by our emotional 
investments in how things ought to be. (3)  
 
Sharon Crowley exemplifies this turn in her analysis of the argument styles of the 
Christian Right and their liberal opponents. Drawing on psychological studies of emotion 
and attention, Crowley writes, 
One of the one hand, we pay attention to events or objects that arouse 
more intense emotional reactions, thus singling them out from the array of 
other potential stimulants in the environment. On the other hand, belief 
can affect the attribution of emotional responses to objects or events [...] 
The relative intensity of an emotional response can either alter or reinforce 
belief. Thus emotion and belief can constitute a feedback loop. (83) 
 
The importance of this feedback loop in public deliberation is “the resulting affect may 
seem to underwrite the empirical truth of whatever conclusion is drawn,” (88) such as 
when a person expresses her adherence to a choice because it “feels right.” The networks 
of affect that Crowley describes are part of the larger working of ideologics, which she 
defines as "connections made between and among moments (positions) that occur or are 
taken up within ideology" (60). She contrasts ideologic with reason, positing that 
ideologic allows us to account for arguments based on “belief, passion, values, and 
desires” as opposed to empirical evidence. 
Crowley is not the only one to argue for different understanding – one that 
highlights the underlying patterns – of the emotional aspects of public debate. While 
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Crowley turns to psychology, Catherine Chaput draws on economic analogies to argue 
that "just like economic value, rhetorical value is achieved through the circulation of its 
many transhistorical and transsituational exchanges and just as money measure economic 
value, affect measures rhetorical value" (14). Chaput writes that "affect, in the form of 
something as taken for granted as a gut sense, exerts pressure on our decision making and 
does not crumble under the deliberative weight of better arguments or more information" 
(8). Chaput goes on to argue that under neoliberalism, which takes advantage of affective 
energies, we must consider "rationality" anew; she illustrates this point by describing an 
individual who opposes Obama's tax redistribution plan because it would benefit lazy 
people and burden hard working citizens. When he is confronted with arguments that tax 
redistribution would affect only the wealthiest, he counters by renouncing his concerns 
with his own economic self-interest and instead couches them in terms of the national 
economy. Chaput writes,  
He does not dislike Obama because he is thinking only of his economic 
self-interest, or because he’s unhappy about the way economic self-
interest is discursively represented by the Obama campaign, or because he 
lacks information, or because he’s irrational. With a clear voice, a sincere 
tone, and after carefully listening to Pelosi, the man maintains his distrust 
of Obama because of deeply affective energies attached to notions about 
economic competition that literally prevent him from communicating with 
those who do not share his understanding of how the world works, 
precluding him, in fact, from connecting with others and entertaining new 
possibilities. (17)  
 
One important implication of this reexamination of emotion is that we must 
reconsider our conceptions of agency. Chaput argues that “conceptualizing discursive 
practices as a form of labor rather than a form of political signification [with its attendant 
questions of political agency] sidesteps anxiety about well-chosen language and 
emphasizes the life-affirming activity involved in deciphering issues, inventing new paths 
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through those issues, and communicating new ideas to others” (2). That is, the time and 
effort that individuals invest in political discourse can be valuable to them without 
material manifestations of political change; individuals may feel like agents just through 
participation in the discourse. 
While Hauser and Warner agree that attention is all that is required for 
membership in a public, Crowley and Chaput’s examination of the role that emotion 
plays in attention indicates that the simple act of paying attention has its own ideological 
constraints. If, as Crowley argues, emotional connection is key in drawing one’s attention 
to discourse, Burke’s notion of identification becomes an interesting aspect of the 
constitution of publics. Arguably, the appropriate connections between emotion and 
attention for a particular public are part of the “commonplaces [that] are known to all 
who participate in the communal discourse in which they circulate” (Crowley 71). As 
Micciche argues, the performance of emotion, even genuinely felt ones, is a rhetorical act 
insofar as "only through collective, implicit assent in communal life does emotion have 
meaning, for here is where identification of emotion is ascribed to expression and 
perception" (11). As such, the feeling and consequent performance of the appropriate 
emotion in reaction to a text is a manifestation of one’s ideologic as well as a 
performance of identification with that ideologic.  
 
Identification and Ethos in Social Media 
 The interactions between emotion and identification online become especially 
apparent in the context of social media. As digital democracy scholars such as Manuel 
Castells and Geert Lovink have found, sites like Facebook and Twitter have become 
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instrumental in how users experience public debate and political action, both their 
construction and reception, and serve as a primary means of circulation for digital texts. 
Moreover, social media has affected how individuals, both public figures and private 
persons, present themselves to the wider world. As part of their larger outline of the 
multiple facets of political rhetoric online, Barbara Warnick and David S. Heinemann 
examine the use of social media by political candidates in the 2010 midterm election, 
finding that while candidates continued to perform identification with their voting base, 
social media and the voters who use it often determined what that performance should 
look like. Warnick and Heineman write, “Social media require that candidates become 
more open about those categories of their life that are deemed relevant by voters and by 
the organizing principles of the sites they use. Their success in approaching 
consubstantiality has much to do with their command of the expectations of both the 
audiences and those virtual spaces in which they meet them” (102). Candidates who 
treated social media as an extension of their campaign website, largely posting the same 
information, fared worse among voters than did candidates who posted more 
personal/personable information like family photos or anecdotes from the campaign trail, 
suggesting that social media is shaping the kinds of evidence voters are evaluating in 
determining a candidate’s credibility, and perhaps indicates that the structures of 
participation of social media spaces – which privilege “authenticity” – have predisposed 
users to expect different kinds of evidence or to evaluate this evidence differently.  
What does or does not count as evidence of credibility to different groups is 
affected by and in turn affects circulation. In some cases, ethos precedes, capacitates, and 
accelerates circulation, but in others circulation precedes ethos, especially in communities 
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of group-authorship, such as wikis or forums. Within these communities, users build their 
credibility through what might be viewed as a system of meritocracy insofar as 
individuals are evaluated apart from identity markers or social attachments. Laura Gurak 
and Judith Donath find that one’s contributions to the community – especially 
contributions that are “of the kind admired by the group” – are the primary factor in 
establishing ethos (Donath 31), a point that Axel Bruns later expands upon. Bruns writes 
that “participants who consistently make […] unusable contributions will […] themselves 
drift to the outside of the community, although those found to be usually worthy 
contributors will rise to greater prominence among their peers” (25). Bruns goes on to say 
that “leadership is determined through the continuous communal evaluation of the 
participants and their ideas, and through the degree of community merit they are able to 
build in the process,” calling these communities “ad hoc meritocracies” (26).  
These arguments about the Internet as a meritocracy have been used to support 
notions of the Internet as an ultimately democratic space where one’s ethos built on one’s 
contributions is enough for a person to accomplish rhetorical tasks. What Bruns fails to 
take into account, however, is ideological structures guiding what users find “usable,” 
“productive,” or “valuable,” as well as the forms such contributions must take. For 
example, Wikipedia, while presenting a space for the democratization of knowledge, has 
long been criticized for the overwhelming majority of white, male editors, which 
contributes to the dominance of a Western notion of “objectivity” as intrinsic to good 
knowledge production and curation. This problem becomes particularly noticeable in the 
controversy that may surround issues of gender and sexuality, such as the banning of a 
number of feminist editors for their contributions to the “GamerGate Controversy” 
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Wikipedia page (Hern). In addition to these ideological constraints, Bruns neglects the 
role that circulation may play in making one solution to a community problem appear as 
the only solution; as Gurak puts it, “Postings that appeal to community standards and are 
perceived as important, true, and credible will […] be reposted widely and quickly. Those 
participants who do not agree are left on the side, and there is nothing inherent in the 
structure of the Internet itself to suggest otherwise” (259). Posts that reflect community 
values will be widely circulated, and with this circulation, they will reify that these are, in 
fact, the values of this community, thereby diminishing the ethos of dissidents within the 
community. 
 The interactions between ethos and circulation may become especially convoluted 
as texts travel globally. Mary Queen’s study of representations of Middle Eastern 
feminist groups by Western women “reveals the complexity of the intersections among 
global and digital production and consumption of meaning, as well as the process through 
which the global circulation of digital representations becomes rhetorical and, ultimately, 
political actions” (472). Focusing on the Revolutionary Association of Women of 
Afghanistan (RAWA), Queen examines the ways in which RAWA identified itself with 
Western neoliberal feminist principles, making it popular for Western circulation, before 
noting examples of Western-authored texts that were eventually attributed to RAWA, 
giving them additional ethos as representing the perspectives of RAWA (and therefore, 
problematically, Afghan women in general). Queen’s study demonstrates the importance 
of considering not just online texts but also their circulation and reappropriation as we 
consider their rhetorical effects. Sara Ahmed’s notion of stickiness helps explain the ways 
in which texts may accumulate affective value(s) – perhaps never intended by the initial 
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rhetor – through the course of their circulation, influencing audience perceptions of both 
the texts and the rhetor(s) attached to them, including, as Crowley notes, the most basic 
act of paying attention. As such, we much consider that texts that might have no meaning 
for an audience in its initial publication, perhaps because of the initial rhetor, may 
suddenly attain meaning in the course of its recirculation due to the new affective values 
that have been accumulated in the course of its travels. 
 
Circulation 
While circulation has been considered in conjunction with a number of rhetorical 
concerns, it has more recently become an area of inquiry unto itself. In her 2013 article 
“Iconographic Tracking,” Laurie E. Gries identifies circulation studies as “an 
interdisciplinary approach to studying discourse in motion” in which “scholars 
investigate not only how discourse is produced and distributed, but also how once 
delivered, it circulates, transforms, and affects change through its material encounters” 
(333). The exigency for this research, much of which has been published since 2002, is 
two-fold. The publication of an abbreviated version of Michael Warner’s “Publics and 
Counterpublics” in a 2002 issue of The Quarterly Journal of Speech as part of a forum on 
the essay prompted communications scholars to study circulation as constitutive part of 
publics, and the articles in a recent special issue of Rhetoric and Public Affairs on 
circulation indicate that this is still very much the case. For rhetoric and composition 
scholars, circulation studies is largely taken up as part of new media studies more 
generally; James E. Porter’s 2009 call for the study of circulation as an aspect of digital 
delivery is characteristic of this turn. Scholars have examined the circulation of images 
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(Gries; Hariman and Lucaites; Inabinet; O’Rourke), video (Atkinson; Dubisar and 
Palmeri; Lewis), and sound (Foley; Hawk) as well as alphabetic text (Black; Collins; 
Edbauer; Queen; Ridolfo; Trimbur) in both digital and physical spaces. 
Following Warner’s claim that publics are constituted by the circulation of texts 
over time, several scholars have sought to reconfigure our understanding of public 
rhetoric, largely by rethinking the rhetorical situation first posited by Lloyd Bitzer. 
Ronald Walter Greene argues that “the rhetorical situation fails to provide a model for a 
public because in order to be a public, discourse needs to keep circulating beyond its 
concrete situation” (437). Likewise, Chaput argues that the rhetorical situation is unable 
to account for “capitalism’s ability to cross boundaries, change its identification 
strategies, and thrive within the overdetermined spaces of contemporary neoliberalism” 
(10). Jenny Edbauer posits rhetorical ecologies as a new framework for “theorizing 
public rhetorics (and rhetoric’s publicness) as a circulating ecology of effects, 
enactments, and events” (9). By moving away from the limitations of the rhetorical 
situation, scholars can more fully account for both the initial publications of text and their 
various re-publications, appropriations, and remixes as well, as Edbauer demonstrates 
through her examples of the “Keep Austin Weird” campaign and its spin-offs. Chaput 
argues that “Edbauer’s rhetorical ecology allows us to replace our liberal belief in the 
social world as a collection of sites that add up to some rational whole – the rhetorical 
situation – with a neoliberal understanding of the social as a living totality of events that 




Scholars have also turned to Burke’s notion of identification to understand 
circulation, demonstrating that circulation often reaffirms and reconstitutes group 
identities. In his examination of the circulation of Jacksonian political cartoons, Brandon 
Inabinet argues that the "simple solutions, even ironically violent ones," presented in the 
lithographs serve to shore up identifications thrown into turmoil by economic panic 
(661). Lynn C. Lewis highlights the roles that speed plays in the creation and perceived 
value of memes, arguing that the use of typed identities (just as one might find in political 
cartoons) contributes to the viralness of memes through audiences’ identification with and 
against them. In her extended examination of the Star Wars Kid meme, Lewis finds that 
audiences identified both negatively ("look at this dumb nerd") and positively ("this is 
something my friends and I would do") in their responses. Often these identifications 
become apparent in the commentary that individuals supply as they recirculate a text, as 
Joel Penney and Caroline Dadas find in their examination of Twitter use by Occupy Wall 
Street protesters. 
Other scholars note the ways in which re-publications and reappropriations often 
bring the text that may be considered alternative or radical back in line with dominant 
ideologies regarding race, class, and gender. In her analysis of The Account of Hester Ann 
Rogers, the published version of the journal of a devout Methodist woman and close 
friend of John Wesley, Vicki Tolar Collins finds that the supplementary materials 
included in subsequent editions of the book serve to reaffirm dominant beliefs that the 
place of a religious woman is the domestic sphere, while the core text by Rogers suggests 
otherwise. Likewise, Jason Edward Black’s analysis of the appropriation of Chief Seattle 
by white environmentalists highlights the "substantive maneuverings, retrofits, and 
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commodifications" involved in rhetorical circulation and demonstrates the ways that 
circulation by colonizers may negatively affect the ethos of the colonized rhetor by 
usurping the original context of the text (637). Benjamin Lee and Edward LiPuma argue 
that these “cultures of circulation,” whether understood as radical or supporting the status 
quo, “are created and animated by the cultural forms that circulate through them, 
including – critically – the abstract nature of the forms that underwrite and propel the 
process of circulation itself” (192). Expanding on Warner, Lee and LiPuma go on to 
write,  
The circulation of such forms – whether the novels or newspapers of the 
imagined community or the equity-based derivatives and currency swaps 
of the modern market – always presupposes the existence of their 
respective interpretive communities, with their own forms of interpretation 
and evaluation. These interpretive communities determine the lines of 
interpretation, found institutions, and set boundaries based principally on 
their own internal dynamics. 
 
While it reasserts the world-making properties of circulation and publics that Warner 
presents with an eye toward the economic as well as the textual, Lee and LiPuma’s 
statement also reasserts the need for rhetorical scholars to consider the relationship 
between publics and audiences, as these interpretive communities they describe do much 
of the work attributed to audiences. 
Rhetoric scholars have posited a number of heuristics and methods for the study 
of circulation. In order to examine the representations of Middle Eastern women most 
commonly taken up by Western feminists, Queen posits a methodology of rhetorical 
genealogy, which she defines as “a process of examining digital texts not as artifacts of 
rhetorical production, but rather, as continually evolving rhetorical actions that are 
materially bound, actions whose transformation can be traced through the links embedded 
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within multiple fields of circulation” (476). Queen focuses on the “multiple processes 
structuring representation, rather than seek[ing] to identify the original intentions or final 
effects of structured (and thus already stabilized) representations.” Rhetorical genealogy 
calls particular attention to ideological structures of participation that govern the 
circulation of particular representations and the elision of others.  
Rather than focusing primarily on the ideological constraints on circulation, Jim 
Ridolfo’s heuristic of rhetorical velocity allows scholars to also taken into account the 
materialities of circulation as well. In his and Danielle DeVoss’s 2009 article, rhetorical 
velocity is defined as “a conscious rhetorical concern for distance, travel, speed, and 
time, pertaining specifically to theorizing instances of strategic appropriation by a third 
party.” They outline rhetorical velocity as concerned with both how best to get the 
original text to an audience (What file format is going to be easiest for others to access? 
How should I tag this video to make it search friendly?) and how best to allow that 
audience to then remix the text (What file formats are easiest to manipulate? How might I 
organize the information to make it easy to excerpt?). While the initial set of questions 
has been a long time concern of delivery in the context of public rhetoric, the latter is 
largely specific to digital compositions and remix-oriented culture. Ridolfo argues that 
text-based analysis, while useful, is not sufficient for scholars to gain a complete picture 
of circulation. He adds to “delivery” and “circulation” the category of “distribution” in 
order to more fully flesh out the representation of the relationships among the rhetor, the 
audience, and the text that one may perceive when one includes ethnographic research 
methods such as interview and observation. 
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While Ridolfo argues that ethnographic methods are better suited for determining 
the process of digital composers, Gries supplies a method of data collection that supports 
an understanding of representation, circulation, and rhetoric as constantly in flux. 
Drawing on principles of new materialism, Gries proposes a recursive approach to data 
collection and coding in digital environments that requires researchers to return to the 
digital search after their data coding indicates new potential search terms in order to more 
fully document the various remixes, appropriations, and re-publications of a text. Some 
researchers, both inside and outside the academy, have begun using large collections of 
publicly available data on social networking sites to track the circulation of news stories, 
hashtags, or conversations. For example, Medium.com’s i [heart] data collection features 
a number of studies responding to questions pertinent to rhetoricians. In his examination 
of the social media discussion surrounding the July-August 2014 conflict between Israel 
and Gaza, collection editor Gilad Lotan demonstrates that, rather than receiving a wide 
selection of opinions, social media users are most likely to see texts with which they 
already agree. Fellow contributor Suman Deb Roy seeks to elucidate the characteristics 
of a Facebook trending news story by examining the trending patterns of news stories 
related to the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong beginning in September 2014. These 
popular studies indicate the potential of big data analysis for a better understanding of 
circulation and public rhetoric, especially with regards to the role of mainstream media 





As much of this scholarship on circulation suggests, we must consider the 
circulation of individuals stories in the context of the circulation of larger cultural 
narratives and genres. At the same time, these two categories are often cross-constituting 
insofar as larger cultural narratives are often buoyed along by individual stories and 
individual stories are both invented and interpreted with regard to larger cultural 
narratives. Much work on the role of narrative in rhetoric and/or the rhetorical nature of 
narrative has highlighted this interplay between individual texts and the larger cultural 
stories from which they are drawn. 
 
The Narrative Paradigm  
A primary theory on the relationship between rhetoric and narrative is Walter R. 
Fisher’s narrative paradigm. At the center of the narrative paradigm is the argument that 
knowledge is “ultimately configured narratively, as a component in a larger story 
implying the being of a certain kind of person, a person with a particular worldview, with 
a specific self-concept, and with characteristic ways of relating to others” (17). Beginning 
by outlining a history of the split between logic, rhetoric, and poetics, Fisher paints 
narrative rationality in stark contrast to technical rationality, arguing that such distinctions 
are important in public moral arguments as technical rationality, which Fisher regards as 
the dominant voice in public debate, does not acknowledge reasoning based on values, a 
major shortcoming when debating the public good. Alternately, Fisher proposes a 
narrative rationality which is evaluated on “the principles of probability (coherence) and 
fidelity (truthfulness and reliability)” (47). Probability “is assessed in three ways: by its 
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argumentative or structural coherence [Does the story agree with itself?]; by its material 
coherence [Does the story agree with the audience’s previous experiences?]; and by 
characterological coherence [Are the characters involved, including the rhetor, acting in 
ways one would expect?]” (47, emphasis in original). Fidelity, on the other hand, is 
assessed using what Fisher calls the logic of good reasons, a heuristic that questions the 
validity and ethics of the values inherent in any message (108-10).  
A number of scholars have questioned the efficacy of Fisher’s theory, offering 
their own heuristics for understanding the interactions between narrative and rhetoric. 
Michael Calvin McGee and John S. Nelson, for example, criticize Fisher’s “deliberate 
contrast of reason to narrative, especially in public argument” (139). Rather than 
distinguishing between the relative dominance or merit of “technical” reasoning versus 
the narrative paradigm, McGee and Nelson argue that “what we need is to dispel the 
dichotomy: to understand and improve the place of narrative in rationality and of 
reasoning in storytelling” (145-6). They draw on Quintilian’s statements regarding the 
“narration of facts” to demonstrate the longstanding connections between rhetoric and 
narrative (as opposed to Fisher’s claims that “technical” reasoning is also “traditional”), 
noting the frequent translation of narratio as “statement” or “statement of facts” (148). 
John Louis Lucaites and Celeste Michelle Condit likewise turn to Quintilian to argue for 
a functional approach to narrative, as a structuralist approach may neglect the full range 
of narratives in favor of those that are clearly poetic in nature (104-5). They argue that the 
characteristics of various types of narratives – they acknowledge that their categories of 
dialectical, rhetorical, and poetic narratives are oversimplified but useful for offering a 
cursory examination – are often the product of their functions:  
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A rhetorical narrative [understood as the narratio of the classical oration] 
is a story that serves as an interpretive lens through which the audience is 
asked to view and understand the verisimilitude of the propositions and 
proof before it. Both content and form of the rhetorical narrative are thus 
subservient to the demands of the relationship between the specific 
audience to which it is addressed, the specific context in which it appears, 
and the specific gains toward which it strives. (94) 
 
Lucaites and Condit consequently find that rhetorical narratives are characterized by 
brevity, as they “must compel an audience to a favorable interpretation of the proofs for a 
case without taxing its members to weariness or disinterest with digressions or 
unnecessary details,” and univocality, as “the reasons and evidence they offer must […] 
be directed at proving a single interpretation of a claim to fact, value, or policy” (98). As 
opposed to Fisher’s principles of probability and fidelity, Lucaites and Condit find that 
“the ability of a narrative to from an interpretation of the proof and to move to audience 
to action is […] functionally contingent upon the speaker’s credibility,” resulting in “an 
inherent, formal unity of narrator, author, and speaker” (101). 
Warnick criticizes Fisher’s paradigm on a number of fronts, arguing that “the 
narrative paradigm lacks what Fisher calls ‘narrative probability,’ by which I take him to 
mean internal coherence” (“The Narrative Paradigm,” 172). She finds Fisher’s 
characterization of traditional rationality too “ambiguous and equivocal” for use in the 
assessment of texts and concludes, “What is disturbing about narrative rationality is that 
value choices are ultimately based on the critic’s personal preference but in the interim 
masquerade as something else – an ‘objective’ critical method that assures its consumers 
that a greater measure of ‘truth’ will be attained that in other critical systems” (181). 
Warnick, among others (Bennett and Edelman; Rowland; Kirkwood), worries that 
Fisher’s focus on stories that confirm audience’s self-conceptions is, in fact, detrimental 
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to public moral argument that Fisher seeks to encourage as it leaves little space or 
impetus for rhetors to introduce stories that fall outside an audience’s purview.  
One of the points of confusion brought to light in these criticisms by Warnick and 
others is whether we should understand Fisher’s narrative paradigm as descriptive – a 
model for explaining how a kind of persuasion happens in the world – or prescriptive – a 
model for how individuals should approach persuasion in the world. As Warnick’s 
criticisms indicate, there are aspects of both in Fisher’s work: while his case studies of 
Ronald Regan, Death of a Salesman, and Plato’s Gorgias suggest the former, much of his 
language regarding the logic of good reasons suggests the latter. As a prescriptive method 
presented as superior to other forms of reasoning, the narrative paradigm does have 
questionable aspects; however, it also offers a useful descriptive heuristic for 
understanding how audiences respond to and evaluate both explicit and implicit 
narratives. The descriptive value of the narrative paradigm is especially evident in 
Maurice Charland’s theory of constitutive rhetoric which builds on Fisher’s narrative 
paradigm by examining the ideological nature of narrative in relation to the interpellation 
of subjects. He argues that “the subject is constituted at the nodes of the narrative’s 
surface. What Walter Fisher terms ‘narrative probability’ is a formal and ideological 
constraint upon the subject's possibilities of being” (140). Moreover, “since narratives 
offer totalizing interpretations that ascribe transcendent meanings to individual acts, the 
maintenance of narrative consistency demands that a certain set of acts be chosen,” 
meaning that individuals are limited in both the roles and the act they may take based on 
what would be understood by themselves and perhaps by their audiences as narratively 
consistent (143). One advantage of Charland’s theory is its insights into situations where 
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the rhetor and the audience cannot be clearly distinguished in terms of who is persuading 
whom; instead, Charland presents cultural narratives as mutually produced texts that 
rhetors both draw on and create, since “subject positions are bequeathed by the past, by 
yesterday’s discourse” (147). As such, Charland argues that Fisher’s narrative fidelity, as 
both a site of rhetorical invention and a tool of interpretation, “has an ideological 
character, for the experiential ground to which narrative would be faithful are always 
already ideologically framed within the very being of the experiencing subject” (148). 
While Charland focuses on the rhetorical conception of the self, Robert Asen 
examines the role of narrative and imagination in the rhetorical conception of the other. 
Asen argues that collective imagining, “shape[d] through discursive engagement among 
interlocutors in contexts of varying structure, scope, and formality,” influences the 
perceptions of participants in public debate whether or not they are physically present 
(349). Moreover, “imagining affects participants in public discussion differently, often 
disadvantaging socially and historically marginalized people and groups while tacitly 
aiding the appeals of other” (347). Using the welfare debates of the 1980s, Asen 
demonstrates the relationships between imagining, representation, and counterpublics, 
suggesting that public imagination – as distinguished from representation – is a driving 
influence in the inclusion and exclusion of counterpublic discourse and agents in public 
debate. 
The persuasive nature of narratives is perhaps tied to their ability to evoke 
emotion. Charles A. Hill writes that recent research by psychologists in the area of 
vividness has found that "vivid language makes a persuasive message easier to 
comprehend and more likely to be remembered" (32). While Hill links vividness to the 
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immediacy of the rhetorical image, I would argue that we could also link this to narrative 
which, like an image, often makes abstract arguments more materially present to 
audiences. Moreover, like rhetorical images, frequently repeated narratives may become 
linked to particular values, and once this association is internalized, the narrative can 




 In considering the personal narrative’s role in moving abstract ideas into concrete 
terms, a number of scholars in rhetoric and composition have discussed personal writing 
as part of writing pedagogy (Spigelman; Paley; Tobin; Comfort; Banks; Sullivan) and of 
our own scholarship (Miller; Holdstein and Bleich; Hindman; Elbow; Brandt et al.). A 
common theme in this work is the interactions between identity and ethos in the personal 
narrative; it seems this genre, more so than others, forces us to confront the myth of the 
“authentic” self. As Candace Spigelman puts it, “we do not reproduce ourselves in 
writing; rather, as Aristotle suggests, we select strategically the most appropriate versions 
and representations to complete our rhetorical purposes while acknowledging as post-
modern thinkers our inability to access a stable, singular psychic core” (44). These 
interactions become even more complicated, as Asen indicates, for those marginalized 
groups about whom dominant narratives already circulate. These dominant narratives 
influence both the reading and writing of personal narratives; Lorraine D. Higgins and 
Lisa D. Brush find that welfare recipients frequently cast themselves in the stereotypical 
role of hero or victim as they tell their stories, roles with Higgins and Brush argue are not 
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subject positions viable for building ethos in the debate surrounding welfare as these 
subject positions are too easily discounted by mainstream audiences considering welfare 
policy.  
Dana Anderson offers one framework for understanding the relationship between 
identity and ethos in personal writing. Drawing extensively from Burke’s writings about 
identity, Anderson examines a number of autobiographical “conversion” stories in order 
to understand the role that presentation of identity plays in persuasion, writing that 
“concepts that can show more at work in the making of identity are an essential step 
toward more robust analysis – toward more fully appreciating identity’s argumentative 
value” (165). Anderson argues that, while the two terms are inherently connected, we 
should understand “ethos” and “identity” as separate constructions in the rhetorical text, 
that the presentation of an identity can be persuasive in and of itself. Anderson’s 
framework is useful in that it helps us grapple with that thin line between ethos and 
identity, and via her distinction between the “person” and the “character” of the rhetor, 
we may begin to understand identity as the representation of the self and ethos as the 
interpretation of that self by the audience through a value-laden framework. That is, 
certain identities may be deemed “good” or “right” by an audience because they adhere to 
the values that audience prizes; thus, that rhetor is perceived as credible. This may, in 
fact, be the case in Jeffrey T. Grabill and Stacey Pigg’s study of an online forum 
connected to a science museum blog in which participants are encouraged to respond to 
and engage with recent science news, such as the discussion about the HPV vaccine that 
serves as the focus of the analysis. They find that several participants in the HPV 
discussion use different constructions of identity, such as a teenager seeking more 
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information about side effects of the vaccine or a woman living with HPV, in order to 
steer the conversation to meet their needs, primarily to receive more information about 
both the vaccine and treatment for HPV. Other users find these presentations of identities 
to line up with their own values about one’s responsibility for and agency in one’s own 
health and consequently fulfill the rhetor’s requests. 
 Sherry Turkle has also written extensively about the construction of identity, but 
her work primarily examines constructions of identity online, with a particular focus on 
gender. Over the course of several case studies, Turkle elucidates the role that identity 
creation within the spaces of Role-Playing Games (RPGs) and Multi-User Dungeons 
(MUDs) plays in individuals’ constructions on their real-life (RL) selves. Turkle arrives 
at ultimately an ambiguous position: while some participants seem able to work through 
RL issues by taking up other subject positions in RPGs and especially MUDs (where 
anonymity is possible), others use the space reenact past problems without moving 
forward. What is telling about Turkle’s study is the ways in which RL and MUD life 
began to collapse for players, which in many ways offer a precursor for more 
contemporary experiences with social networking. That is, we may imagine Facebook, 
for example, as an MUD in which users are playing characters, except that social 
networking sites have the added patina of “authenticity,” meaning that audiences’ 
anticipate themselves to be reading/viewing genuine constructions; the outrage at 
discoveries of “catfishing” – the act of posing as another individual on Facebook and 
striking up a relationship with someone – attests to this assumption.   
 This question of “authenticity” is a frequent one in multimodal narrative 
composing practices. In their study of teenagers composing digital narratives, Birgit 
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Herzberg Kaare and Knut Lundby found that the composers attributed greater 
authenticity to autobiographical texts that included personal images and the composer’s 
own voice. For these teens as well as the users of Facebook, images carry a great deal of 
weight in verifying what is “real” or “authentic” in the construction of an identity. Of 
course, despite the confusion and outrage when a supposed autobiographical text proves 
to be false, users of social media are often well aware of themselves as constructing 
identities and self-narratives, and this discussion is often surrounded by questions of 
surveillance and privacy. In her study of Internet users’ perceptions of privacy, Miyase 
Christensen finds that many users hold “an understanding of privacy in which the issue is 
not whether one’s information is accessible, but by who, to what extent, and toward what 
gain or loss” (231, emphasis in original). In other words, users have taken a 
fundamentally rhetorical view of their information and its circulation, with careful 
attention to what may be gained or lost by circulating certain identities in certain spaces. 
Digital spaces frequently feature recursively constructed identities and narratives as 
rhetors revise existing texts or create new ones based on audience responses.  
 Sometimes, though, the careful construction of identity has little effect on how 
audiences receive particular texts. In her examination of the discourse surrounding breast 
cancer, Judy Z. Segal finds that audiences’ adherence to dominant narratives often results 
in the censure of rhetors presenting alternative narratives; individuals who complain 
about the difficulties of treatment, criticize the “warrior” metaphor so often applied to 
breast cancer patients, or indict carcinogen-producing industries are accused of having 
bad attitudes by other members of the breast cancer community. Like Charland, Segal 
finds that the stories that will be received positively by an audience are limited by that 
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audience’s ideological understanding of material surroundings; when audiences are 
confronted with stories that fall outside their experiences, they often dismiss such stories 
as failing according to their measures of narrative probability of fidelity.  
In her conclusion, Segal makes two statements about personal narratives in 
general. She writes, “I believe that personal stories have lost value recently by virtue of 
an excess of opportunity and exposure – a condition wrought, arguably, by commerce and 
the popularity of blogging […]. No one, including the narrators, benefits from the 
publication of these stories; meanwhile, the genre of the personal is diminished by its 
careless examples” (17). She continues, “The personal narrative can be the end of 
dialogue, a conversational trump card” (18). On the one hand, Segal’s two critiques seem 
counterintuitive: there are too many narratives out there for one to matter, and we overly 
value a single narrative so that it ends conversation. At the same time, we might 
understand her critiques as judging the use of personal narrative on both the macro and 
micro level. In instances of individual persuasion, one person’s narrative may prevent 
another from questioning or responding critically because personal experience is given a 
particular kind of weight in intimate settings. At the same time, it is extremely difficult 
for a private individual to reach a public with a personal narrative due to the 
overwhelming number of narratives that have taken up residency on the internet. We 
might also understand Segal as criticizing the participation structures for personal 
narratives in online spaces as reductive and strictly regulated. While she names blogging 
as one reason for the proliferation of narratives, she also mentions an ad campaign for 
hair care products that asks consumers “What’s your story?” While some participants tell 
stories related to the product, others told stories of abuse, addiction, and tragedy, but 
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these stories circulated in a commercial space that rendered them useless, or worse than 
useless, as Segal sees it, since the genre itself is “diminished” by such flippant use. The 
generic conventions of dominant cultural narratives become part of the structure of 
participation; one may only have her story circulate and matter if she follows the generic 
regulations. 
 
The Available Means of Imagination 
 As Segal’s work suggests, audiences for personal narratives are often limited in 
their interpretations of these narratives, resulting in some storytellers being discredited 
and others validated based on their adherence to the conventions of our dominant cultural 
narratives regarding a particular topic. We might understand this difficulty in evaluating 
alternative narratives – narratives that do not fit dominant conventions – as an 
insufficiency of imagination, an inability to think beyond the stock narratives one has 
been enculturated into considering “realistic.” “Narrative imagination,” as Martha 
Nussbaum calls this ability to engage with stories, “is an essential preparation for moral 
interaction. Habits of empathy and conjecture conduce to a certain type of citizenship and 
a certain form of community: one that cultivates a sympathetic responsiveness to 
another’s needs, and understands the way circumstances shape those needs, while 
respecting separateness and privacy” (90). However, when we have a limited number of 
narratives, we may be limited in empathetic responses due to the motivations we assume 
of individuals based on what we have gleaned from dominant cultural narratives. In many 
ways, expanding the available means of imagination through the acceptance of alternative 
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narratives into what one imagines as possible does for public audiences what Jacqueline 
Jones Royster and Gesa Kirsch propose “critical imagination” may do for scholars: 
“The idea is to account for what we ‘know’ by gathering whatever evidence can be 
gathered and ordering it in a configuration that is reasonable and justifiable in accord 
with basic scholarly methodologies,” or in accord with the principles of narrative 
probability and fidelity (71). “The next step,” they write, “is to think between, above, 
around, and beyond this evidence to speculate methodologically about probabilities, that 
is, what might likely be true based on what we have in hand,” and the more extensive 
one’s available means of imagination is, the less one is limited in those probabilities to 
dominant cultural narratives with their frequently sexist, heteronormative, ableist, and 
racist assumptions. 
 My primary reason for proposing the available means of imagination is to justify 
the study of circulation as a rhetorical end. It is difficult to determine the effects of a 
single text on the material world, but increasingly, rhetoricians are shying away from 
judging material effects as manifestations of agency in exchange for considering affective 
nature of agency, as Chaput demonstrates. The available means of imagination allows us 
to take wide circulation as a sign of the rhetorical success of a text even without material 
changes because it acknowledges that political change is an incremental process of 
changing the assumptions of individuals.  
 Secondly, the available means of imagination is a theory of invention and 
reception, of internally persuasive discourse as well as more formal, explicit situations of 
rhetoric. In this way, I take my understanding of rhetorical theory from Crowley: 
As ancients rhetors such as Gorgias and Cicero argued in theory and 
personified in practice, an art or practice entitled to be called “rhetoric” 
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must intervene in some way in the beliefs and practices of the community 
it serves. Hence any rhetorical theory must at minimum formulate an art of 
invention, as Aristotle did; furthermore, the arguments generated by 
rhetorical invention must be conceived as produced and circulated within a 
network of social and civic discourses, practices, images, and events. (27) 
 
The available means of imagination fits Crowley’s understanding of “rhetoric” by 
offering a theory of the recursive role of narratives, both dominant and alternative, in the 
invention of arguments as part of larger “social and civic discourses, practices, images, 
and events.” The recursive nature of imagination cannot be overstated, even as, in this 
section, I attempt to present its effects in a somewhat linear format, beginning with the 
work of interpretation of narratives, then moving onto the work of invention. 
 While Fisher’s work has been aptly criticized, I continue to find his heuristic for 
the interpretation of narratives useful in its descriptive capacity, especially in regard to 
personal narrative. We can see readers using the categories of structural coherence, 
material coherence, and characterological coherence based on the criticisms that they 
make of narratives. For example, a common move for discrediting a witness’s testimony 
in a court of law (or other venues trying to establish an account of past events) is to point 
out aspects of the witness’s story that do not agree with each other, demonstrating 
evaluation of structural coherence. Similarly, audiences will question aspects of a story 
that do not line up with their own experiences, or its material coherence, such as men 
who argue that street harassment doesn’t happen because they never see it. 
Characterological coherence, or whether or not the rhetor would in fact do or say the 
things she claims, comes into play when evaluating the stories of people the audience 
knows personally (or at least feels like they do, as tabloid journalism encourages exactly 
this kind of evaluation of celebrities). In addition, characterological coherence may be 
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evaluated based on archetypes, such as when audiences wonder how a doctor, who is 
sworn to promote life, can perform euthanasia. 
 As Charland points out, these categories of evaluation – our internal rubrics for 
coherence – interact with each other and with our ideological viewpoints. This is most 
obvious, perhaps, with material coherence, as what audiences imagine as possible in the 
narrative depends on their own experiences of what is possible – thus, some men have 
trouble understanding the pervasive nature of street harassment. However, what feels 
structurally coherent is likewise ideologically limited; Higgins and Brush found that their 
participants writing stories about being welfare recipients tended toward hero or victim 
narratives because those are narrative structures that seem coherent. The ideological 
implications for characterological coherence based on archetype is obvious, given that 
different audiences will hold different assumptions about a given archetype, but the 
characterological coherence of an action taken by a person one knows will be colored by 
whether or not one perceives that action as good or bad, just or unjust, productive or 
futile, etc. Conversely, one’s actions might be judged as good or bad, etc., depending on 
how audiences perceive the actor, as in Chaput’s example of the interviewee seems 
determined to paint all of Obama’s reforms as harmful (17).  
In discussing characterological coherence online, I believe it is best to make 
certain distinctions between identity and ethos, much like Anderson in her examination of 
memoir. While the root word “character” has particular connotations for a “narrative” 
framework, it may also bring to mind for rhetoricians the definition of ethos as the 
character of the speaker. This understanding may be well and good if we take ethos to be 
solely based on what is in the text at hand, as Aristotle did, but Warnick points out quite 
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quickly that the ancient understanding of ethos is insufficient for digital environments 
where the construction of an ethos or ethoi over time may be documented (Rhetoric 
Online, 34). This is, of course, not necessarily a phenomenon restricted to digital spaces; 
politicians have long been held accountable for previous voting records, for example. 
However, in digital spaces and especially with the advent of social media, more 
individuals are establishing public identities that can be seen as developing over time. 
Moreover, these identity constructions are happening across a number of sites, often with 
different audiences in mind, and may or may not be explicitly networked (such as 
connecting a personal website to one’s Facebook profile or connecting one’s Twitter 
account to a LinkedIn profile). 
 This fragmentation of identity, however, is not always perceived by audience 
members as a fragmentation of ethos, given our longstanding myth of the unified self. 
Ethos, I would argue, is what happens when an audience interprets a manifestation of 
identity. While Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca avoid using the term ethos in deference to 
Aristotle’s definition, their account of the interactions between a person and his acts in 
others’ perceptions of him as a rhetor form the backbone for our modern understanding of 
ethos as well as, perhaps, another theory of characterological coherence. Consequently, 
audiences perceive fragmented digital identities as multi-nodal ethoi – or bits of identity 
scattered across the web that are interpreted as a unified ethos – to the benefit or, more 
often, detriment of the rhetor. While public figures often invest time in constructing 
coherent identities across platforms, private individuals often do not or even purposefully 
separate these identities and their intended audiences.1 
                                                          
1. For example, because I have Facebook friends from a variety of religious and political 
backgrounds, I avoid discussing politics on Facebook beyond the most hedged statements. On Twitter, on 
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 My point here is that the characterological coherence of digital texts and texts that 
circulate digitally is dependent on the outside knowledge that an audience member has. 
Again, like with development of ethos over time, this is not necessarily a phenomenon 
limited to digital spaces – whether or not one deems the actions of an acquaintance as 
characterologically coherent will depend on how much one knows of the person – but 
what is different is the degree to which this scattered bits of identity can be found and 
collected via Internet searches. Thus, as we will see in my examination of viral blog post 
“I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother,” a narrator/rhetor may be found characterologically 
coherent within the confines of one text but may be criticized for lack of coherence or 
hypocrisy when previous texts are taken into account by readers.  
 Like characterological coherence, evaluations of material coherence will often 
depend on how much contextualizing knowledge an individual has at her disposal. While 
Fisher notes personal experiences as a rubric for these evaluations, we must also consider 
the repertoire of narratives that individuals and groups accept without having experienced 
them for themselves, something akin to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Segal 
highlights one example of this with the pink ribbon rhetoric that surrounds breast cancer, 
influencing how individuals without direct experience with the disease imagine what 
patients, survivors, and their families feel and do. As Asen points out in the welfare 
debate, these imagined narratives in turn influence how individuals discuss issues 
involving the group in question, whether or not that group is present. The recursive nature 
of this phenomenon – that our ideas of what narratives are possible are dependent on 
                                                          
the other hand, I am more likely to perform my feminist, socialist, anti-racist diatribes as I don’t have to 
worry about my mother reading them. The irony of this is, of course, that while my Facebook account is 
somewhat protected from random viewers, my Twitter feed is public, reflecting Christensen’s assertion that 
social media users have complicated and contextually-based understandings of privacy. 
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what narratives we hear and accept as valid and that what narratives we accept as valid 
will be evaluated based on what narratives we have already heard – is at the heart of 
William G. Kirkwood’s criticism of Fisher’s narrative paradigm. Kirkwood writes, 
“Fisher’s account of rhetoric and moral argument might prove useful in predicting how 
specific audiences will evaluate stories. However, it is also troubling, for it implies that 
‘good stories’ cannot and perhaps should not exceed people’s values and beliefs, whether 
or not these are admirable or accurate” (30). He goes on to argue that “Although any 
account of rhetoric should acknowledge its role in expressing the shared values of a 
culture, a complete account must do more than this. It must also explain how rhetors can 
acquaint people with new and unsuspected possibilities of being and acting in the world” 
(31). Using the term “the rhetoric of possibility,” Kirkwood outlines the ways in which 
narratives – taking folk tales as his primary examples – may suggest new ways of being 
in and interacting with the world around us. He pays particular attention to the many 
obstacles that rhetors may need to overcome to make audiences aware of the new 
possibilities they present. The uptake of new kinds of narratives is additionally inhibited 
by the affective nature of attention. As Crowley reminds us, a person pays attention to a 
narrative in the first place because it elicits an emotional reaction, especially when 
narratives can be easily interpreted by her already-held belief system. Crowley writes that 
densely articulated ideologies construct bad affective grammarians who 
pay intense notice to objects and events that can be threaded into the 
intricate tapestries of their belief system(s). They notice because almost 
everything that is made legible by their belief system(s) is weighty with 
affect for them. If this account is correct, extremists have difficulty taking 
notice of events or objects that neither support nor attack their beliefs. (85) 
 
While Crowley is inquiring specifically into fundamentalist Christianity, “densely 
articulate ideologies” abound, even among positions deemed “moderate” or 
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“progressive”; while I may consider my ideology of feminism morally superior to 
another’s misogyny, it does just as much to determine what I do and do not see based on 
my emotional reactions. Moreover, as Ahmed argues, objects and signs, including 
narratives, become imbued with affective meaning as they circulate and are appropriated 
by various rhetors, meaning that when and where attention is paid by different audiences 
may change over time. 
Kirkwood concludes that when uncommon narratives and/or interpretations of 
narratives are accepted, it is usually on the basis of the rhetor’s ethos:  
When commentary reveals possibilities that cannot be derived from the 
immanent facts of an account, auditors can judge the merits of the 
commentary on two grounds. If it confirms their pre-existing beliefs, they 
may agree with it. Then, however, they are not gaining new insights. If 
commentary raises unfamiliar possibilities which are neither confirmed 
nor denied in their beliefs or experience, auditors can choose to accept the 
commentator’s word that she or he can perceive these possibilities. To do 
so they must judge whether the commentator is reliable. This does not 
lessen the aesthetic or logical value of commentary, but it shows the limits 
of narrative rationality and reinforces the idea that some kinds of 
storytelling rely heavily on the ethos of the narrator. (41-2) 
 
If audiences accept the rhetor’s assessment that these new possibilities are, in fact, 
possible, then new narratives are added to their available means of imagination. The 
ideological judgments an audience will necessarily make about these narratives will 
continue to influence how the audience interprets arguments based on them, but at the 
very least, the expansion of “reality” also expands the possibilities for debate. 
Additionally, since these narratives are “sticky,” to use Ahmed’s term, they carry with 
them affective meanings but may also have new affective meanings impressed upon them 
in the course of circulation; Ahmed writes that “the more signs circulate, the more 
affective they become” (45). This suggests that narratives added to the available means of 
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imagination increase the rhetorical and affective positions available to an individual or 
group, perhaps then adding to the kinds of narrative to which one may pay attention. In 
this way, we can see the interactions between the affective values of larger cultural 
narratives and the emotions of individual stories, including appeals to pathos: while 
dominant cultural narratives unequivocally influence an audience’s position in relation to 
individual narratives, individual narratives, once accepted by an audience, may influence 
their perception of and affective relation to cultural narratives. Consequently, while 
audiences may not necessarily express new positions in debate regarding the issues of the 
narrative at hand, their affective position in relation to it may shift and change over time 
as they are exposed to more narratives, perhaps priming audiences to consider favorably 
new narratives, new positions, and new rhetors, or to even consider them at all.  
 
Narrative and New Materialist Methods 
While living in a time when the things most likely to spread on the Internet are cat 
videos can make anyone skeptical of the political power of circulation, a theory of the 
available means of imagination articulates why wide circulation of a narrative, even one 
met with substantial criticism, has an effect on political discourse. The question then, for 
rhetoricians, is what narratives circulate and why. This is, in fact, the central question of 
this dissertation. In order to best account for the circulation of the individual personal 
narratives that form the basis of my case studies alongside (and sometimes through) the 
attendant affective structures and ideologics, I turn to Gries's new materialist methods. As 
Gries explains, "Things, especially in a digital age, simply, or rather complexly, flow. We 
need methods that can explain how new media practices enable things to experience 
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reproduction and distribution and thus circulate widely at viral speeds. We especially 
must better account for how digital technologies, participatory media platforms, and 
various actor networks contribute to the circulation and transformation of things in both 
digital and physical realms" (Still Life with Rhetoric, 8). While Gries focuses on the 
transformation and reproduction of images, much of her work is applicable to narrative, 
in particular if we think of individual personal narratives as transformations and 
reproductions of cultural narratives, as well as considering the retellings rhetors may 
perform of the stories of others for their own rhetorical ends. Perhaps most important for 
a study of digital circulation is that new materialist methods understand agency as 
emergent through the relations between human and nonhuman entities, treating the social 
networks and structures of participation that promote circulation with equal weight as the 
human actors (68). 
I have used "a new materialist rhetorical approach" in the case studies that follow, 
which "privileges following, tracing, embracing uncertainty, and describing in order to 
construct the empirical evidence needed to learn how single multiple things become 
rhetorical as they reassemble collective life" (88). These case studies began when a 
personal narrative or news event related to one came onto my radar, frequently via social 
media. Much like Gries describes in relation to the Obama Hope image, I began a process 
of searching for the responses to these narratives, clipping web pages, following links, 
performing multiple searches with different key terms, even looking at newspapers on 
microfilm in one case. As I developed my collections, I avoided evaluating the content of 
the texts I collected, instead opting to gather as much as possible before examining the 
texts in any detail. I also avoided evaluating the “credibility” of any source, treating 
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anonymous authors and usernames with the same weight as journalists and documented 
experts. Gries writes that “to keep up with a runaway object or a body multiple such as a 
viral image [or narrative], scholars much relinquish their own control to a certain extent 
and be flexible enough to follow the thing under study wherever it takes them,” and by 
focusing first on collection, I allowed myself to roam through the Internet before 
applying overly deterministic interpretive frameworks that might limit my search (91). 
Following this collection stage, I began examining the texts I collected in more detail, 
reading specifically for common narratives or arguments regarding the personal narrative 
that served as the origin point or regarding the context, arguments, or author of that 
narrative. As categories of common narratives emerged, I returned to searching with more 
detailed key terms or with specific gaps in mind that I wished to fill.  
Because I wished to focus on the most common interpretations and meta-
narratives of the original personal narrative, these case studies feature little analysis of 
individual texts, instead relying on thick descriptions of reactions common across a 
number of texts to understand the larger movements of texts through structures of 
participation and ideologics. While I had a vested interest in tracing the circulation of 
narrative from the beginning of this project – and consequently was predisposed to 
understand the responses I found in my searches through the interplay between individual 
personal narratives and dominant cultural narratives – I made an effort to let myself “be 
drawn by psychogeographical attractions” – or “those influences that impact our thoughts 
and emotions and constantly draw us back to a particular place or site” – as I decided 
what aspects of these cases to prioritize in my writing (Gries, Still Life with Rhetoric 99). 
This is especially true in the GamerGate case study where the sheer number of texts 
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prevented any kind of comprehensive accounting of the case in the limited space of a 
chapter. 
Each case study highlights some aspect of the interaction between narrative and 
circulation.  The second chapter, which covers Long’s article “I Am Adam Lanza’s 
Mother” and subsequent conversations, establishes the relationship between emotion and 
circulation, arguing that Long’s post traveled widely because of the wide range of 
emotions it evoked. This relationship stands out starkly in cases like Long’s where a 
personal narrative is used to maneuver audiences into an emotional state that will make 
them more open to the rhetor’s arguments. Chapter 3 analyzes the ways in which the 
story of Savannah Dietrich, a teenage sexual assault victim who violated a court order by 
posting the names of her underage attackers on Twitter, was circulated via its uptake into 
preexisting ideologics, demonstrating the ways in which rhetors may adapt another’s 
personal narrative to serve as evidence of their own claims while also having their own 
interpretations of the story mitigated by their worldviews. In Chapter 4, I turn to the case 
of GamerGate, a movement purportedly devoted to ethics in games journalism which 
began with programmer Eron Gjoni’s blog post about his relationship and break-up with 
game designer Zoe Quinn and culminated in Quinn and other women in the games 
industry receiving rape and death threats. This case provides further insights into how a 
personal narrative may be interpreted to fit a preexisting world view, as well as 
demonstrating how competing narratives develop surrounding the same event, including 
accounts of the motivations of participants, critiques of opponents, and moves to bolster 
the ethos of the group with which the rhetor identifies. 
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Through the course of these case studies, I find that emotion is a key component 
of the structures of participation in social media, especially when emotional reactions to 
particular arguments or commonplaces become sedimented into ideologics. 
Understanding these emotional reactions may help rhetors anticipate potential circulation 
routes for personal stories and identify multiple ideologics in which their narratives may 
spread, increasing the number of individuals who may come into contact with an 
alternative narrative and the likelihood of prompting discussion on dominant narratives as 
incomprehensive, hegemonic, misrepresentative, or otherwise flawed – in other words, 




CIRCULATION, CONTROVERSY, AND MEASUREMENTS OF “SUCCESSFUL” 
RHETORIC: 
THE CASE OF “I AM ADAM LANZA’S MOTHER” 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, I outlined the theory of the available means of 
imagination as a way of contextualizing the roles of circulation in public rhetoric. In this 
chapter, I turn my attention to a single case to demonstrate the interactions between 
emotions and circulation in a public debate, namely the potential relationship between 
mental illness and violent crime. On December 14, 2012, 20-year-old Adam Lanza 
entered Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newton, Connecticut and killed twenty 
children and six adults before turning his weapon on himself. Prior to this attack, Lanza 
had killed his mother, Nancy, in their home. As one of the deadliest shootings in U.S. 
history, the incident prompted a broad examination of gun control legislation, including 
proposals for new regulations regarding background checks for firearms purchases and 
for the banning of certain kinds of firearms and ammunition. 
While the suddenly vocal support for stricter gun control regulations and the 
equally vocal opposition of the same have become unfortunately par for the course when 
shootings like this occur in the U.S., the discussion of mental health care for individuals 
and support for their families was somewhat new. A few days after the shooting, little-
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known blogger Liza Long wrote a response explaining that her son is mentally ill and 
occasionally takes a violent turn, threatening harm to himself and others. She outlines her 
fears regarding his future, especially the lack of facilities and insurance coverage for 
treating individuals with mental illness. Long’s narrative quickly gained traction on social 
media through numerous re-publications and responses and the reader comments that 
inevitably follow. While Long was roundly criticized for her post, this wave of attention 
also imparted to her a degree of ethos by expertise, resulting in her invitation to the U.S. 
Congressional Forum on Mental Health in March 2013. Long’s case demonstrates the 
ways in which relatively unknown individuals may harness digital circulation to generate 
a kind of credibility that would be otherwise unattainable, making her narrative and its 
context worth study by rhetoricians. In this chapter, I examine Long’s narrative in 
relation to some of our dominant narratives regarding mental illness and motherhood, 
arguing that one of the reasons that Long’s narrative circulated so widely was that 
individuals were compelled by their emotional reactions to her story to publically refute 
her, thereby sharing the story further. Moreover, Long’s narrative offers an example of 
how a narrative may be widely criticized but can still contribute to the available means of 
imagination for a particular issue, requiring us to rethink how we measure “successful” 
rhetoric. 
 
“I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother”: Circulation and Reception 
While the “mommy wars” of the last decade have been manifested in a variety of 
arenas – breast versus bottle feeding, for example, or attachment parenting versus the 
Ferber method – the debate has most often been depicted as pitting stay-at-home moms 
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against mothers who continue to pursue careers. In more recent years, the focus has 
shifted from the either/or decision to the attempt to balance both, as evidenced by the 
popularity of Anne-Marie Slaughter’s 2012 article “Why Women Still Can’t Have It All.” 
As Catherine Rottenberg demonstrates, Slaughter’s argument that happiness is to be 
found in the ideal work-family balance reinscribes dominant notions of appropriate 
desires for (white, middle-class) women, who “are compelled and encourage to want to 
‘have it all’” (163). While numerous critics (and Slaughter herself) have recognized the 
ways in which the work-family balance model neglects the material circumstances of 
working-class women and women of color, the experiences of mothers of children with 
mental illnesses are not often considered in the debate. When we do hear these voices, 
they are almost exclusively mother of children with autism; parents of children with 
depression, anxiety disorders, or eating disorders are largely absent from public view. 
When these parents are present in publically available narratives of mental illness, they 
are often depicted as causes of or contributors to mental illness, like the figure of the 
overly critical mother who prompts a daughter’s anorexia or the chronically traveling 
father who is oblivious to his child’s depression. Combined with the recent discourse 
surrounding the causes of autism – from the unloving “refrigerator mother” to 
vaccination to what kinds of diet will “cure” it – popular opinion seems to be that parents, 
especially the mothers who should serve as primary caregivers, are responsible for mental 
illness in their children.  
In this cultural context, it is perhaps unsurprising how much attention was given 
to Adam Lanza’s mother, including a certain amount of misinformation. Early accounts 
of the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary reported that Lanza’s mother was the teacher 
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of the class Lanza initially targeted. Pop psychologists were quickly offering the 
explanation that Lanza was attempting to eliminate what he saw as rival siblings. When 
this report was clarified as inaccurate, some began focusing on Nancy Lanza as the 
source of the firearms used in the shooting, as she owned a number of legally acquired 
guns and was reported to regularly take her sons target shooting. In addition, later reports 
suggested that Nancy had not done enough to help her son, focusing on his comfort 
instead of encouraging him to take his medication. Even as Nancy Lanza was labeled as 
the first victim of her son’s attack, she was indirectly held responsible. 
It was in this context that, on December 14, 2012, Liza Long’s article “I Am 
Adam Lanza’s Mother” appeared on The Blue Review, a journal of “popular scholarship 
in the public interest” published by the Boise State University College of Social Sciences 
and Public Affairs, and on her blog, The Anarchist Soccer Mom, under the title "Thinking 
the Unthinkable." On December 16, the article went viral, reproduced on such news 
aggregate sites as The Huffington Post, Salon, and Slate, and circulated via social media 
(I first became aware of the piece from the multiple postings that showed up in my 
Facebook feed). On December 17 and 18, reactions to the original article began 
circulating as widely as the initial post itself, again often brought to social media via 
news aggregate sites.   
In her post, Long describes a recent incident with her 13-year-old son, Michael 
(Long has changed her children's names throughout the blog). A few days before the 
Newtown Shooting, Michael and Long found themselves in an altercation over whether 
or not his pants fit his school's dress code. After losing his electronics privileges for the 
day, Michael became remorseful and apologized to his mother before asking for his video 
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games back for the day. When Long accepted his apology but denied his request, Michael 
became belligerent again and threatened to kill himself. Long describes a previous 
incident in which Michael pulled out a knife and threatened to kill her and himself while 
her two younger children locked themselves in the family's car. Following Michael's 
second threat of suicide, Long drove him straight to a psychiatric facility and checked 
him in. "By day three," she writes, "he was my calm, sweet boy again, all apologies and 
promises to get better. I've heard those promises for years. I don't believe them anymore." 
Long closes her articles with some statistics about the number of people with mental 
illness who are relegated to the prison system because there are not suitable facilities for 
individuals like Michael, arguing that it is time for a nation-wide conversation about 
mental illness.  
Segal provides an interesting framework for analyzing both Long’s narrative and 
responses to it. Segal examines the role of common breast cancer narratives in the public 
construction of both cancer and the cancer patient, finding that “a standard story of breast 
cancer had emerged, and that it function[s] as an epideictic rhetoric” (13). Moreover, the 
“standard story” functions as a gatekeeping device, ensuring that stories that fall outside 
the pink-ribbon norm – stories that call for political action against carcinogen-producing 
corporations, for example – rarely achieve a wide audience, resulting in what Segal calls 
the “maintenance of ignorance about breast cancer” (14). Using the lens of standard and 
non-comformist stories, we see that Long's story disrupts common narratives in a few 
ways. First of all, the common narrative of a mother with a mentally ill child paints the 
situation as a hard but ultimately rewarding experience, with the mother and other family 
members learning valuable life lessons. Admittedly, this narrative is most commonly in 
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reference to children with autism, like Tom Fields-Meyer’s Following Ezra or the 
television show Parenthood, and often this portrayal of mentally-ill people as teachers of 
great life lessons continues into adulthood, as in such films as Rain Man, The Fisher 
King, and The Soloist. When we do see stories of those mentally ill individuals who are 
violent, usually in fictional narratives like the serial killer mystery or horror stories, they 
are generally villains, and families are only mentioned as victims or as perpetrators of the 
abuse that leads to the mentally ill person's violent actions. Long breaks these common 
narratives by presenting the figure of the long-suffering mother who is not happy with the 
hand she has been dealt. Her statement about no longer believing her son's promises and 
apologies indicates her level of cynicism about her position. Additionally, few narratives 
about mental health and violence indict both our stigmatization of mental illness and our 
broken health care system for providing few options for family members in Long's 
situation. Interestingly, Long breaks the standard narrative in many of the same ways that 
Segal notes non-conformist breast cancer narratives do: Long does not treat this obstacle 
as a chance to learn a life lesson, nor does she express unconditional love for Michael by 
framing her struggle in her concern for him. Instead she asks readers to identify with her 
fear for herself, her other children, and other people Michael may lash out at. 
Additionally, Long criticizes the system that has forced her into such a tenuous situation, 
having to choose between having her son incarcerated or living with his violent outbursts, 
much like non-conformist breast cancer narratives may indict carcinogenic producing 




That Long’s story does not conform to the dominant narrative is important when 
we consider Walter Fisher’s framework for the evaluation of narratives by the criteria of 
structural, material, and characterological coherence. By telling a story apart from the 
dominant one of mainstream discourse, “I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother” breaks material 
coherence for its readers unless they have alternate discourses on which to draw. That is 
to say, if they are relying on TV shows like Parenthood and the other pop culture texts 
described above, readers will find themselves having to judge Long’s story in relation to 
fictional accounts about raising mentally ill children that are frequently subject to and 
perpetuators of a sexist, racist, ableist hegemony. If readers are instead relying on 
different narratives, perhaps their own experiences with mentally ill children or the 
stories they have heard from friends and family, their evaluations of Long’s narrative will 
be different.  
In addition to this trouble with material coherence, some responses to “I Am 
Adam Lanza’s Mother” indicate that readers also found fault with the characterological 
coherence of Long’s story. Fisher defines character as “generalized perception of a 
person’s fundamental value orientation. From this perception, one infers a person’s 
probable decisions and actions, and determines the relationship of the person’s 
orientation to one’s own way of being in the world” (148). Fisher differentiates between 
character and ethos insofar as one’s credibility or lack thereof with particular audiences 
often depends on one’s perceived values. Additionally, a rhetor’s ethos will suffer if she 
appears to lack characterological coherence (for this reason, some politicians are indicted 
as “flip-floppers”). In the case of Long, this tension is manifested as criticism of her 
practices as a mother who claims to love her son.  Some critics, including academic 
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blogger Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg, question Long's use of her son's photo as part of the 
article, arguing that the inclusion of the photo and telling the story under her own name is 
a complete disregard of Michael's privacy. Blogger Hanna Rosin goes so far as to claim 
that Michael is being libeled by his mother and deserves protection by the state. 
Columnist and blogger Sarah Kendzior takes these critiques a step further; in a post title 
“Want the truth behind I Am Adam’s Lanza’s Mother? Read Her Blog,” she argues that 
readers should carefully examine Long's other posts before drawing conclusions about 
the article. Kendzior writes that “Long has written a series of vindictive and cruel posts 
about her children in which she fantasizes about beating them, locking them up and 
giving them away. In most posts, her allegedly insane and violent son is portrayed as a 
normal boy who incites her wrath by being messy, buying too many Apple products and 
supporting Obama.” She includes excerpts from Long's previous posts to support this 
claim before concluding that Long might be mentally unstable herself and perhaps a 
danger to her children, a claim Rosin also makes. Interestingly, Kendzior and Long later 
posted a joint statement claiming that they did not want to become part of the "Mommy 
Wars" of the blogosphere – a looming background for the conversation as a whole – 
though here Kendzior is arguing that the validity of Long's argument rests entirely on her 
credibility as a mother.  
Other responses to Long's article demonstrate a distrust of the fidelity of Long’s 
narrative. Fisher writes, “Obviously some stories are better stories than others, more 
coherent, more ‘true’ to the way people and the world are – in perceived fact and value. 
In other words, some stories better satisfy the criteria of the logic of good reasons, which 
is attentive to reason and values” (68, emphasis in original). Many readers were troubled 
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by the values depicted in Long’s article and the possibility that these values might come 
to be widespread in larger conversations regarding mental illness. One of the most widely 
circulated of these responses was an anonymous post on the blog thursday titled “You 
Are Not Adam Lanza's Mother” in which the author lists six points “to summarise the 
main reasons why it’s a terrible springboard for further conversation on the subject.” The 
author criticizes Long for both silencing Michael by making him the object of the 
narrative and taking on the voice of a dead woman, “appropriate[ing] the experiences of 
people who are unheard.” In addition, the thursday blogger argues that Long’s article 
“complains about mental illness stigma while reinforcing it by explicitly tying it to 
violence, and in particular, mass killings,” pointing out that people with mental illness are 
far more like to be the victims of crimes rather than their perpetrators. A second response 
came from feminist news aggregate site Jezebel, titled “That Woman Is Not Adam 
Lanza’s Mother, and She’s Distracting Us From the Real Issue,” in which Laura Beck 
argues that this discussion of the role of mental illness in mass shootings detracts from 
the focus on easily accessible guns, a more immediate problem in Beck’s opinion.  
A third set of responses were much less widely circulated: the personal narratives 
of individuals who find themselves in positions similar to Long. Chad Eagleton, blogging 
at Cathode Angel, writes that his violently mentally ill brother is currently serving a 56 
year sentence before describing the day when he viciously attacked family members and 
friends. He closes his post by stating, “Looking back and pondering my brother's life, 
only one thing brings me any comfort—at least he never picked up a gun. That's the best 
that can be said when you live in a country where a citizen's best hope for mental health 
care is prison.” Rebecca Schoenkopf, writing at Wonkette, echoes this lack of options as 
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she tells the story of her older brother who killed himself, she believes, to prevent himself 
from harming their younger brother. That these responses and others like them did not 
receive the same level of attention as the critiques of Long’s article demonstrates again 
that these narratives are non-conformative and are consequently regulated by readers 
through lack of circulation. In light of its wide criticism, then, it is worth asking why 
exactly “I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother” circulated so much farther than other narratives of 
the same type. 
 
Strategies of Circulation: Narrative and the Generation of Controversy 
To begin to understand the circulation of Long’s narrative, we must first consider 
the genre of the blog, as Ridolfo and DeVoss consider the genre of the press release. “I 
Am Adam Lanza’s Mother” appeared almost simultaneously on The Blue Review and The 
Anarchist Soccer Mom and shows signs of the generic markers outlined by Carolyn R. 
Miller and Dawn Shepherd. They note that "most commentators define blogs on the basis 
of their reverse chronology, frequent updating, and combination of links with personal 
commentary” (171), and Julie Rak argues that understanding blogs as an online diary 
misses the importance of this combination of links and personal information, making 
blogs a genre that looks simultaneously outward and inward. "I Am Adam Lanza’s 
Mother" demonstrates both the personal disclosure and commentary on recent events via 
links that is considered typical of blogs as a genre. What is somewhat telling is the 
structure of the argument: in previous blog posts, Long has included links toward the end, 
like in "I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother," but those links were not used as evidence for her 
arguments. Instead they offer readers more information on a topic. We can see, then, that 
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Long was writing in anticipation of publishing at The Blue Review; she is offering outside 
sources to support her argument as she would in an academic setting as opposed to a 
blog. Using Ridolfo and DeVoss’s concept of rhetorical velocity, we might then posit that 
Long designed her text to circulate more widely than just her personal blog, where 
evidence beyond personal experience is not required.  
Moreover, as Kendzior’s critique demonstrates, Long develops a distinctly 
different ethos in the text of “I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother” than in much of the rest of her 
blog. Kendzior's methodology of bringing to light previous posts is indicative of the 
shifting nature of ethos in online spaces. As Warnick notes, the ancient understanding of 
ethos as something limited to and created within a single rhetorical performance is 
completely inadequate in the age of the internet (Rhetoric Online 34). As I explained in 
the previous chapter, while public figures have long had ethoi outside the text – in the 
form of voting records, previous speeches or writings, or coverage by the media – with 
the rise of social networking and blogging, even private individuals have accessible ethoi 
outside their texts. Miller and Shepherd write that "in a blog, that construction [of self] is 
an ongoing event, the self being disclosed a continue achievement.” With her intended 
publication venue of The Blue Review, Long may not have anticipated the association of 
her ethos from her blog with the ethos she crafts in the text itself – though she published 
the article to her blog as well. 
But, as Edbauer demonstrates in her analysis of viral marketing campaigns where 
individual rhetors and audiences are difficult to identify, focusing on the rhetorical 
situation, with its components of exigency, text, and audience, can only get us so far in 
accounting for the circulation and distribution of a rhetorical text in the context of 
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neoliberalism. In the case of "I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother," we must attempt to account 
for the viral spread of the article in its various iterations via social media. While the 
motivations for "sharing" via social media (posting a link, image, or video for one's 
followers to view) are undoubtedly multifaceted and complicated, I would argue that one 
underlying goal in sharing is the construction of a rhetorical representation of self. In the 
case of a political text like "I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother," sharing is often used to identify 
or reaffirm one's political affiliations or commitments. That is, social media users often 
share texts to demonstrate Burkean identification with the writer and/or the position 
illustrated by the text, or, at least, this is the assumption when one shares a link without 
commentary. For example, a social media user might post the National Congress of 
American Indians’s video “Proud to Be” without commentary to illustrate his belief that 
Washington D.C.’s NFL team should change their name as well as his commitment 
against racism. Likewise, he might post a link to an article from the Tea Party news blog 
Townhall.com about reproductive health and socialist medical care to illustrate his 
agreement with its argument as well as his politically conservative position. 
Other times, however, social media users will share a link with commentary that 
details the user's relationship to the text and/or the political positions therein, and often, 
though not always, the commentary will announce a disagreement; the same article from 
Townhall.com may be posted with a comment along the lines of “Tea Party attacking 
women yet again” and readers will assume very different things about the poster’s 
relationship to the article and the views it espouses. In this way, users identify against the 
text that they share, simultaneously promoting and critiquing, which may result in just as 
many views as sharing for identification. This fact has become so apparent to some online 
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writers that they have begun writing critiques of offensive texts without providing links 
to the text in question in order to discourage their readers from giving the text more 
views, which may provide the creator/owner with cultural capital and/or monetary gains. 
Moreover, the processes of identification for and against can be mutually-producing in 
that as a text circulates in social networks, more users feel compelled to take a stance on 
the issue of the day (or at least what seems like the issue of the day according to their 
social media feeds), resulting in more shares and more views.  
Because of the dual (and mutually-producing) processes of identification for and 
against through sharing, controversy generates circulation2. This point may seem obvious 
given how often popular thinkers of the Nicolas Carr variety have decried the death of 
nuanced argument in the face of short-forms like Twitter and the rise of “tl;dr”3 and 
practices like “trolling” or “flaming”. Given how much we have come to rely on the 
Internet for democratic discussion, concerns regarding the potential of these spaces for 
civil debate are warranted (see Lampe et al.), but, more and more, we can see web writers 
using controversy generation as a rhetorical tool rather than viewing it merely as a 
constraint. For example, when Twitter activist Suey Park wanted to call attention to 
                                                          
2. There is a long standing relationship between controversy and rhetoric, often referenced with 
the dislogistic term “demagoguery.” There is relatively little scholarship on the generation of controversy in 
online forums, a practice that may all too easily descend into “trolling.” Though she does not specifically 
address the digital, Leah Ceccarelli examines the use of controversy in public debates regarding science as 
a means to stall political decision-making on issues such as AIDS or global warming, demonstrating that 
the generation of controversy can be used for many ends and is worth further consideration as a rhetorical 
tool.  
 
3. Some long-form web texts have started providing short summaries of content under the heading 
of “tl;dr,” or “too long; didn’t read.” Interestingly enough, these summaries function much the same way as 
abstracts in academic articles, giving the reader enough to know if she wants to read the article in full (or at 
least giving her enough to talk about it as though she has read it). 
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Stephen Colbert’s use of racial humor on The Colbert Report, she used the hashtag 
#CancelColbert, not because her goal was to actually get the show canceled, but because 
the perceived call for cancellation was more likely to circulate, thus drawing attention to 
her message regarding the problem of using racial slurs to combat other kinds of racism. 
Whether or not this strategy worked is up for debate; Park did gain a lot of attention, but 
many respondents focused only on the message of the hashtag rather that Park’s larger 
arguments about institutional racism and the treatment of Asian Americans in particular. 
However, Park did acknowledge that the hashtag was designed to be deliberately 
inflammatory, telling interviewer Jay Caspian Kang, “There’s no reason for me to act 
reasonable, because I won’t be taken seriously anyway. […] So I might as well perform 
crazy to point out exactly what’s expected from me.” 
Another place we can see the deliberate generation of controversy is in article 
titling, like Dr. Richard Saul's opinion piece in Time titled "Doctor: ADHD Does Not 
Exist." Following this inflammatory title, Saul qualifies his statement, writing that 
"ADHD — as currently defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) and as understood in the public imagination — does not exist." 
Deliberately provocative titling in this vein has become a common practice in web 
writing and, along with titles of the "You won't believe what happens when..." variety, 
have come to be known as "click-bait," reminding us that, while the writers themselves 
may be hoping for readers to meaningfully engage with their texts, the capitalist system 
that sponsors their circulation relies only on the number of views to self-perpetuate.  
This kind of titling can be seen in the way that Long’s piece appears under two 
different titles: on her own blog, the title is “Thinking the Unthinkable,” but on The Blue 
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Review, and in its subsequent shares on The Huffington Post, etc., the piece is called “I 
Am Adam Lanza’s Mother.” This second title may be considered “better” for a number of 
reasons: it is more specific, more likely to draw readers’ attention, and more likely to 
come up in the myriad of online searches that were being performed to find out more 
about the Newton shooter – that it, it is more likely to get views. In the body of the blog 
post, the claim of solidarity may be seen as an instance of cohortatio, or “amplification 
that moves the hearer’s indignation” (Lanham 36): “I am sharing this story because I am 
Adam Lanza’s mother. I am Dylan Klebold’s and Eric Harris’s mother. I am James 
Holmes’s mother. I am Jared Loughner’s mother. I am Seung-Hui Cho’s mother. And 
these boys – and their mothers – need help” (Long, “Thinking the Unthinkable”). By 
naming a string of famous shooters in conjunction with their mothers, Long reminds us of 
the magnitude of the problem of gun violence, suggests that the mothers of these shooters 
had also tried to get help for their sons, and attempts to move readers to anger and 
sadness at the lack of options for these mothers. In this way, Long again works against 
the dominant narrative regarding mental health and violence, which as Margaret Price 
argues, is one of “mental pathology escalating ‘inevitably’ toward extreme violence” 
(143). These incidents, Price writes, are “framed as a failure of control [through medical 
treatment or incarceration] rather than a failure of care” (156). In requesting help for the 
perpetrators of violence and their mothers while explicitly rejecting the option of 
incarceration, Long calls attention to the oft-forgotten alternative option of care. 
But claiming solidarity with these mothers is a controversial move, which we can 
see from the number of responses that began (often in their titles) by refuting Long’s 
claim to solidarity. Readers often pass over the argument regarding the lack of systematic 
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aid for the mentally ill and their families to focus on the narrative of motherhood found 
between the lines. This is perhaps not surprising, given that Long is most certainly the 
subject of the story. And it is not even the narrative of motherhood in relation to mental 
illness that comes into play; instead, critics attack Long for being a bad mother in 
general: for posting a picture of her child online with her real name attached and denying 
her son privacy, for writing about how frustrated she gets with her children, for making 
herself the center of her blog, and so on. That critics opted to engage with Long’s 
motherhood rather than her argument about the lack institutional support for people with 
mental illness and their families may indicate that they did, as Segal suggests, find 
Long’s narrative silencing; perhaps an audience of other mothers felt qualified to address 
the topic of motherhood but not the topic of mental illness. When it comes to children 
with disabilities, Alison Kafer writes, “Parents are not only the ultimate arbiters but also 
the only ones with any right to speak or reflect on the case; both decision making and 
debate belong only within the realm of the family” (61). Thus, critics who are not parents, 
specifically parents with mentally ill children, cannot enter the debate until they have 
discredited the authority of the Parent; unfortunately, following attempts to discredit 
Long, few critics put forward arguments regarding mental health care. 
Additional engagement with Long’s argument is perhaps curtailed by the fact that 
at the heart of the matter is a mentally ill, sometimes violent child. Kafer notes our 
discomfort at the “disruption in [our] temporal fields” when the ability of one’s mind and 
the age of one’s body do not align (55). While Kafer specifically examines the figure of 
the adult with a child’s mind, I would argue that Long’s son Michael presents an equally 
disconcerting problem: the child exhibiting behaviors we attribute to adults. The title of 
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Jennifer Kahn’s New York Times article, “Can You Call a 9-Year-Old a Psychopath?”, 
indicates our discomfort at picturing the likes of Ted Bundy in a child’s body, our 
avoidance of even considering the possibility of children that disturbed, unless they are in 
horror films. Likewise, given our difficulty imagining psychopathic children, Michael’s 
behavior borders on the edge of unbelievable, resulting in a skeptical view of Long as 
narrator. However, whether critics feel the need to discredit Long as a mother or express 
their disbelief at Michael’s purported behavior, the result is the same: dramatistically 
speaking, attention is shifted away from the scene about which Long is making an 
argument and onto the agent herself, similar to the ways in which arguments about 
environmental concerns in breast cancer narratives were usurped by criticisms of the 
narrators themselves. 
 
Emotional Engagement and Expressions of Outrage 
One aspect of the controversy of Long’s article is the competing emotions of 
outrage and resignation found in the Long’s text itself and the responses that followed. 
Jenny Rice notes that outrage is often considered the most appropriate reaction for 
intelligent, informed individuals: “The experience of outrage becomes a warrant that 
proves I am indeed ‘paying attention’ to whatever public crisis needs to be addressed” 
(55). Rice worries that “feeling easily becomes a substitute for action. That is, feeling 
becomes both the evidence of and the actual activity of public relationality. Feeling angry 
is not a prelude to action; it is the action itself” (60). Marilyn M. Cooper articulates a 
more complex relationship between emotion and social action. Drawing on the work of 
neurobiologist Walter J. Freeman, Cooper argues that “emotions are intentions to act in a 
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certain way,” as emotions are responses to outside stimulation that encourage individuals 
to react toward that stimulus in a particular way in the future: “emotions are, at base, 
preparations for action, and we become aware of them (as others do, often before we do) 
only when they are expressed in publicly observable, and internally felt, adaptations of 
the body that serve as signals of intent” (430). Cooper’s understanding is especially 
pertinent for the responses to Long’s article that I have discussed here, given the level of 
engagement required to craft the kinds of extended arguments presented. We may 
interpret the emotion of outrage as the precursor to the act of writing a rebuttal (or a 
rebuttal to the rebuttals in the cases of Schoenkopf and Eagleton) and posting it to a 
publicly accessible forum. 
But it is important to consider the ways that outrage as an embodied emotion is 
mediated through both previous experience and textual constructions. Outrage is first 
experienced as a bodily sensation – tightening in the stomach, clenching of the muscles, 
the feeling of being pressed together, contained, and the need to push back. That bodily 
experience is then mediated through our cultural norms for what those embodied 
sensations mean; Laura Micciche writes that “only through collective, implicit assent in 
communal life does emotion have meaning, for here is where identification of emotion is 
ascribed to expression and perceptions, which comes to stand for what we have agreed to 
interpret as […] indignation” (11, emphasis in original). However, as Cooper argues, we 
are often unsure of the emotion until it is performed, until we see exactly what action 
comes out of the bodily sensation. The same bodily sensations that I named as part of 
outrage could just as easily be sensations of anxiety, and we may only be able to interpret 
the feelings as one emotion or the other based on the accompanying thoughts (“How 
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could anyone say such a thing!” versus “I can’t breathe! I need to get out of this room!”) 
and actions (yelling and/or throwing things versus fleeing a space or curling into a fetal 
position). The sensation that we identify as outrage is experienced as the result of a 
stimulus, often a text, but the initial bodily experiences may fluctuate over time and, 
consequently, the emotions related to them. Crowley writes, “Words, performances, 
images, and other representations appeal to the gut. They trigger emotional responses that 
can set off a chain of ideologic that can in turn arouse additional emotional response” 
(88). These additional emotional reactions are also contextualized in cultural norms and 
the specific situation but “may seem to underwrite the empirical truth of whatever 
conclusion is drawn” (88).  
At any point in this process, an individual may begin planning and/or executing a 
textual response that reflects their emotions. In the case of shorter, faster responses, such 
as a comment on a blog posting or Facebook status update, responses may use alphabetic 
texts, images, or gifs (short, repeating video clips) to express the emotional reaction. 
These shorter responses frequently rely on a set of shared values, ideologies, and 
language norms for correct interpretation by readers. For example, the popular phrase “I 
can’t even” has become widely used to express the feeling of being overwhelmed by 
emotion, but the actual emotion itself is often up to the reader of the comment to identify. 
In some cases, the emotion may seem self-evident; when left as a comment to a video of 
baby sloths, readers will most likely identify the comment as an expression of “squee,” an 
onomatopoetic term for the feeling of being overwhelmed by “cuteness.” If this same 
video were left on a video of Indiana governor Mike Pence announcing his signing of the 
state’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the commenter anticipates that readers will 
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share her feelings of despair or elation and consequently interpret her comment 
appropriately. Much of the same may be said for gifs as rhetorical conveyors of emotion. 
It is perhaps easier for audiences to interpret the emotion conveyed by gifs as they often 
contain images of an embodied performance sometimes accompanied by text. For 
example, one popular gif shows Tina Fey’s character Liz Lemon moving her hands in the 
air as though giving high-fives to invisible recipients. This short, repeating video is 
overlaid with the text “High-fiving a million angels.” This gif is often used to express a 
sense of accomplishment, though whether the accomplishment is genuine or ironic is 
often up for the reader to decide. Sometimes, though, a rhetor using a gif relies on more 
than the embodied performance captured by the gif to relay meaning. Many gifs are taken 
from popular television shows and movies, and a full interpretation of a gif may rely on 
the audience’s familiarity with this larger context. Interpreting the ironic sense of 
accomplishment that may be conveyed by the “high-fiving a million angels” gif in part 
depends on a certain familiarity with the character of Liz Lemon and the kinds of things 
she would deem “accomplishments.” 
Longer responses, like the blog posts regarding Long and “I Am Adam Lanza’s 
Mother,” require an additional level of planning and, consequently, represent an 
additional degree of emotional mediation. At this point, responders are more likely to see 
themselves engaging in the persuasion of an audience rather than just expressing a 
reaction. Because these texts are longer, rhetors may rely less on shared values and 
narratives to convey meaning than they would with shorter comments, but they continue 
to rely on shared values and narratives for persuasive purposes. In addition, at this point 
rhetors are more likely to engage in extensive language use to describe their emotions, 
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codifying sometimes messy, complicated feelings into standard forms of expression in 
order to engage audiences. This is, perhaps, one function of seemingly stock narratives, to 
act as a vehicle for the sharing of emotions. In this way, the narratives that rhetors use or 
reinterpret indicate both an ideological and emotional stance. The case of “I Am Adam 
Lanza’s Mother” presents competing narratives of motherhood identified with the 
competing emotions of resignation and outrage. To begin, the predominant emotional 
performance of Long’s text is resignation instead of outrage; she has dealt with Michael’s 
outbursts and threats as well as an institutional system that offers her no support for so 
long that she almost seems to have no energy left for outrage. And this is, perhaps, one of 
the problems that many readers had with “I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother.” The cultural 
power of Motherhood as a master signifier is essential here; Crowley writes,  
People who fantasize identity with whatever is depicted by one or more 
master signifiers – God or nation [or motherhood], for example – do so 
because they desire love or recognition from a culturally sanctioned Big 
Other. When they believe that significant groups of people do not desire 
identification with the same master signifier that motivates their fantasies 
of identification, they can become alienated and even enraged by this 
implied challenge to a fantasized communal identity. (95) 
 
Since the narrative of the warrior mother, iconized in women like Jenny McCarthy and 
Sarah Palin, is celebrated as perhaps the epitome of womanhood, Long’s resignation 
strikes some readers as almost morally reprehensible, as though she is committing the 
ultimate sin of giving up on her child (never mind her other two children who sometimes 
lock themselves in the car in case their brother becomes violent). As such, many of the 
women who respond as mothers may see themselves as performing the outrage that every 
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child deserves; in publicly denouncing Long, they perform their own appropriate 
motherhood.4  
One of the important functions of mediation in regards to outrage is to present 
appropriate performances of outrage for one’s subject position. While outrage may be the 
most appropriate reaction for informed individuals, too much outrage may be deemed as 
socially inappropriate, especially in relation to one’s race, class, and gender. For this 
reason, political demonstrations populated primarily by people of color are more likely to 
be called “violent” or “threatening” by media, such as in the coverage of the 
demonstrations in Ferguson, MO following the shooting of Michael Brown, while 
women are commonly judged as “hysterical” when they express anger. The object of 
outrage is also important; expressions of outrage that serve to uphold dominant 
conceptions of race, such as black women expressing anger regarding their treatment by 
black men, are far less likely to be deemed socially unacceptable than expressions of 
outrage intended to disrupt the status quo, such as black women expressing anger 
regarding their treatment by white police officers. It is perhaps for this reason that the 
strong reactions against Long as a mother go unchecked; the respondents’ outrage is 
always presented as being on behalf of others: on behalf of Michael, on behalf of other 
people with mental illness, and on behalf of the victims of future shootings should our 
firearms regulations not be made stricter. This outrage reifies our dominant narrative of 
motherhood, that mothers (and women generally) are the primary protectors, 
                                                          
4. This kind of compulsory maternal protection is a common trope in film and fiction; while it 
may seem “natural” for Mrs. Weasley, who has seven children of her own, to become a primary mother 
figure for orphaned Harry Potter, it seems less natural that Ellen Ripley of the Alien franchise, a character 
who was originally intended to be male, would immediately take on the mother role to a little girl she finds 
in Aliens, seemingly due exclusively to her gender. 
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spokespeople, and caregivers to children. In fact, Long is committing another cardinal sin 
of motherhood: expecting others to help care for her child. The controversy of “I Am 
Adam Lanza’s Mother” is fueled by the aspects of Long’s argument that make it an 
appropriate case for relatively high levels of outrage, given its position as a non-dominant 
narrative.  
 
The Available Means of Imagination and Conceptions of Success 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, I am employing the concept of the 
available means of imagination to refer to the narratives and subject positions that 
individuals and groups imagine as possible in a given set of circumstances. An obvious 
play on Aristotle’s available means of persuasion, I consider the available means of 
imagination a recursive construction that influences both what options rhetors see 
themselves in a rhetorical situation and how audiences interpret those arguments based on 
the stock of narratives they have available to them. One reason I have proposed this 
framework for understanding especially the circulation of narratives is that cases like “I 
Am Adam Lanza’s Mother” provoke interesting questions regarding rhetorical success 
and agency in public discourse. While Segal would argue that the widespread criticism of 
Liza Long and her article indicate the same repression of alternative narratives about 
mental illness and motherhood that she finds in breast cancer narratives (and the same 
subsequent ignorance on the subject), the degree of circulation that the text attained 
through the controversy it generated led to the proliferation of Long’s narrative rather 
than its repression; after all, Long was interviewed by a number of major news sources, 
spoke before a U.S. Congressional Forum on Mental Health, and published a book, The 
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Price of Silence: A Mom’s Perspective on Mental Illness, following “I Am Adam Lanza’s 
Mother.” One of the complications, perhaps, in interpreting something like “I Am Adam 
Lanza’s Mother” as successful or not is the sheer spread of the text and the ambiguous 
nature of the Long’s goals. Scholarship on narratives that circulate locally tend to focus 
on limited goals based on assumptions about a rhetor's purpose or intent. For example, 
Grabill and Pigg examine personal narratives coupled with requests for more information 
in a comment forum regarding the HPV vaccine, finding that narratives allowed 
commenters to position themselves in ways that encouraged other commenters to answer 
their requests. Martha S. Cheng identifies several uses of personal narrative in an online 
class chat room and demonstrates that the “success” or “failure” of these narratives can 
largely be determined by the responses of other participants. 
However, unlike the narratives examined in these studies with their localized 
goals, Long’s narratives seems to take as its primary goal the start of a conversation 
regarding the lack of options for people with mental illness and their families, making the 
parameters of rhetorical success harder to judge. In these cases, an argument could be 
made for the number of views a text receives as a marker of success, as Dubisar and 
Palmeri do in evaluating the success of one student's digital remix project, and there is 
some merit to this approach. The number of views does indicate that a text has circulated, 
and I would argue that circulation in and of itself can be considered a success even (or 
perhaps especially) if, as in the case of "I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother," the final goal is 
wide-reaching political and social change. However, I would argue that the responses to 
"I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother", even the negative ones, are a better indication of its 
rhetorical success than its number of views as these responses indicate the degree to 
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which "I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother" found its public, if not its ideal audience. That is, 
the fact that Jezebel writer Beck felt the need to warn readers that Long’s essay could 
take our attention away from gun control issues suggests that Long’s essay really did shift 
the debate. 
Long’s narrative is in many ways not new – Kahn’s article “Can You Call a 9-
Year-Old a Psychopath?” appeared months before Long’s post – but Long’s article 
traveled much farther than previous texts had done, demonstrating that the circulation of 
texts is deeply affective in nature. Moreover, the concerns expressed that Long’s narrative 
would take up residence in readers’ minds as a viable option among narratives regarding 
mental illness and mass shootings indicate an understanding that emotionally laden 
narratives like Long’s are more likely to stick, as Ahmed would say, in the available 
means of imagination. For rhetoricians, Long’s case indicates that a thorough 
examination of digital circulation requires us to pay careful attention to the multiple 
emotional economies that influence circulation and the ways in which digital tools 
encourage certain kinds of emotional exchanges and not others. In the following chapter, 
I will examine how the emotional aspects of a personal narrative may be shaped to suit 




CIRCULATION, IDEOLOGICS, AND GOD-TERMS: 
THE CASE OF SAVANNAH DIETRICH 
  
 
 In the previous chapter, I explored the relationship between dominant cultural 
narratives and ethos in Liza Long’s essay “I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother.” I argued that 
because of the affective economies that are privileged in social media spaces, texts or 
positions that provoke controversy or generate outrage circulated more widely than texts 
that offer “safe” positions and identifications (cat videos aside). In this chapter, I examine 
the ways in which personal stories are interpreted as they are circulated in different 
discourse by focusing on the case of Savannah Dietrich, a teen whose sexual assault case 
gained national attention after she violated a court order to name her attackers. After a 
description of the case and the key texts involved, I argue that the different ways in which 
the case was characterized as it was circulated in different discourses can best be 
understood through Crowley’s notion of “ideologics” and its attendant ideas of the 
relationship between emotion and attention. I pay particular attention to the role of god-
terms in circulation as well as their relationship to cultural narratives, arguing that a god-
term derives its meaning in part through the narratives that may be associated with a the 
term, and that these narratives are often dependent on an individual’s ideological 
position. Considering the role of cultural narratives in the interpretation of god-terms 
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offer rhetoricians a new way of understanding the boundaries between groups as well as 
the role of god-terms in public debate. Furthermore, understanding circulation as part of 
the complex systems of ideologics highlights the recursive relationship between 
interpretation and circulation as different audiences focus on different aspects of the story 
as warranting its circulation. 
 
Thick Description of the Case 
 In August of 2011, high school student Savannah Dietrich gathered with some 
friends and acquaintances at her father’s home in Louisville, KY while he was at work. 
After drinking several shots, Dietrich passed out and awoke the next day to find her bra 
shifted and her underwear removed. It was not until November that Dietrich found out 
what had happened that night, after a friend reported that there were naked photos of her 
circulating: two boys had groped her breasts and penetrated her with their fingers while 
taking photos. Dietrich confronted the boys via text message at the end of November, and 
after collecting information from a number of friends, filed a police report regarding her 
sexual assault the day after Christmas. When the boys were questioned by police in 
February 2012, they confessed to their actions and handed over their cell phones for 
forensic testing, but the photos had already been deleted. The following month the boys 
were charged with first degree sexual abuse and voyeurism, to which they pled guilty in 
June as part of a plea bargain in exchange for a sentence Dietrich later described as “a 
slap on the wrist” (Riley, “Assault Victim’s” A8). 
 It is at this point that this story takes an unexpected turn: presiding Judge Dee 
McDonald was asked by the defendants’ attorneys to remind those present in the court 
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room of the confidentiality of the proceedings, as the defendants were minors. According 
to Dietrich and others, the judge took it a step farther, stating that those present could not 
discuss the trial proceedings or the crime itself. Angry at being silenced by the court and 
not being informed of the plea deal, Dietrich sent off a string of tweets, naming her 
assailants as Will Frey III and Austin Zehnder and writing “Protect[ing] rapist[s] is more 
important than getting justice for the victim in Louisville” (qtd. in Riley, “Assault 
Victim’s” A8). The defendants’ attorneys quickly filed a motion to hold Dietrich in 
contempt of court. Just over a week before her contempt hearing, Dietrich and her parents 
sat down with Jason Riley of the Louisville-based Courier-Journal for an interview 
regarding the case. When Riley’s initial article was published on July 21, 2012, Savannah 
Dietrich and her story came into the national spotlight. After the wide circulation of 
Dietrich’s story and the outrage that followed, the defendants dropped the motion for 
contempt.  
 However, believing there to have been a conflict of interest on the part of the 
prosecuting attorney that resulted in such a lenient plea deal, Dietrich’s lawyers and the 
Courier-Journal petitioned the court to make the court files open to the public. As 
Dietrich and the Courier-Journal waited for the hearing regarding this motion, Zehnder’s 
attorney, David Mejia, stated in an interview with the Huffington Post that Dietrich had 
ruined his client’s life by naming him as a rapist, arguing that Dietrich was spreading 
inaccurate information as Zehnder was never charged with rape (Lohr, “Savannah 
Dietrich, 17-Year-Old”). These statements again brought the story into the public eye, 
and the Courier-Journal added Mejia’s comments to their motion as an example of the 
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attorney speaking publically about the case and disparagingly about Dietrich while 
Dietrich herself was barred from speaking (Lohr, “Savannah Dietrich Case”).  
 The third wave of national attention came once the court files were opened by 
Judge Angela McCormick Bisig, when prosecuting attorney Paul Richawlsky came under 
scrutiny for both the lenient plea deal and his reported comments to Dietrich when she 
confronted him about it. Richawlsky was found to be an alum and frequent financial 
supporter of Trinity High School, where both Zehnder and Frey attended and played 
lacrosse. Furthermore, Dietrich reported that when she confronted him about the plea 
bargain (of which she claimed no knowledge before the hearing), Richawlsky reportedly 
told her to “get over it and see a therapist,” that “jail was for real rapists” (Riley and 
Wolfson A10). At the sentencing hearing in September, Judge Bisig issued a harsher 
punishment than the plea bargain originally called for, most notably that the charge of 
sexual abuse could not be expunged from the defendants’ records, but could rather be 
downgraded from a felony to a misdemeanor if the boys demonstrated good behavior. 
Dietrich continued to speak publically about her experience, especially its effects on her 
social life, in interviews following the sentencing, expressing a desire to encourage other 
young women to speak up about their own sexual assaults. 
 In looking at a sample of the overwhelming number of texts that deal with the 
Dietrich case, it quickly becomes apparent that a small number of texts serve as the 
impetus for many others. As we saw with “I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother,” a single text 
may be the exigency for any number of other publications as individuals offer their own 
reactions to new audiences. Before I begin my analysis of the many competing narratives 
that emerged from the Dietrich case, I offer a quick overview of these key texts. It is 
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worth noting that, while Dietrich did participate in a number of video interviews, 
including one with ABC’s Nightline, I will primarily be focusing on alphabetic texts as 
these tended to be excerpted and linked to in responses more than filmed interviews. 
Since the case gained national attention following Dietrich’s interview with Jason Riley, 
a reporter at the Courier-Journal, this initial report was frequently linked to. However, 
the Associated Press report of the event based on Riley’s article was more widely 
circulated and excerpted, and this briefer version omits some interesting details. For 
example, while both articles focus on the context of the contempt charge, the Associated 
Press tends to focus on the content of Dietrich’s tweets and the subsequent fall-out, 
whereas Riley offers more details about the context of Dietrich’s tweets, stating that 
“Farrar-Crockett [one of Dietrich’s attorneys] said Dietrich looked at the laws of 
confidentiality before she tweeted and ‘tried not to violate what she believed the law to 
be,’ not tweeting about what happened in court or was in court records” (“Assault 
victim’s” A8). The result is that Riley’s article offers a more nuanced portrayal of 
Dietrich’s motivations; while many other articles portray Dietrich as solely acting in 
anger, Riley’s article suggests that Dietrich carefully considered her actions and the effect 
she wanted them to have. 
 Following the news that the motion to hold Dietrich in contempt had been 
withdrawn by Frey and Zehnder’s attorneys, the case fell out of the public eye until 
Zehnder’s attorney David Mejia was interviewed by The Huffington Post during the lead-
up to the opening of the court files. In that interview, Mejia claimed that Dietrich had 
ruined his client’s life: “He’s had to move […] He has lost all the potential that was there. 
He was on course to a scholarship to an Ivy League school to play sports and that may be 
74 
 
jeopardized. He’s in therapy. He’s just overwhelmed and devastated by what started from 
the conduct of this young girl saying the false things she did” (qtd. in Lohr, “Savannah 
Dietrch, 17-Year-Old”). Mejia argued that Dietrich’s tweets mischaracterized what had 
occurred, that she had inaccurately used the term “rapist” when no rape occurred and 
stated that she had been videotaped when Zehnder and Frey had only taken photos. 
Mejia’s statements spurred a new interest in the case as individuals rapidly criticized his 
victim-blaming stance with arguments much in line with the statement from Farrar-
Crockett that appears at the end of Lohr’s article: “[Frey and Zehnder] took the pictures, 
they disseminated it, they told people about what they had done. To come back and blame 
[Dietrich] now for ruining their reputation I think is despicable. They did this to 
themselves.” 
 One final round of media attention and subsequent responses occurred once the 
court files were released on August 30, 2012. These opened court files brought out a 
number of new details including that when the boys confessed to their crimes, they said 
they did it because they “thought it would be ‘funny’” (qtd. in Riley and Wolfson A1); 
that Richawlsky, the prosecutor in the case, had belittled Dietrich’s complaints regarding 
her exclusion from the plea deal and its leniency; and the details of the plea deal itself, 
which Farrar-Crockett described as “completely unheard of” (qtd. in Riley, “Dietrich’s 
Files” A8). This new information, along with the final sentencing hearing in mid-
September, prompted a much smaller round of response than previous texts, probably due 
to the apparent age of the story. By the time Abigail Pesta released her Newsweek piece in 
December, the story was being treated as over, and any subsequent responses tended to 
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either harken back to Dietrich as she related to more recent cases or reflect on the final 
characterization of the case.  
 
Competing Narratives, Competing Ideologics 
 Out of this large number of texts, audiences appeared to rely on a relatively 
limited number of narratives to make sense of the case. Crowley’s concept of resonance 
in densely articulated belief systems is helpful in understanding how different individuals 
and groups interpreted Dietrich’s story in different ways. In her work to understand why 
two prominent hegemonies of the U.S., Christian fundamentalism and liberalism, are 
unable to debate meaningfully with each other, Crowley begins by positing “that 
ideology, fantasy, and emotion are primary motivators of belief and action” (59). Crowley 
introduces the term “ideologic” – or the logic of an ideology – to describe the systems of 
pathways that connect the nodal points or master signifiers of an ideology. Crowley 
distinguishes between ideologic and what has traditionally been called “reason”: 
One difference between ideologic and reason […] has to do with the 
sources from which its positions (moments) are drawn – belief, passion, 
values, desires – rather than empirical evidence. But ideologic also entails 
more means of making connections than are acknowledged in liberal 
accounts of reason. For one thing, an appeal to a belief can stimulate an 
emotional response that in turn can activate other closely related beliefs. 
For another, ideological means of connection include webs of analogous 
and/or metonymic historical associations (that is, articulations) built up 
over time. (61) 
 
Since ideologics accept a larger variety of kinds of evidence, it is tempting for adherents 
to liberalism (include the institution of the academy) to dismiss ideologics as irrational. 
However, as Chaput explains using different terminology, while ideologics may appear to 
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be “unreasonable,” they are not “irrational.” Rather, they are subject to the circulation of 
affective energies over time rather than the circulation of empirical evidence (17). 
 Crowley notes that ideologics may vary with regards to how densely articulated – 
or connected – their nodal points are, arguing that “the more densely beliefs are 
articulated with one another in a given belief system or across belief systems, the more 
impervious they are to rhetorical intervention. The pathways typically taken in some 
ideologics are so tightly connected with one another, so routinely and regularly traveled, 
that they become a sort of automatic ‘first response’ to encounters with new or countering 
beliefs or belief systems” (78). Moreover, because emotional reaction is one of the 
determinants for what we pay attention to in the world and because belief and emotional 
responses are often mutually constituting (83), “densely articulated ideologies construct 
bad affective grammarians who pay intense notice to objects and events that can be 
threaded into the intense tapestry of their belief system(s),” but “have difficulty taking 
notice of events or objects that neither support nor attack their beliefs” (85). This 
conception of densely articulated belief systems explains the surprise expressed by a 
conservative acquaintance of mine when I told him that many of my liberal friends were 
not thrilled by Hillary Clinton as a Democratic presidential candidate because she was 
too moderate; while he may have encountered any number of critiques of Clinton from 
the left, he did not notice or pay attention to them until our conversation, likely because 
face-to-face exchanges are often more affectively laden than other kinds of 
communication. 
 Crowley uses the concept of ideologic to understand, among other things, 
rhetorical appeals to myth. While Crowley understands myth as a stylistic retelling of 
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history in which “the moral derived from the event becomes more important than the 
incidents recounted,” I would argue that much of what she has to say regarding myth is 
also applicable to dominant cultural narratives (98). As I discussed in Chapter 1, cultural 
narratives often serve as bare-bones outlines of events with appropriate emotional 
responses onto which the details of experience may be mapped. As Crowley writes of 
myth, in dominant cultural narratives “the narrativity of the originating event can remain 
compelling, but it is more or less irrelevant to the cultural uses to which the story is put.” 
 While Crowley’s notion of densely articulated belief systems and their 
relationships to emotional reactions does much to explain why different audiences filtered 
the details of Dietrich’s story into different narratives, it is important to remember that 
ideologics are not necessarily harmful; they simply are. Moreover, it is possible for an 
individual to experience dissonance between two ideologics that may have once 
resonated deeply. In fact, my own personal narrative of exploring Dietrich’s case 
illustrates this point. One aspect of the case that became interesting to me, as I explored 
the online archive of texts related to it, was my own experience of finding the facts of the 
case as reported by the media, most dominantly the Courier-Journal; I felt a driving need 
to get at the Truth of the situation. Was the prosecutor lenient with the boys because of 
his ties with their school? Was Judge Dee McDonald really intending for Dietrich to 
interpret her warning as the teen did? What really happened at the party and afterwards? 
What really happened in the courtroom? My scholarly-self watched over my shoulder as I 
experienced these news stories and blog posts much as someone would have in the initial 
event, as my emotional reactions fluctuated with each new text I read. As a result, my 
analysis of this case is deeply influenced by my personal emotional reactions to it, as a 
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reflection of what many audience members who share my feminist commitments 
experienced. My analysis of this case is also deeply influenced by the dissonance I felt 
between my feminist commitments and my scholarly frameworks at that moment, though 
I have often found the two to be overlapping and commensurate.  
 As I began to write this chapter, I realized that my personal reading of these 
events and my sense of a scholarly responsibility to represent the event objectively came 
into conflict in two areas: the naming of the event itself and how to identify the two 
attackers. As I will describe later in this chapter, audiences articulated a great deal of 
tension between the terms “sexual assault” or “sexual abuse” and “rape” in how they 
talked about this case, in part due to how Kentucky criminal law categorizes particular 
sex crimes and in part due to dominant cultural understandings of “rape.” While the 
charges brought against the boys were sexual abuse and voyeurism, their crimes would 
have been characterized as rape in other states. Moreover, “rape” is the term that Dietrich 
frequently used to talk about what happened to her, and I have opted to validate the 
victim’s experience over the institutional authority of the court by using the term “rape” 
in my analysis. Secondly, and in relation to this first concern, I wanted to take care in 
how I identified the boys who attacked Dietrich, beginning with whether or not I would 
deliberately avoid using their names. While Dietrich made her attackers’ names public, 
most news sources continued to avoid publicizing them, while in other spaces individuals 
encouraged the circulation of their names through a variety of strategies. However, the 
fact that the boys are no longer minors and the minimal effect that any publication on my 
part might have on the further circulation of their identities has led me to use their names 
whenever it seems appropriate or stylistically easiest. A further consideration, though, 
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was whether or not I would identify Frey and Zehnder as “rapists,” a tension I discuss 
later in this chapter. 
 In any case, as Dietrich’s story was circulated in a variety of ideologics, different 
details of aspects of the case were brought to the forefront. A great deal of discussion by 
Louisville locals focuses on Trinity High School, a Catholic boys school, and reveals 
some of the underlying local class tensions of the case. Frey and Zehnder both attended 
and played lacrosse for Trinity at the time of the rape, while Dietrich had recently 
transferred into the public school system. In some cases, these tensions manifested as 
competitiveness between schools, such as in Megan Schwartz’s comment: “If my son 
were at Trinity, I would be outraged! Fortunately, he goes to the only true zero tolerance 
school in Louisville, St. X….those predators would have been gone last year, regardless 
of legacy and money if they were at St. X…Trinity=ALL about the money and 
sports….NO CHARACTER…NO INTEGRITY…NO RESPECT FOR WOMEN” 
(Rancid Muffdiver). While this comment illustrates the long-standing rivalry between 
Trinity and St. Xavier, another Catholic boys school, others responded as outsiders to the 
Louisville private school circle. When Insider Louisville’s Curtis Morrison reported on 
the connection between Trinity High School and Richawlsky, he writes, “It’s difficult to 
live in Louisville and not know how connections among Trinity alumni and other private 
school grads provide many men privileges not enjoyed by the rest of us.” Likewise, some 
responders commented on the boys’ material circumstances as relevant to the case, like 
Lola-at-Large: “If they [Frey and Zehnder] had been from the west end (black) or south 
end (white trash), they would have been named somewhere. It’s only because they live in 
the east end (top 5%) that they got the treatment they did” (Rancid Muffdiver). In these 
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conversations, the immediate context of Louisville informs readers’ interpretations more 
than any larger cultural context; even though these comments can be seen as addressing 
class issues that are prevalent in any metropolitan area, they are framed quite specifically 
in Louisville’s schools, geography, and economic structures. 
 Outside of the immediate context of Louisville, two different narratives emerged: 
that of Dietrich’s case as a manifestation of rape culture and that of Dietrich’s case as one 
of First Amendment rights. The former of these was, unsurprisingly, propagated by 
feminist news sites and blogs, like Jezebel and Feministing. The scathing sarcasm of Julie 
Gazdag’s hellogiggles piece was perhaps unmatched in the other reports, but her 
comments reflect an underlying attitude toward the case by feminist respondents: “For 
everyone who’s heard about Savannah Dietrich’s court case, let’s please show some 
respect for the victims of this situation, OK? Those poor boys, who sexually assaulted an 
unconscious Savannah at a party, posted the pictures online making a public mockery of 
her, and then had to suffer the traumatic experience of having their names posted on 
twitter for all to see.” Comments in this vein, debating over who most deserves “victim” 
status in the case,” continued throughout the media coverage, especially after Mejia’s 
interview with the Huffington Post was released, but Gazdag also goes on to comment on 
the high recidivism rate of sexual criminals, arguing that lenient punishments only teach 
these predators how to better manipulate the system later on. Other writers expanded on 
this notion of victim-blaming to situate the case in larger political structures. For 
example, following the release of Richawlsky’s comments to Dietrich after she 
confronted him about the leniency of the plea deal, one anonymous writer at Inquisitr 
comments, “And this, folks, is the result of the rape culture promoted by politicians like 
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Paul Ryan and Todd Akin with questions over what is ‘legitimate rape’ because, by all 
accounts, what is known about Dietrich’s assault is most assuredly a crime and one might 
think warrants a serious charge.” Cara Kulwicki points out that even victim support 
organizations can perpetuate the silencing of victims; Kulwicki critiques comments made 
by Jo Ann Phillips, director of Kentuckians Voices for Crime Victims, in the initial 
Courier-Journal article, suggesting that rather than going against the court order, Dietrich 
should have turned to Phillips’s organization for help. Kulwicki writes, “Even 
organizations that are supposed to advocate for victims’ rights fail to critique the state’s 
authority. Indeed, they also reassert their own authority over the survivors’ rights and 
autonomy – she should have come to us, the experts, to tell her more about what she 
[was] and wasn’t allowed to do.” While these respondents criticize a number of different 
institutions, the ultimate conclusion is that the underlying misogyny in our culture has 
resulted in institutions that are fundamentally biased against women, especially victims of 
sexual assault and rape. As such, for many of these writers, this case serves as a prime 
illustration of the many ways the ideologic of rape culture operates in American culture. 
 For writers concerned with issues of constitutional rights, Dietrich’s case seems to 
very obviously be a situation in which individual’s right to free speech was violated by a 
court order. The two arenas in which this story was primarily propagated was among 
conservative bloggers and blogs by lawyers intended for popular consumption. On 
conservative blogs, the most common emotion expressed was outrage, which, as I 
discussed in the previous chapter, is one of the primary emotions prompting recirculation. 
While respondents working within the rape culture narrative also expressed a certain 
amount of outrage, conservative bloggers like Maggie of Maggie’s Notebook, Ellery 
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Davies, and Chuck Slowe tended to direct their anger toward individuals involved in the 
process rather than toward the larger institutions that feminist respondents tended to 
target. For example, Maggie calls out Dietrich’s legal counsel for providing insufficient 
guidance and support: “Apparently Ms. Dietrich’s attorneys were distracted, maybe a text 
came in or they were playing Angry Birds. […] She’s 17. How would she know [the 
appropriate response to the gag order] without her counsel guiding her? And where are 
her First Amendment Rights, and who is standing for them?” Maggie goes on to target 
the judge as well, especially focusing on gender: “So we have a female attorney who did 
not protect her client, and the name ‘Dee’ is usually a female name – so, a female Judge 
who had three minor[s] in her court and protected only the criminals.” While not calling 
out the individual judge, Davies places blame on the Jefferson County court system, 
writing,  
I, for one, respectfully disagree with the court. Wait a minute… That’s not 
truthful. I have NO respect for this court! […] This is my response to the 
state: Show us that you have more backbone than Kentucky blue grass 
[sic], a bucket of fried chicken, and thoroughbred horses. Don’t mock 
justice in Jefferson. Instead of relying on web vigilantes like me, post the 
photos below on your public crime log. 
 
This sense of web vigilantism was prominent among conservative bloggers, and they 
were far more likely to post the names and photos of Frey and Zehnder than the feminist 
respondents5. In fact, Slowe reported receiving a letter from Frey’s father, Bill, 
threatening legal action if Slowe did not remove Frey’s photo from his blog, citing 
                                                          
5. I would argue that because feminist respondents were often more interested in addressing 
institutional and systematic misogyny, they may have chosen not to name the boys as this would provide 
more focus on the individuals who committed the crimes rather than the culture that validated their choices. 
Interestingly, we may attribute this distinction to a fundamental, and perhaps stereotypical, divide in 
liberal/conservative ideology: the conservative focus on individual blame is perhaps a result of the 
domineering ideology of the rugged individual, while the more liberal/feminist perspective downplaying 
the individual in favor of addressing institutional and social forces reflects an ideology of collectivism. 
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copyright infringement. At this point, Slowe wrote two blog posts addressing Bill Frey 
directly (even going back to replace his initial post about Dietrich’s case with a new 
post), indicting the older Frey for his involvement in smearing the victim and the attitude 
of entitlement he has instilled in his son, further indicating a tendency to single out 
individuals for blame in the case. 
 The second group that viewed this case largely through the lens of rights was law 
bloggers. Some, like Eugene Volohk, address the technicalities of the law, specifically 
what can or cannot be considered confidential in these court cases. Volohk points out that 
Dietrich was not revealing information that she learned in the course of the court 
proceedings and that previous cases set the precedent that witnesses cannot be prevented 
from sharing their first-hand information. The comments on this post maintain this 
somewhat clinical tone as commenters debated the appropriate nomenclature for the 
defendants and whether or not the story was even worth the hype as contempt motions 
are largely meaningless until upheld by a judge. Other lawyers, like Maxwell S. Kennerly 
and the anonymous writer at Prosecutor’s Discretion, take a more personal stance. 
Kennerly relates Dietrich’s case to a previous blog post he had written regarding the First 
Amendments rights of private individuals versus the First Amendment rights of 
corporations; he takes Dietrich’s situation as further proof that “the First Amendment, the 
quintessential American right that ensures the protection of all the others, was losing its 
power as the sword of the people, instead being fashioned in to the shield of the 
powerful.” The anonymous blogger at Prosecutor’s Discretion approaches Dietrich’s 
case as a way to illustrate the sometimes complicated contradiction between a 
defendant’s rights and a victim’s rights, asking readers to consider whether one set of 
84 
 
rights should trump the other. While Volohk and his commenters are focusing on the 
specifics of this particular case, like conservative comments focused on the individuals 
involved, these latter two writers are more concerned with the systematic treatment of 
victims by the law, an approach more in line with the feminist institutional critiques.  
 A fourth narrative emerged, often coupled in with the rape culture or free speech 
narrative, that of public safety. As Gazdag noted, the recidivism rate among sexual 
criminals is relatively high, and many writers seemed aware of this. Since rapists rarely 
receive punishment that victims find appropriate for the seriousness of their crimes, many 
women have taken to using social media as a way to simultaneously out the rapist and 
warn other women away.  Thus, the naming of Frey and Zehnder as rapists and 
disseminating their photos becomes a particular purpose for many writers responding to 
the Dietrich case; as Tumblr user hana-rosemona wrote in her prominently reblogged 
post, “Spread their names and pictures to protect yourselves.” This is not necessarily a 
new strategy; Jessica Valenti opens her post of the case with a reference to the movie 
Girls Town and the practice of using bathroom walls as a place to record sex crimes and 
warn other women about predators. However, the digital component of these new 
bathroom walls – spaces like Tumblr and Facebook – adds a few new dimensions. While 
the fact that these messages may now spread much farther than a single town or school 
has been well-documented, I am also interested in how these web vigilantes are 
understanding time and memory, especially on the social blogging site Tumblr. Tumblr 
users seemed particularly aware of how Google search algorithms could be used to 
further their case. “Don’t just sign the petition,” user youngbadmanbrown added to hana-
rosemona’s initial post, “make sure to reblog this so their names stay in the google [sic] 
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cache. Forever” (qtd. in greeneyedzengirl). Other bloggers, following user dragonglass’s 
lead, reblogged after adding the phrase “Will Frey and Austin Zehnder are rapists,” often 
multiple times, playing with Google’s tendency to show pages that contain a high number 
of the search term. Tumblr users promoted the viral spread of posts featuring Zehnder and 
Frey’s photos and names to reduce the chances that their crimes could be kept under 
wraps through legal measures; as user cyber-logic says, “Their attorneys can’t prosecute 
me for a gag order not aimed at me […] Nor can they silence the entire fucking Internet.” 
 These four circulation paths that Dietrich’s story took demonstrate the ways in 
which a narrative may be picked up by different groups to be circulated for different 
reasons. In each of these cases, Dietrich’s narrative serves as further proof for the 
worldview already held by respondents, who focus on the details of the narrative that 
made the story meaningful to them. In doing so, they posited the story as worthy of 
circulation to other members of their groups and brought to the forefront the terms that 
articulated the story within their ideologics. The terms that become associated with the 
narrative, however, affect not just its circulation – as terms deeply influence the 
movement of a text through an ideologic – but also, in the recursive process of 
circulation, its interpretation and situation within particular ideologics. 
 
What We Talk About When We Talk About Rape: God-Terms, Ideographs, Nodal 
Points, and Narratives 
 While the most common point of contention in the conversation surrounding the 
case was whether or not Dietrich was justified in releasing the names of her attackers, the 
second sticking point for many commenters was the use of the term “rape” to describe the 
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event. Under Kentucky state law, the actions taken by the boys constituted “sexual abuse” 
but in other states, the same actions would be considered “rape.” Later, Zehnder’s 
attorney Mieja claimed that Dietrich’s use of the term “rape” to describe the event was 
dishonest, as the boys had been charged with sexual abuse and voyeurism. For some 
writers, like Kyra-lin Hom, this slip in terminology by Dietrich and others is what makes 
the boys additional victims in the situation: “It was the Internet’s rallying cry that really 
did the boys in – whether they deserved it or not. It was unassociated people on the 
Internet […] who really built and nailed that coffin, repeatedly incorrectly labeling the 
boys as rapists.” 
 The need displayed by commenters to lock down exactly what happened – 
whether it was “real” rape or not – is reflective of the term’s instability in mainstream 
discourse. In considering how the term itself functioned as a boundary, a piece of 
evidence, and a point of contention in this case, I am turning to rhetorical theoretical 
conceptions of “ultimate” terms. Rhetorical theorists have created or imported from other 
areas of study a cluster of terms for those words tied to transcendental ideas that function 
as “ultimate” (as Kenneth Burke would describe them) in a given ideology: Burke and 
Richard Weaver with “god-terms” and “devil-terms,” Michael Calvin McGee with 
“ideographs,” and Crowley with “nodal points.” Through a synthetization of these three 
terms, I hope to offer a new understanding of the ultimate term as situational and deeply 
embedded with narrative meaning. 
 While neither is attributed with the coining of the term, both Weaver and Burke 
used “god-term” to great effect in their writing in the early 1950s. Weaver defines god-
term as “that expression about which all other expressions are ranked as subordinate and 
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serving in dominations and powers. Its force imparts to the others their lesser degree of 
force, and fixes the scale by which degrees of comparison are understood” (212). He 
offers such examples as “progress” and “science,” highlighting the seemingly 
universally-agreed-on nature of such terms. Burke, on the other hand, identifies god-
terms as those terms that suggest a transcendental or universal purpose, keeping the 
spiritual connotations of the term: “For when means become ends,” he writes, and are 
sought to the exclusion of all else, then the man for whom they are thus transformed does 
indeed identify himself with a universal purpose, an over-all unitary design, quite as with 
mystical communion” (332). A key difference, though, is that while Burke would agree 
with Weaver that many god-terms are culturally defined and accepted, Burke also posits 
that god-terms may be entirely individual in their fascination. What these two scholars do 
agree on, however, is that god-terms often prompt sacrifice from individuals; Weaver 
writes, “This capacity to demand sacrifice is probably the surest indicator of the ‘god 
term,’ for when a term is so sacrosanct that the material goods of this life much be 
mysteriously rendered up for it, then we feel justified in saying that it is in some sense 
ultimate” (214). God-terms also have their opposites. Burke draws extensively on Jeremy 
Bentham’s conception of eulogistic and dyslogistic terms to a single god-terms’s many 
potential iterations, and Weaver introduces the “devil-term,” pointing specifically at the 
use of the term “un-American” in his own day (a state of affairs that has arguably 
continued into our own). The formation of eulogistic and dyslogistic terms allows 
theorists to take into account both the ultimate purposes and the ultimate enemies of a 
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given ideological moment.6 In additions the terms themselves – god-term and devil-term 
– suggest the affective impact that they have on audiences, coloring the use of these terms 
in vernacular as well as explicitly rhetorical language.   
 While Weaver and Burke cover a wide range of scenes of human action to explain 
god- and devil-terms, McGee focuses primarily on the realm of politics as he introduces 
the ideograph. McGee argues that “ideology in practice is a political language, preserved 
in rhetorical documents, with the capacity to dictate decision and control public belief 
and behavior. Further, the political language which manifests ideology seems 
characterized by slogans, a vocabulary of ‘ideographs’ easily mistaken for the technical 
terminology of political philosophy” (5). McGee understands these ideographs as part of 
“‘structures’ of public motives” that “have the capacity both to control ‘power’ and to 
influence (if not determine) the shape and texture of each individual’s ‘reality.’” 
Highlighting Weaver’s concern with ethical rhetorical practices and Burke’s focus on 
uncovering human motives, McGee differentiates ideographs from god-terms, claiming 
that ideographs call attention to “the social, rather than rational or ethical, functions of a 
particular vocabulary” (8). That is, McGee emphasizes the ways in which ideographs 
may serve as border terms between groups, writing that  
one can therefore precisely define the differences between two 
communities, in part, by comparing the usage of definitive ideographs. 
[…] So we are divided by usage into subgroups: Business and labor, 
Democrats and Republicans, Yankees and Southerners are united by the 
ideographs that represent the political entity “United States” and separated 
by a disagreement as to the practical meaning of such ideographs. (8, 
emphasis in original) 
 
                                                          
6. I am adopting the term “moment” from Crowley, who adopts it from Laclau and Mouffe, to 
couple the notion of an ideological position with a sense of temporality and history. 
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In additional to, and perhaps because of, the way the practical meanings of ideographs 
mark borders, McGee notes that ideographs shift over time: “when we engage in 
ideological argument, when we cause ideographs to do work in explaining, justifying, or 
guiding policy in specific situations, the relationships of ideographs changes” (13). 
Crowley’s preferred term “nodal points,” borrowed from Laclau and Mouffe, also carries 
with it connotations of shifting relationships while also suggesting places of 
sedimentation. Crowley writes that “within hegemony meanings become fixed around 
‘nodal points’ that stabilize moments or positions in such a way that they seem natural 
rather than constructed. […] Nodal points seem to arrest and even stabilize the movement 
of difference, and hence they limit the possibility that openings or spaces for dissent may 
appear within hegemony” (63). As I noted earlier, Crowley describes these limitations as 
primarily occurring through well-worn pathways between nodal points so that reactions 
by individuals become somewhat automatic.  
 While each term has its various connotations and theoretical baggage, it is worth 
noting a few key shared characteristics. First of all, all three concepts are described as 
limiting an individual’s perception of reality in some regard. For Burke and Weaver, 
because the god-term is ultimate and transcendental, adherents to it feel little need to 
inquire further into the nature of “progress” or “science.” Crowley describes nodal points 
as limiting openings for dissent, and McGee argues that the structures that ideographs 
manifest influence and possibly determine one’s understanding of reality. Furthermore, 
each individual assumes that all other individuals understand the many layers of meaning 
found in the god-term/ideograph/nodal point; as McGee writes, these terms 
“presumptuously suggest that each member of a community will see as a gestalt every 
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complex nuance in them” (7). Ultimate terms are often incorporated into discourse 
without interrogation of meaning, even though a pair of interlocutors might have very 
different assumptions regarding meaning. These different assumptions about what terms 
mean are often related to a third shared characteristic, that ultimate terms always exist in 
relation (and often in hierarchical relation) to other ultimate terms, relations that allow 
these terms to contain such a great amount of meaning. As such, a single god-
term/ideograph/nodal point may mean two different things to two different individuals 
based on the ideologic network to which each individual feels that term belongs.  
 I would argue that another way god-terms7 contain meaning is through the variety 
of narratives that may be embodied by the term. As McGee notes of ideographs, ultimate 
terms are by their very nature abstract and retain meaning only through application: “No 
one has ever seen an ‘equality’ strutting up the driveway, so if ‘equality’ exists at all, it 
has meaning through its specific application” (10). Because of their abstract nature, god-
terms are often defined through the use of generic narratives, which may or may not have 
personal details attached to them. For example, often when Americans try to define the 
“equal opportunity” of which we are so proud, we turn to the “bootstraps” narrative in 
which an individual from a poor family may, through hard work, sacrifice, and 
perseverance, obtain financial success. Usually this narrative documents a series of steps 
that highlight the work of the individual: academic success through many hours spent 
studying, significant amounts of leg work to obtain and succeed at early jobs, sacrificing 
                                                          
7. While each term has its own merit, and while others may argue that they are distinctly different, 
I continue to see these three concepts – god-terms, ideographs, and nodal points – as descriptive markers of 
the same class of phenomenon. I have chosen to use “god-term” as the generic term for this sort of 
phenomenon because it reflects the affective value of these terms in a way that neither “ideograph” nor 
“nodal point” do.  
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time with family and friends in order to work, and finally the achievement of happiness 
and success, often illustrated through the notion that the individual’s children will have a 
better life than he or she had growing up. This narrative, however, is not shared among all 
ideologics; in fact, it is one of the primary nodal points of the white patriarchal capitalist 
hegemony. Other ideologics may define “equal opportunity” through different narratives, 
narratives that do not necessarily coincide with current material circumstances; feminist 
ideologics may highlight the wage gap between men and women across fields while anti-
racist ideologics would call attention to the unequal education opportunities for racial and 
ethnic minorities and the school-to-prison pipeline among other disadvantages. This 
discrepancy among narratives is one of the ways that ultimate terms serve to demarcate 
the boundaries of ideologies, as McGee argues. To use his example, asking American and 
Soviet citizens in 1980 (at least those who genuinely buy into their respective forms of 
government) what “equality” is would result in different narratives about an individual’s 
relationship to other individuals and to a governing body.  
 The term “rape” offers an interesting case for illustrating this theory. Notably, 
while the other dominant god-term in the Dietrich case, “free speech,” fits rather neatly 
into the vocabulary of political life that Burke, Weaver, McGee, and Crowley highlight in 
their discussions, there is little work on the rhetorical value of the term “rape.” I contend 
that “rape” operates as a god-term is many situations, but it does not operate the same 
way in every situation. While it fits McGee’s criteria of abstractness – “rape” indicates a 
quality of an interaction between two or more people rather than a thing in and of itself – 
it is perceived as “ultimate” differently in different ideologics. For feminists, “rape” is an 
ultimate term in the way it sums up a history of women being used by men as objects. As 
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Susan Brownmiller documents in her foundational work Against Our Wills, the “crime” 
of rape was established as the violating by one man of another man’s property; the raping 
of women by conquering men was merely another way to subjugate the conquered, along 
with the seizing of goods and property. While much of this history is now summed up in 
the term “rape culture” – from catcalling and workplace harassment to the 
characterization of women as prizes won by the male protagonists of video games and 
movies, from the virgin/whore dichotomy and lack of access to birth control to the 
treatment of women of color as decoration or background – “rape” remains the Ur-
violation of the feminist worldview, the fundamental objectification of women. 
 Among other groups, though, “rape” holds a different kind of ultimate status. For 
example, many patriarchal ideologics perceive the claim of rape as a kind of trump card 
against which there is no appeal, similar to how Weaver describes “un-American” (222). 
Some men’s rights activist argue that women use the accusation of rape as a means to 
retaliate against men or to hide their own promiscuity. Todd Akins remarks regarding 
“legitimate rape” succinctly sum up this belief that not everything women would call 
“rape” is actually rape and highlights the importance of narratives in defining ultimate 
terms like rape, especially since rape is an embodied experience. Akins and other like him 
hold that “legitimate rape” follows a particular narrative: A woman, who is not by her 
clothing or demeanor giving any indication that she is interested in sexual contact, is 
confronted, perhaps in her home or perhaps in public, by a strange man who threatens her 
with violence. The woman resists verbally and/or physically but is overcome by the man, 
who engages in vaginal intercourse with her. That this is the dominant narrative of rape is 
demonstrated by the fact that other narratives are identified by more specific names: date 
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rape, spousal rape, male rape, anal rape, rape with an object, etc. A genuine “legitimate” 
rape can serve as justification for retaliation. Men who assault or even murder the rapists 
of their wives/girlfriends/daughters are often seen in a sympathetic light, whether in 
fiction or real life. Women, however, are rarely afforded the same consideration. In 
Dietrich’s case, some respondents suggested that if she was really raped, then she was 
justified in naming attackers that were given a lesser charge of sexual abuse. This kind of 
statement, however, calls into question Dietrich’s own assessment of her experiences as 
rape. A substantial number of others argued that, regardless of the crime committed 
against her, Dietrich should not have outed the boys, especially if the details of the case 
may be regarded as murky. 
Much of the work of feminist activists in the last three decades has been to 
expand the number of narratives that are included in the term “rape.” According to 
Kenneth Plummer, “forced sex and sexual violence towards women (and sometimes men) 
has probably existed throughout history. But it does not dwell within the same meanings, 
discourses and stories. Rape is always historically and culturally specific, and how it is 
understood depends on a framework of story telling” (63). As such, feminists like 
Brownmiller were tasked with developing a new narratives in which rape occurred. 
Plummer writes, “Three important strategies in the creation of the new story were (1) 
debunking the myths, (2) the creation of a history and (3) the writing of a political plot,” 
a statement that could serve as a succinct summation of Against Our Will (67). The 
relative success of this project is debatable. On the one hand, we do now have terms like 
“date rape” and “spousal rape” that give women new ways to talk about violent sexual 
interactions with men. On the other hand, while Donald Trump’s advisor Michael Cohen 
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was roundly criticized for claiming “you cannot rape your spouse,” Trump’s own history 
of sexual violence against women did not prevent him from continuing his presidential 
campaign. In addition, if the storylines on television shows like Law & Order: SVU are 
any indication of the way mainstream audiences can imagine rape, many experiences are 
left outside the purview of the term, such as when a man is not violent or aggressive but 
is annoying to the point that a woman gives exasperated consent just to get some peace. 
Perhaps some of the push-back against expanding the narratives of rape is that it 
would also expand the definition of “rapist,” which is universally treated as a devil-term. 
One common assumption regarding women who argue for the reality of rape culture is 
that they are also arguing that all men are rapists, an assertion that is vehemently denied – 
consider the rapid traction of the “Not All Men” hashtag following the 2014 Isla Vista 
shooting in which shooter Elliot Rodger explicitly indicated that he was punishing 
women for not having sex with him. Though the comparison should not be taken too far, 
the terms “rapist” and “racist” seem to have similar effects; they serve as terms of 
ultimate demonization, not to be thrown around lightly lest one ruin another’s reputation. 
As John Metta notes in his essay following the Charleston church shooting, “The entire 
discussion of race in America centers around the protection of White feelings;” similarly, 
women cannot say that, yes, all men are complicit in the systematic oppression of women 
without running the risk of alienating potential allies. Instead they say that, yes, all 
women experience sexism. 
Because of the current treatment of rape as a relatively minor offense, feminists 
often find themselves in a position of non-negotiation. By this I mean that, while we may 
find ourselves in positions of sympathizing with a shoplifter or a murderer because of the 
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circumstances in which they found themselves, doing so with a person accused of rape – 
a move that mainstream patriarchal ideologics often make – would ultimately harm 
feminist progress regarding the prosecution and prevention of rape. To put it another way, 
we can engage in arguments regarding free speech with the understanding that there are 
nuances and complexities at play, that the context and material circumstances of an act of 
speech matter, because free speech is already regarded as an important and serious issue 
that warrants such careful consideration. In the case of rape, however, allowing those 
nuances to become part of the conversation would rarely work in feminism’s favor. 
Similarly, because of the harm a term like “rapist” can do to an individual’s reputation, 
patriarchal opposition may be equally hard-nosed, lest some individual be identified as 
“kind of a rapist.” Feminists and their opposition may find it impossible to engage in 
dialogue as both sides find it more important to shore up their own positions against 
assault by the other because they perceive themselves as at risk of losing ground 
(“perceive” being a key word here with regard to dominant, mainstream anti-feminist 
sentiments). 
A sticking point seems to be the difficulty in shifting between the macro reality of 
rape culture and the implications that may have for individuals, those who might then be 
called “rapists.” In part, our hesitancy to ascribe the label of “rapist” to others is a result 
of our tendency to see rapists (and other sex criminals) as beyond rehabilitation. While it 
is possible for us to imagine a variety of crimes, like theft or the buying and selling of 
illegal substances or even murder, as the result of unfortunate social circumstance, 
ideologics that eschew the concept of rape culture can only treat rape as the manifestation 
of a person’s essential immoral nature. Thus, we may avoid calling an act “rape” or its 
96 
 
perpetrator a “rapist” in order to continue to believe that rehabilitation is possible. This 
becomes even more apparent when, like in the Dietrich case, the perpetrators of the crime 
are young; the stated purpose of withholding the names of juvenile offenders is to aid in 
their rehabilitation. This tension seems to be at the heart of my own hesitancy to use the 
term “rapists” that I described earlier, lest I interpellate Frey and Zehnder into identities 
they cannot escape even should they one day come to understand the privileged positions 
they occupy.  
 
Circulation, God-Terms, and Ideologics 
 Like “I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother,” the Dietrich case demonstrates the role that 
controversy plays in circulation. Also like “I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother,” Dietrich’s case 
highlights what gets perceived as controversial, especially given that the case gained no 
attention before Dietrich took to Twitter with her story. However, the Dietrich case also 
illustrates how a story may gain wide circulation through its easy entry into multiple 
mainstream ideologics. Because respondents could identify Dietrich’s story with the god-
term “rape culture,” it slipped easily into the larger world view that “rape culture” entails. 
Likewise, because respondents could identify the story with the god-term “free speech,” 
it could be circulated as proof of the wide-spread attack on free speech many subscribers 
to certain conservative ideologics fear. Through its identification with these two different 
god-terms, Dietrich’s story was circulated across the political spectrum without “liberal” 
and “conservative” reactions being directly oppositional. 
 Arguably, the circulation of Dietrich’s story with the god-terms of “rape culture” 
and “free speech” does little to expand our available means of imagination regarding rape 
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– subscribers to feminist ideologics already understand that labeling what happened to 
Dietrich as rape is both political and necessary, while subscribers to the constitutional 
fundamentalist ideologics that circulated the case as part of free speech discourse seemed 
to perceive no reason to address the issue of rape. On the other hand, the cross-pollination 
of these two ideologics – the fact that one might find both if one went on an Internet 
search for more information – can perhaps extend how we imagine victims of sexual 
abuse navigating the criminal justice system. For some readers, having the lawyers agree 
with the feminists that something is serious wrong with the system may make the 
feminists appear more credible in future claims. For feminist activists interested in 
highlighting the material circumstances of victims and their experiences attempting to 
find justice, identifying other potential arenas of circulation and tailoring arguments for 
those ideologics is one strategy for promoting the overall circulation of victim narratives 
and increasing the available means of imagination for the American public when it comes 
to victims’ experiences. In the following chapter, in which I focus on the event that 
became known as GamerGate, we will see in greater detail the ways in which rhetors may 
make choices based on the ideologics in which they wish their arguments to circulate and 





“WHY DO YOU WANT TO CHANGE THE WORLD? I GIVE A SHIT WHEN THE 
WORLD TRIES TO CHANGE STUFF I LIKE”: 
#GAMERGATE, CONSPIRACY NARRATIVE, AND THE RECURSIVE 
RELATIONSHIP OF NARRATIVE AND ETHOS 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, we saw how a personal narrative may be taken up and 
circulated by different groups, often based on how those groups fit the narrative into 
preexisting ideologics. In this chapter, I will continue to explore how a narrative may be 
interpreted and then utilized by different groups by examining the event that came to be 
known as GamerGate. GamerGate falls into the purview of my project because it began 
with a personal narrative: on August 16, 2014, computer programmer Eron Gjoni 
published a series of blog posts, collectively called The Zoe Post, describing his 
relationship and subsequent break up with indie game designer Zoe Quinn, who had 
recently attained some notoriety for the success of her game Depression Quest and her 
outspoken criticism of the long-standing misogyny and homophobia in the games 
industry. Gjoni admitted in a later interview that he designed his narrative to incite vitriol 
toward Quinn, ideally ending her games career, and he achieve at least part of his goal: 
following the publication of The Zoe Post, Quinn received unprecedented levels of 
harassment online, and soon other women in the industry, including journalists like Leigh 
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Alexander and critics like Anita Sarkeesian, were also being threatened (Jason). 
Meanwhile, those who attacked Quinn, whether by arguing that The Zoe Post revealed 
that her success was undeserved or by engaging in death and rape threats, claimed that 
they were not opposed to women in the gaming industry but were concerned by nepotism 
and unethical practices in games journalism. Over the following months, GamerGaters 
(those who argued that the games industry had become corrupt) and anti-GamerGaters or 
Social Justice Warriors8 (those who argued that GamerGaters represented the 
overwhelmingly misogynistic nature of games culture) worked to forward their own 
interpretations of The Zoe Post and its fallout and fought to make their narratives The 
Narrative of GamerGate. 
 Because GamerGate was an extended event that resulted in an incredible number 
of artifacts, textual or otherwise, I have opted to focus on four narrative moments that 
illustrate the ways in which each side responded to new shifts in the narrative of the 
other, primarily focusing on the practices and discourse of GamerGaters. The first two 
narrative moments, The Zoe Post and early responses to it, illustrate the larger 
misogynistic ideologics in which GamerGaters operated as well as their dependency on 
conspiracy narrative tropes to make sense of the event and circulate it to others. The latter 
two narrative moments, the Death of Gamers articles and #NotYourShield, occur after 
GamerGate moved into the mainstream and reveal a shift in GamerGater focus from 
collecting evidence in line with conspiracy epistemologies to developing a coherent ethos 
for the group that presented itself as moderate, inclusive, and unbiased. While we can see 
                                                          
8. “Social Justice Warrior” or, more commonly, SJW has become a commonly used, often 
derogatory term in online discussions to denote anyone who argues against racist, heterosexist, patriarchal 
norms of media and culture. 
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many of the same phenomena that I have examined in previous chapters, including the 
role of emotion in motivating circulation and the interpretation and use of narrative by 
different ideological groups, GamerGate illustrates a somewhat different role of narrative 
in rhetorical practice. In the cases of “I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother” and Savannah 
Dietrich, narratives were used as evidence to support larger arguments or worldviews, 
whether they be about mental health care for children, rape culture, or free speech rights. 
In the case of GamerGate, a narrative was crafted to deliberately discredit, threaten, and 
provoke hostile and violent reactions toward an individual. Additionally, we have access 
to interviews with the participants and a rich collection of behind-the-scenes discussion 
regarding the construction of the narratives at play which allow us some sense of how 
rhetors are imagining circulation prior to releasing their texts into the world9, providing a 
more nuanced picture of the recursive nature of the available means of persuasion. 
 A quick word about language: I have quoted extensively from GamerGaters 
throughout this chapter and have standardized spelling, capitalization, and punctuation 
where I deemed it appropriate for ease of reading. However, I have maintained the 
offensive language and slurs that are an inherent part of GamerGater discourse in order to 
demonstrate to readers the disconnect between everyday GamerGater practice and their 
purported commitments. Additionally, I have opted to refer to those who opposed 
GamerGaters collectively as SJWs, as that is the term that GamerGaters used and serves 
well to highlight their monolithic characterization of their opponents. 
                                                          
9. Jim Ridolfo encourages the use of ethnographic methods like observation and interviews to 
learn more about how rhetors plan for circulation, but new materialist methods of following and tracing 
served me well here, as GamerGate was a well-documented event in many ways, with several individuals 




The Zoe Post 
As the text that began GamerGate, The Zoe Post deserves careful consideration 
for the ways it sets the tone for the debate that followed. In The Zoe Post, Gjoni describes 
his relationship with Quinn, documents her many infidelities and his discovery of them, 
and implicitly argues that Quinn is a compulsive liar and manipulator, all the while 
painting himself as the victim. He describes his story, arranged in seven acts and 
beginning with “Act 0,” as “written almost entirely in shitty metaphors and bitter snark.” 
He also notes that the story’s initial publication venues were the discussion forums of 
Penny Arcade and Something Awful, two websites popular in the gaming community, but 
that his threads were removed, foreshadowing the concerns regarding censorship brought 
up in early responses to the story, particular in the forums of games news website The 
Escapist. Gjoni opens with a quick overview of the happy parts of his relationship with 
Quinn before ending “Act 0” with the revelation that Quinn had been cheating on him 
with her boss, Joshua Boggs. His closing remark in this post hints at even more scandal to 
come: “the above conversation happens a few days after a considerably more painful one, 
where I discover almost none of the things I loved about her were true.” Gjoni’s framing 
of his narrative in acts, his use of delayed revelations, and his cynical prose style lend the 
narrative a certain literary air – Gjoni is an engaging writer telling the kind of train-wreck 
relationship story that is hard to look away from. But Gjoni does not rely solely on his 
ethos to make his argument; he presents evidence of his claims regarding Quinn’s 
character in the form of screenshots of chat logs and text messages they exchanged. He 
even utilizes a citation system in which numbers listed in the body of his text direct 
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readers to specific moments in the chat logs. The use of screenshots as evidence was 
pervasive throughout GamerGate, when GamerGaters would collect images of Twitter 
exchanges, reviews of games, and personal emails and compose collages that allegedly 
demonstrated the unethical relationships among game developers, journalists, and 
corporate sponsors. Gjoni even posts a video of him pulling up the chat logs on his 
computer as evidence that the chat logs were not invented, an attempt to head-off 
accusations of the digital manipulation of the images he provides. 
The ultimate goal of Gjoni’s narrative, beyond publicizing the fact of Quinn’s 
infidelity, is to damage Quinn’s reputation by demonstrating that she is a hypocrite, a liar, 
and mentally unstable, though he frames this goal as a “warning” to others who might 
develop professional or personal relationships with Quinn in the future. In “Act 0,” Gjoni 
outlines some of the recurring themes came up in his conversations with Quinn: 
1. Stories about how the grief and confusion of being raised by a 
pathological liar taught her to make it a point to always say what she 
meant, and to communicate at face value. 
2. Stories about an extremely manipulative ex-husband, who would do things 
like refuse to stop wearing the ring from his last relationship, and make 
her feel terrible or insane for any discomfort she expressed – though he 
was in fact cheating on her as he was making her feel terrible for being 
worried. 
3. The pain of spending most of her childhood alone, as well as the injustice 
of being ostracized from various groups and communities in her 
adulthood. 
4. Views on the ethics of infidelity. Which she maintain is inherently wrong 
even if the person who was cheated on never finds out, because (aside 
from willingly endangering their partner by way of increased STD risk) if 
the unfaithful party then has sex with their partner, they are doing so under 
false pretenses, and therefore without their partner’s consent. That is, sex 
with a partner who doesn’t know you’ve cheated on them is sex without 
consent. 
 
Gjoni follows this list by saying “There were other strong principled positions,” 
indicating perhaps that Gjoni chose to elaborate on these while leaving aside those 
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stances that Quinn did not seemingly violate in their relationship. However, the notion of 
a “strong principled position” or “strong principle stance” comes up throughout the 
narrative any time Gjoni wishes to highlight Quinn’s hypocrisy, reminding us of this 
initial list. 
Throughout The Zoe Post, Gjoni relays personal information that he gleaned from 
Zoe during their relationship, such as details about how she feels about her childhood and 
previous relationships, to support his claim of her manipulative nature. For example, after 
a well-publicized disagreement with Youtube personality JonTron, known in gaming 
circles for his comedic reviews of video games, Quinn posted to her social media that she 
had nothing against JonTron and that the dispute had been played up by the reality 
television context of the disagreement. Gjoni, however, states that Quinn frequently 
spoke badly of JonTron and describes her post as lying to her followers. Gjoni ultimately 
paints himself as the victim in the situation, describing in detail the mental health 
problems he suffered during the relationship as a result of Zoe’s emotional abuse. 
Moreover, he does this in such a way as to silence Quinn’s concerns about her career and 
her own mental health. For instance, when Quinn expresses her fear that the wife of one 
of her sexual partners will go public, bringing undue scrutiny to her private life – 
especially since women are more likely to be shamed for having sex outside of strictly 
prescribed bounds – Gjoni write these concerns off as another example of Quinn lying to 
the public. Likewise, Gjoni depicts Quinn’s attempts to cut ties with him, unfriending 
him on Facebook and not responding to messages and texts, as strategic moves to give 
him less incriminating material should he decide to public, completely ignoring her claim 





Unfortunately, Quinn’s concerns regarding the emphasis placed on her sexual 
history were not unfounded, and early reactions to The Zoe Post manifested many of the 
same ideologics of rape culture criticized by feminist respondents in the Savannah 
Dietrich case, though some of these early GamerGaters attempted to disguise their 
misogyny. Initial discussion of The Zoe Post took place primarily on gaming discussion 
forums and YouTube with different groups emphasizing the aspects of Gjoni’s narrative 
that fit in with their preexisting concerns, much like what happened with Dietrich’s story. 
Many people became aware of The Zoe Post after gaming vlogger MundaneMatt posted a 
video describing Gjoni’s story and offering his own commentary. MundaneMatt is one of 
the first to suggest that the positive reception of Quinn’s game Depression Quest was due 
to her personal (and sexual) relationships with gaming journalists, in particular Kotaku 
writer Nathan Grayson. He introduces the issue of journalistic integrity – which became 
key to GamerGaters arguments in the month to follow – stating, “There’s a lot going on 
behind the scenes in the indie world of gaming right now. And in essence, it’s 
incestuous.” This is not the first time, MundaneMatt argues, that he has expressed these 
concerns about indie gaming and journalism, though a quick survey of his previous 
videos might suggest that he is more concerned about keeping feminists out of gaming 
than issues of journalistic integrity.  
On the forums of games news website The Escapist, the conversation primarily 
focused around whether or not Gjoni’s revelations of Quinn’s infidelity was 
“newsworthy,” with original poster (OP) Rebant questioning why gaming journalism 
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sites (like The Escapist) were not reporting on the connections between Quinn and 
Grayson in their initial post “Zoe Quinn and the Surrounding Controversy.” In the early 
discussion, most participants argued that the story was gossip, personal, and not worth the 
attention of news sites, but Rebant pushed back, writing, “when a feminist game 
developer causes what in my opinion would be a scandal, that’s a big deal” (Post #8). 
When a respondent suggested that Rebant was engaging in slut shaming, Rebant replied, 
“She [Quinn] acted like a slut and deserves shaming for what she did, setting the 
legitimacy of feminism back a whole ton by being a massive hypocrite” (Post #12). 
Another user retorted, “the only thing this has to do with feminism is that she’s [Quinn is] 
a feminist. In case this has slipped everyone’s minds again, a feminist doing something 
bad should not be used by anyone concerned with intellectual honesty to say something 
about the entirety of feminism” (LifeCharacter, Post #15). Rebant responded by arguing 
that due to her public and outspoken persona, Quinn is a spokesperson for feminism 
before articulating a dominant theory regarding feminism to explain the absence of the 
scandal from gaming news: 
People who are [certain of] their view point being the only correct 
one will interpret any non-fitting post as a troll post [a post intended to 
incite anger and derail conversation rather than an authentic engagement 
in the debate]. It’s a common mechanism and this confirmation bias is 
pretty much proven by psychology. I’d appreciate it if you stopped calling 
me a conspiracy theorist for making the absolutely ludicrous suggestion 
that there are feminists in charge of forums and they abuse their 
moderation powers by [interpreting oppositional posts as trolling]. That’s 
a legitimate [real, documented by psychologists] thing, and it’s what the 
power of moderation does to people. 
While I agree that one should not overgeneralize and nitpick, I 
think it’s justified in this case to call attention to the hypocrisy as a 
symptom, since that’s exactly the argument feminism uses when 




This turning of what they perceive to be feminist values or feminist interpretive practice 
against feminism and feminists to reveal the built-in hypocrisy of the movement is a 
common tactic in anti-feminist arguments. More specifically, critics of feminism 
frequently argue that by focusing on women’s issues and representations, feminists 
deliberately ignore and silence male voices (and sometimes, these critics claim, the 
voices of LGBT folks as well), promoting exclusivity rather than inclusivity.  
The conversation was very different on the GameFAQs forum “Game Developer 
in Bed with Gaming Journalist,” where participants readily condemned both feminists 
and SJWs without offering any reasons for their condemnation, indicating that anti-
feminist sentiment is a commonplace of this particular arena, unlike The Escapist forums, 
where feminists seemed more likely to self-identify and participate. Instead, much of the 
commentary focused on Quinn’s physical appearance, including comments like the 
following: 
 “She looks like a man.” (Lootman, Post #64) 
 “Lol ugly girls cheat even more.” (SleepComa, Post #72) 
 “I’ve never heard of her, but a Google search reveals that she looks kind of 
disgusting.” (seryou101, Post #92) 
 Quinn is “an amoral sack of lumpy mashed potatoes wearing a colorful wig.” 
(Loshadt, Post #127) 
 
These kinds of comments gained traction after photos supposedly showing a nude Quinn 
began circulating. In this forum, there is little to no comment on either the 
newsworthiness of the item or the potential breach in journalistic integrity. Instead, 
participants rally around well-established assumptions regarding feminists as 
hypocritical, manipulative, and physically unattractive. 
These two forums both reflect popular discourses regarding the relationship 
between feminists and mainstream culture. As feminist critiques of media and culture 
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have become more visible, online movements like men’s rights activism and 
#Idontneedfeminism seek to debunk the feminist “myth” of the systematic oppression of 
women by men. Men’s rights activists instead argue that men have been quantifiably 
harmed by feminism, especially in terms of educational and employment opportunities, in 
cases of divorce and child custody, and with regards to falsified rape and sexual 
harassment charges. Using #Idontneedfeminism, women circulated messages portraying 
feminists as man-haters who expected unreciprocated respect from men, as perpetuating 
the man=agent / woman=victim binary, as manipulative pro-abortion activists who expect 
the American people to take financial responsibility for their sexual choices, and as 
opposed to feminine appearance and performance by women (interestingly, many of these 
messages appeared on handwritten signs held by white, conventionally attractive young 
women). These arguments against feminism are not new, but the vocalness of their 
proponents increased following the Isla Vista killings on May 23, 2014, in which Elliot 
Rodger announced his intention to punish women for refusing to have sex with him in a 
YouTube video before killing seven people and injuring fourteen others. As I discussed 
briefly in the previous chapter, some men pushed back against having this killing spree 
described as evidence of widespread and systematic misogyny, beginning the hashtag 
#NotAllMen, and feminists answered these protestations of innocence with stories of 
their experiences with sexual harassment, catcalling, violence, and rape, collected under 
#YesAllWomen. One point that feminist respondents at this time tried to make clear was 
that not being extreme in one’s misogyny was not the same as being completely guiltless. 
As writer Laurie Penny says in an interview for NPR’s All Things Considered, “The 
language used on men’s rights activists’ forums is an extreme version of language that 
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you see everywhere on the Web. [...] It’s not just sites which are dedicated to hating and 
slut-shaming women – it’s online video games; it’s YouTube and Facebook.” 
For the gaming community, former Jeopardy champion Arthur Chu’s article 
“Your Princess Is in Another Castle” was a clear indictment of common assumptions 
regarding women and sex that Rodger espoused. The title of this article is taken from the 
game Super Mario Bros. 1 where, following every boss except the final one, Mario is 
thanked for his hard work but told that his ultimate goal/prize, Princess Peach, is still out 
of his reach. Chu writes at length regarding the dominant narratives of male nerds and 
women: that these young men will always lust after girls “out of their league” (since the 
idea of seeking out and dating women who share their own nerdy interests is never 
presented as a possibility); that these men will persistently stalk and harass these women 
with the goal of “wearing them down” (represented most pointedly in the character of 
Steve Urkel from the 1990s sitcom Family Matters); that after putting in their time as the 
friend who is always there while the woman in question goes through countless breakups 
with jocks and rich boys, these nerdy men will be rewarded when the woman in question 
discovers her feelings for him; and that, barring that, the young nerdy man may attain the 
object of their desires through trickery and deceit (as seen in Revenge of the Nerds when 
Lewis puts on a Darth Vader mask and pretends to be a woman’s boyfriend to have sex 
with her). Chu then writes about the anger and frustration young male nerds like himself 
experience when they do everything according to these narratives and still don’t get the 
girl in the end, describing the hateful language that he has heard from others and used 
himself, arguing “when our clever ruses and schemes to ‘get girls’ fail, it’s not because 
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the girls are too stupid or too bitchy or too shallow to play by those unwritten rules we’ve 
absorbed.” 
Chu’s summary of how young nerdy men, including male gamers, are trained to 
view women is clearly manifested in the GamesFAQ forum, where Quinn’s physical 
attractiveness is the primary point of discussion, demonstrating the disdain that male 
nerds may feel toward women who are share their interests but aren’t conventionally 
beautiful. Additionally, Gjoni and others are indirectly criticized for choosing to engage 
in sexual relationships with her, almost as though they should be chastised for settling 
instead of setting their sights on more attractive women. The points raised by Rebant on 
The Escapist forum and by MundaneMatt on YouTube, however, reflect the common 
arguments of men’s rights proponents more generally by drawing on popular conceptions 
of feminists as manipulative and hypocritical. Further, MundaneMatt, Rebant, and others 
seem to believe that feminists (both women and male allies) are coming to control large 
portions of the video games media, especially channels of review and criticism, resulting 
in poor reviews for video games that do not adhere to their strict expectations regarding 
the depiction of women and their relationships to men. 
 
Red Pill/Blue Pill: Conspiracy Narrative and Social Reality 
 In many regards, the narrative regarding SJWs constructed by GamerGaters 
manifests characteristics of conspiracy rhetoric, beginning with the early assumptions 
that games news sites were ignoring The Zoe Post and its scandal in order to protect the 
interests of the SJWs controlling the sites. As G. Thomas Goodnight and John Poulakos 
note, “conspiracy awareness usually begins following the appearance of an unusual 
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event: an illegal act, an accident, a significant mistake with important consequence. The 
event draws interest because it represents a human tragedy, or, alternatively, a comic 
departure from the normal course of public affairs” (302). The Zoe Post delivers on both 
accounts: Gjoni’s tragic story of love and betrayal employs a comedic tone that suggests 
that it would all be so funny if it was happening to someone else, given how extreme the 
infidelity is. Gjoni was well-aware of his audience’s desires and expectations; interviewer 
Zachary Jason writes, 
As Gjoni began to craft “The Zoe Post,” his early drafts read like a “really 
boring, really depressing legal document,” he says. He didn’t want to 
merely prove his case; it had to read like a potboiler. So he deliberately 
punched up the narrative in the voice of a bitter ex-boyfriend, organizing it 
into seven acts with dramatic titles like “Damage Control” and “The Cum 
Collage May Not Be Accurate.” He ended sections on cliffhangers, and 
wove in video-game analogies to grab the attention of Quinn’s industry 
colleagues. He was keenly aware of attracting an impressionable 
readership. “If I can target people who are in the mood to read stories 
about exes and horrible breakups,” he says now, “I will have an audience.” 
 
The Zoe Post in and of itself was a horrible break-up story, not a conspiracy; the 
conspiracy became apparent in games journalists’ lack of reaction to the story, which had 
individuals like Rebant and MundaneMatt questioning the backstage workings of games 
journalism sites. The conspiracy (or “Quinnspiracy,” as some called it) built as people 
found more evidence to suggest that Quinn had received professional promotion from 
people with whom she had personal relationships and that other games journalists had 
promoted friends and acquaintances.  
 After an individual or group becomes aware of the conspiracy, argue Goodnight 
and Poulakos, they begin the process of hawking their newly discovered social reality and 
decrying the falsity of the mainstream perception of the conspiracy. In these discussions, 
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Typically, the question centers around the nature of rhetorical proofs: the 
evidence, credibility, and emotional arguments of both the accuser and 
accused […] For those convinced of conspiracy, more evidence leads only 
to greater uncertainty. Since the nature or degree of conspiracy cannot be 
known beforehand, and since part of a conspirator’s duty is to cover-up 
deeds with apparent proof or to remove entirely damning clues, all 
evidence points toward uncertainty. Thus, “facts” which counter the 
conspiracy hypothesis become suspect and must be tested over and over 
again for weaknesses. (Goodnight and Poulakos 306) 
 
For instance, when opponents pointed out to GamerGaters that Nathan Grayson never 
actually reviewed Quinn’s game Depression Quest for Kotaku, many GamerGaters 
responded that the disappearance of the article in question was proof that the SJWs 
running Kotaku were protecting Quinn. One of the most disputed points in GamerGate, 
moreover, was the authenticity of the threats and harassment received by Quinn, 
Sarkeesian, and other women. When Sarkeesian and Quinn began publicly sharing 
messages of abuse they were receiving on Twitter, GamerGaters responded by either 
insisting that the threats were coming from individuals unaffiliated with their movement 
or that the threats had been faked by the supposed recipients. JohnRavioli, in the 
#burgersandfries IRC10, questioned the similar wording of Quinn’s and Sarkeesian’s 
statements regarding the threats as well as their claims: “Anita is saying she was ‘driven 
out of her home.’ Zoey [sic] is saying she was ‘driven out of her home.’ No one is driven 
out of their homes for any kind of threats. The police come to you and sets up cops in 
front of your house” (Aug 28 08.59.27 – 09.00.34). GamerGaters proposed several 
                                                          
10. “Internet Relay Chat.” Along with the /v/ (video games) board on 4chan and the Kotaku in 
Action subreddit on Reddit, the #burgersandfries IRC served as a space for GamerGaters to organize, 
discuss tactics, and share news. The IRC existed from August 18 to September 6, and in that time users 
generated nearly 5,000 pages of writing. Due to the sheer volume of information, I have opted to focus 
primarily on August 28, the day that the “Death of Gamers” articles appeared, to track GamerGaters 
reactions to and plans to combat this narrative. Quotes taken from the IRC are cited with the date and time 
stamp given in the chat logs. 
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methods for proving the threats had been faked; after someone pointed out that the 
amount of time between the date stamp on one threating message and the date stamp on 
Sarkeesian’s screencapture of said message suggested that someone had logged out of 
one Twitter account and logged into another, MundaneMatt suggested collecting all the 
tweets that mentioned Sarkeesian on Twitter to determine whether or not she was 
responsible for the threats made against her (Aug 28 02.55.51). That opponents were 
skeptical at best and entirely dismissive at worst of the kinds of proof that GamerGaters 
offered only further demonstrated to them the entrenched nature of the conspiracy; as 
Goodnight and Poulakos write, “More widely accepted evidence [or denial of one’s own 
evidence] becomes a sign of the conspirators’ power, rejection by authority a sign of the 
depth of the conspiracy, and consensual denial a sign of public gullibility” (307). 
 Additionally, “another form of rhetorical proof which becomes subject to distrust 
is the credibility of all sources that do not share the conspiracy hypothesis” (Goodnight 
and Poulakos 206). This became especially pertinent in determining who could be 
appealed to as authorities on the issue of gender discrimination in video games culture. 
As Quinn’s and Sarkeesian’s first-hand experience was dismissed, GamerGaters sought 
out other women, especially self-identified feminists, to refute SJW claims regarding the 
state of sexism in the games industry. A primary way of indicating which public figures 
and authorities could be trusted and which could be not was the terminology of “red pill” 
and “blue pill,” an analogy drawn from the 1999 film The Matrix. Early in the movie, the 
protagonist, Neo, is offered a choice of two pills: the red pill will cause him to wake up in 
the real world, a terrifying dystopia of evil machines and humans struggling to survive, 
while the blue pill will allow him to forget everything he has gleaned about the nature of 
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reality up to that point and return him to blissful ignorance in the simulation the machines 
had created to keep humans passive. For GamerGaters, “red pill” or “red pilled” meant 
that an individual understood what was really going on. For example, #burgersandfries 
IRC member Kiernoth said, “What’s cool is that the GameHeadlines writer is also a 
feminist BUT she’s a bit red pillish” (Aug 28 02.20.47-57). Later, as members of the IRC 
tried to identify other feminists they could cite as authorities, Kiernoth added, “Well 
there’s Factual Feminist, but she’s libertarian so she’s gonna be a bit more redpilled than 
most” (Aug 28 02.30.57). Meanwhile, “blue pills” either live in ignorance, blindly buying 
into the SJW’s version of social reality, or deliberately manipulate the emotions and 
ideologies of the ignorant for their own ends, as GamerGaters characterize Quinn and 
Sarkeesian. For instance, after YouTube personality Arin Hansen, known by his handle 
Egoraptor, suggested on Twitter that women getting death threats was a sign that 
misogyny existed in games culture, IRC user Britbong asked, “Why is he so bluepilled?” 
(Aug 28 11.01.54). PaperDinosaur responded, “He didn’t used to be. He became one. 
He’s a Zoe type. He will act the way that gets him the most views [on YouTube]. So, he 
acted a pro-gamer until the SJW market started, then thought he could ride the wave” 
(Aug 28 11.02.00-36). 
 One of the characteristics of blue pills is that they are unable to engage in 
discussion; as Goodnight and Poulakos write, “The enemy is beyond communication” 
(310). GamerGaters complained that SJWs on Twitter used passive aggressive statements 
to avoid actually arguing their points (Aug 28 03.26-28) and that some opponents refused 
to listen to or converse with white men, citing white male privilege (Aug 28 08.00.24). 
Moreover, GamerGaters perceived themselves as being the moderates of the situation 
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while SJWs treated anyone who did not immediately agree with them as an enemy. IRC 
user AneiDoru argues, “Neutral is still a side to us. It isn’t to the SJWs” (Aug 28 
02.27.16-21). However, while most SJWs are mere blue pills, sheep tricked into believing 
lies about the nature of social reality, GamerGaters had larger concerns – the evil 
machines, if we keep with The Matrix analogy. While the very nature of conspiracy 
prevented GamerGaters from uncovering the full extent of the games journalism cabal, 
they found what they considered to be several key members, including Silverstring 
Media, a gamers development group for which Sarkeesian consults; Adrienne Shaw, an 
Assistant Professor in Temple University’s Department of Media Studies and Production 
and avid video game scholar who GamerGaters identified as the origin of the “Death of 
Gamers” narrative; and the CYCLES program, an Air Force-funding project, which Shaw 
is a part of, aimed at using video games to help individuals confront cognitive biases in 
decision making (Codeswish). GamerGaters interpreted the connections that could be 
drawn among these entities as evidence of a large-scale attack on white male gamers with 
the goal of eliminating them from games culture. Goodnight and Poulakos write that 
“conspirators are portrayed as twisted, abnormal and brutal, yet clever, and powerful 
beings” (310), and this is demonstrated in the ways Pastebin user Codeswish assesses his 
findings on these behind-the-scenes actors: 
This PR group [Silverstring Media] Sarkeesian is tied to is fairly creepy. 
Heavily ideological, they hold retreat workshops for SJW concepts, with a 
sharply activist tone. Reminds us of [the documentary] Jesus Camp. They 
do workshops for game [developers] where they discuss “dismantling 
hegemonic masculinity in the gaming industry,” and do weird training 
activities like “State Torture Jenga.” “Hegemonic masculinity” – it’s like 




This quote contains an interesting array of contradictions, with Silverstring and its 
sponsored SJWs being described as akin to both religious fundamentalists and Marxist 
intellectuals, suggesting that GamerGaters are skeptical of “extremists” on both the right 
and the left and that they understand these groups, led by the conviction of their beliefs, 
to be manipulating blue pilled individuals in order to make them disciples of their 
ideologies.  
 Though Gjoni’s initial break-up story retreated into the background as the 
conspiracy narrative began to spread, both narratives allow the white male gamer to be 
the victim. Admittedly, many GamerGaters were disenfranchised in some way: some 
suffered from mental illness while others were able to participate as extensively as they 
did due to being un- and underemployed. However, in this case, establishing themselves 
as the victims (of belligerent SJWs, of mainstream media stereotypes of gamers, and of 
government-sponsored projects for eradicated white male gamers) allowed GamerGaters 
to make certain claims regarding their ethos and supported their version of events.  
 Within the localized context of the gaming community, the conspiracy narrative 
served GamerGaters well as a means to promote circulation. As we saw in some of the 
early responses, many gamers were already concerned about the feminist take-over of 
games, a ideologic with well-greased rails for a narrative like The Zoe Post. Moreover, a 
primary tenet of conspiracy rhetoric is that the individual must come to his own 
conclusions by examining all available evidence himself. In an online context, this 
epistemological practice means more views to key texts, consequently making them more 
likely to appear in searches for items related to Quinn and GamerGate. Additionally, by 
having so many individuals searching for the “truth,” GamerGaters turned up a huge 
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amount of “evidence” of unethical practices, with each individual nugget having its own 
circulation life. At the same time, the conspiracy narrative was an impediment in many 
ways to the story spreading outside the a conservative gamer ideologic, as this same 
“evidence” was not taking seriously under other epistemologies, and GamerGaters 
required a circulation sponsor, someone to boost their voices beyond the gaming 
community, to move their concerns into the mainstream. 
 
The Death of Gamers 
 Individuals who pitted themselves against Quinn and corruption in the gaming 
industry collected themselves under a few key terms – #Quinnspiracy and 
#burgersandfries11 among the most popular – until actor Adam Baldwin, known for his 
unabashed conservative opinions, became involved on August 27, creating the 
eponymous hashtag for the movement and moving GamerGate out of the games 
community and into more mainstream conversations. The following day, a series of 
articles appeared on a variety of websites, games-focused or otherwise, that served to 
establish the primary SJW response to GamerGate and that forefront the abuse received 
by Quinn, Sarkeesian, and other women. On August 25, Sarkeesian released “Women as 
Background Decoration: Part 2” as part of her YouTube series Tropes Vs. Women in Video 
Games. Sarkeesian, who had been on the receiving end of Internet harassment since the 
inception of the Tropes Vs. Women series, had publicly supported Quinn on Twitter, and 
this was the first video she had released since Gjoni published The Zoe Post. Perhaps due 
                                                          
11. In The Zoe Post, after claiming that Quinn cheated on him with five different men, Gjoni 
writes, “And now I can’t stop mentally referring to her as Burgers and Fries,” a reference to the chain 
restaurant Five Guys Burgers and Fries. 
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to her connection with Quinn or perhaps due to the extra publicity of this video afforded 
by supportive tweets and links from Joss Whedon12 and Tim Schafer13, Sarkeesian 
received an unprecedented amount of vitriol, culminating in an individual posting her 
address and the address of her parents on Twitter with threats of rape and violence and 
driving Sarkeesian from her home. 
After Sarkeesian released an image of these violent messages on her own Twitter 
feed, writers from gaming sites and beyond responded. This collection of articles from 
across websites contained a relatively unified meta-narrative of the events of GamerGate, 
which came to be referred to as the “Death of Gamers” narrative, as many of the titles – 
such as “The End of Gamers” (Golding), “The Death of ‘Gamers’ and the Women who 
‘Killed’ Them” (Johnston), “A Guide to Ending ‘Gamers’” (Wilson), and “‘Gamers’ Are 
Over” (Alexander) – implied that the identity marker of “gamer” was becoming (or 
should become) less and less monolithic in gaming culture. The “Death of Gamers” 
narrative begins with a history of the gamer identity. Dan Golding writes,  
For a while, perhaps, when such technology was found mostly in 
masculine cultures, videogames accordingly developed a limited, inwards-
looking perception of the world that marked them as different from 
everyone else. This is the gamer, an identity based on difference and 
separateness. When playing games was an unusual activity, this identity 
was constructed in order to define and unite the group (and to help 
demarcate it as a targetable demographic for business).  
 
The problem with this identity continuing to hold sway in games development and 
marketing is that, as several of these authors note, women have become half the gaming 
                                                          
12. creator of iconic “nerd” favorites like Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Firefly 
13. designer of critically-acclaimed and fan-favorite video games like The Secret of Monkey 
Island, Day of the Tentacle, Full Throttle, and Grim Fandango 
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population, though they are still treated as outsiders: “The predictable 'what kind of 
games do [women] really play, though – are they really gamers?' response says all you 
need to know about this ongoing demographic shift. This insinuated criteria for 'real' 
videogames is wholly contingent on identity (i.e. a real gamer shouldn't play Candy 
Crush, for instance)” (Golding). Self-identified gamers “see themselves as the 
gatekeepers of the gaming community,” serving as the “guardians of a culture only they 
can define” (O’Rourke; Bernstein). 
However, as many of these articles point out, gamers are not necessarily the ones 
defining what does or does not count as a “real game”; the gaming industry is. Devin 
Wilson writes, “At its core, to be a ‘gamer’ is to obsessively and regularly make the 
correct purchases. ‘Gamers’ are such vicious gatekeepers because they want to protect 
the perceived value of their investments.” The inherently consumerist nature of gamer 
culture is frequently highlighted. Leigh Alexander writes, “‘Game culture’ as we know it 
is kind of embarrassing – it’s not even culture. It’s buying things […] It’s young men 
queuing with plush mushrooms hats and backpacks and jutting promo poster rolls. 
Queuing passionately for hours, at events around the world, to see the things marketers 
want them to see.” Chu critiques the very assumption that games journalism has ethics in 
the first place, arguing,  
Games journalism isn't journalism. Games journalism is a neglected 
johnny-come-lately subset of entertainment journalism, which is also – 
with a few honorable exceptions – not journalism. Because entertainment 
journalism is a field where all of the money and all of the power lies in the 
hands of companies selling products, where the only thing to cover is 
products being sold, where the target audience of the publication is defined 
by their pre-existing desire to purchase the product, and thus the border 
between advertising and “journalism” can't help but be blurred. (“It’s 




These critiques of the corporate gaming industry and of gamers’ willingness to participate 
in it further highlight the perceived ideological battle lines of GamerGate: while white 
male gamers continue to eat up big name franchises like Halo and Grand Theft Auto, 
feminist games enthusiasts turn to indie developers for a wider variety of stories and 
gameplay. Chu goes on to say,  
Never have I met a group of people as doggedly convinced that their 
opinion is “objectively” correct as gamers. Hence the incredible reservoirs 
of rage that Depression Quest may have gotten positive attention it didn't 
deserve because the reviews of it were “biased” and not “objective,” as 
though any such thing were possible. Hence the seething fury that this 
developer may have gotten her position by “knowing the right people” and 
not through perfect “objective” meritocracy.  
 
Since “gamers” don’t enjoy playing Depression Quest, an interactive fiction game about 
living with mental illness, they believe that Quinn’s game only received positive press 
because of who Quinn is, either because journalists feel pressured into positively 
representing outspoken feminists or because she had sex with them. 
 
#NotYourShield  
 Arguably, the “Death of Gamers” narrative sets up a strawman – or, rather, straw-
gamer – easily dismissed by the mainstream audiences who were hearing about 
GamerGate for the first time. This straw-gamer is a white, heterosexual male whose 
speech is peppered with thoughtless race-, gender-, and sexuality-based slurs, especially 
when he encounters others from the anonymous comfort of his gaming console or 
computer screen. Individuals who were non-white, non-male, non-straight, and 
GamerGaters pushed back against what they perceived as an erasure of their existence, a 
silencing of their perspectives, and a paternalistic lecture about what they should be 
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offended by. This narrative, which directly opposes the notion that the only ones angry 
about the push toward more “inclusionary” video game culture is white, straight men, 
was largely collected under #NotYourShield – a hashtag intended to convey to SJWs that 
these individuals refused to sit by silently while said SJWs carried out a culture war in 
their names. Twitter user @Ninouh90, working in conjunction with fellow black gamer 
Jason Miller (@j_millerworks), created and began spreading #NotYourShield on 
September 2, and by the next day the hashtag had become a substantial part of 
GamerGater strategy. On 4chan, one individual anonymously posted tips for best use the 
hashtag, including encouraging the use of both #NotYourShield and #GamerGate so that 
readers would know exactly which side the poster was on because “misinterpretation is 
SJW bread and butter;” cautioning white, cis, males from making claims on the tag, 
arguing that “autism does not count” and the tag should be used by “‘classical’ minorities 
only;” and providing examples of good and bad tweets involving the tag (qtd. in Quinn).  
 Posts like this, which treated #NotYourShield as a strategy in a larger campaign, 
led to questions of the authenticity of the tag as the genuine opinions and perspectives of 
non-white, non-male, non-cis, and non-straight gamers. Quinn posted screenshots of the 
4chan post discussed above on September 4 and of the IRC chatroom #burgersandfries on 
September 6, in both cases implying that #NotYourShield was a PR move by 
GamerGaters to gather public sympathy for their cause. Perhaps in response to these 
criticisms, the YouTube channel Shield Project was established on September 6. Its first 
video, posted on September 7 and titled “#GamerGate – We Are Not Your Shield,” opens 
with the statement, “The gaming media would have you believe that #GamerGate is just 
about ‘straight white male’ gamers trying to ‘reject women’ in the industry… What if the 
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gaming community told you that they were NOT your shield for the narrative you’re 
creating?” The three minutes that follow feature still images, voiceovers, and video clips 
of people of color, queer people, and women professing support of GamerGate, including 
#NotYourShield’s creator @Ninouh90. One woman says over her photo, “I am a queer 
feminist woman and I am not a shield for false ally gaming journalists to hide their 
corruption behind. I support GamerGate and will call you out.” A young black man 
gestures to his wall of gaming paraphernalia as he says, “I am a gamer myself and I am 
also black and these SJWs think they know what offends me and what doesn’t.” Another 
young white man says over his photo, “Even though I’m gay, the games media want me 
to think that all my gamer friends are homophobic, but gaming has always been an 
inclusionary pastime. I support #NotYourShield.” One still image shows a passport for 
the Republic of India next to a yellow note that has “#NotYourShield” and 
“#GamerGate” handwritten on it. The video closes with a clip of @Ninouh90 saying, “As 
a black gamer and the person who started #NotYourShield, I don’t want my identity to be 
used as some kind of marketing push or some kind of instant get-out-of-jail-free card for 
SJWs to use against me. So, my name is Nino, and I am not your shield.” 
The rhetorical choices made in this video fall in line with the focus on visual 
evidence throughout GamerGate on the part of both GG supporters and detractors, given 
the frequent use of screen captures and images to ensure that described events really 
happened. By displaying female and non-white bodies, the premiere Shield Project video 
“proves” that it is not the work of white male gamers attempting to improve their image. 
Interestingly, however, this is the only video in the series to feature images and video 
prominently; future videos often involve the Shield Project host interviewing women, 
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people who identify as LGBT, or people of color through Google Hangouts, but these 
interviews are primarily audio, and while individual user avatars (visible in the bottom of 
the screen) may show their faces, they just as often show anime characters or other 
images. 
 
Controlling Narrative, Controlling Image 
 Throughout the course of the event but especially after the debate broke into the 
mainstream, a great deal of effort on both sides was put into documenting and 
demonstrating the hypocrisy of the other side – that the stated goals and actual practices 
both SJWs and GamerGaters did not line up. While GamerGaters made claims about the 
purported nature of feminism and feminists, Quinn and her supporters argued that the 
ostensible goals of GamerGaters – ethics in gaming journalism – were belied by the 
frequent discussions of how best to end Quinn’s career14. In both cases, rhetors claimed 
that how their opponents argued was symptomatic of the larger problems inherent in each 
side’s ideologies. GamerGateres argued that the refusal of SJWs to listen to and engage in 
debate with them was indicative of a lack of inclusion and the faultiness of their 
assumptions regarding white male privilege. SJWs argued that GamerGaters were unable 
to see their own privilege and the ways in which their call for “ethical” practices was an 
excuse to discourage women from the gaming industry. Furthermore, SJWs argued that 
the threats of death, sexual harassment, and doxing leveled against women in the field, 
before and after The Zoe Post, were evidence of the overwhelming misogyny in video 
                                                          
14. For Quinn, documenting these attacks were a matter of legal importance as she built her case 
for a restraining order against Gjoni that would prevent him from approaching her physically and from 
sharing information about her online. 
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game culture, to which individual GamerGaters frequently replied that they did not 
personally engage in such behaviors and disapprove those who do, often also pointing to 
similar threats leveled against members of their own side. As GamerGate moved into 
mainstream awareness, GamerGaters began to focus less on collecting and distributing 
evidence against Quinn, Sarkeesian, and others (though they continued to do so), instead 
turning their attention to shaping their public image as moderate, informed, unbiased, and 
inclusive. 
 In many ways, the GamerGate incident serves as an excellent example of Ch. 
Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory regarding the interactions between our 
perceptions of a person and her acts. To begin, “the concept of ‘person’ introduces an 
element of stability. Any argument about the person has to do with this stability: it is 
assured when an act is interpreted as a function of the person, and it is failure to respect 
this stability which is deplored when someone is reproached for incoherence or 
unjustified change” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 294). This is the same phenomenon 
that Walter Fisher documents with his ideas regarding characterological coherence and 
that Roland Barthes writes of when he describes the reaction to a wrestling villain hiding 
behind the rules of the ring after violating them himself: “The inconsistency, far more 
than treachery or cruelty, sends the audience beside itself with rage: offended not in its 
morality but in its logic, it considers the contradiction of arguments as the basest of 
crimes” (24). In the case of GamerGate, Gjoni’s framing of Quinn as a hypocrite for 
betraying her “strong principled stances” anticipates an audience’s reproach for such 
instability. But beyond that, GamerGate illustrates our expectations that a rhetorical 
collective – a group of individuals sharing a common rhetorical stance – will exhibit the 
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same stability or characterological coherence we expect of individuals. What Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca term “plasticity, which everyone allows spontaneously to himself, 
while just as spontaneously denying it to others,” may be applied to the group with which 
we identify, allowing us to discuss the multitude of opinions and argue that the 
viewpoints of one individual should not be attributed to the group as a whole, while being 
denied to the group we identify against, resulting in all group members being held 
accountable for the words or actions of a single member (295). This double standard was 
apparent to many GamerGaters; #burgerandfries IRC member haahwaaw wrote, “It’s a 
real shame that one actual person or SJW can flag some stupid series of words and that’s 
all of us by default. But every single person who writes an editorial making us out to be 
worse than 2 Hitlers are only allowed to be treated as individuals, and even then they’re 
supposedly almost infallible at worst” (Aug 28 08.20.07 – 21.12). At the same time, they 
ridicule the perceived hypocrisy in some feminists opposing sex work and others 
defending it, a debate that many feminists would argue is extremely nuanced and 
productive for forwarding feminists ideals (Aug 28 02.37-38).  
The perceived stability of the person is important because “often, the idea one has 
of a person, instead of being the outcome of argument, is rather its starting point and is 
used either to foresee certain unknown acts, or to interpret known acts in a particular way, 
or else to transfer to the act the judgment passed on the agent” (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 299)15. Moreover, “the intervention of the person, as a context for the 
                                                          
15. While Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca avoid using the term “ethos” to characterize this 
relationship between our prior perception of the rhetor and the rhetorical situation at hand (in keeping with 
the Aristotelian foundations of their work), contemporary rhetorical theory has taken this interaction as a 




interpretation of an act, comes about most frequently through the medium of the notion of 
intention, which has the function of both expressing and justifying the reaction of the 
agent on the act. […] The idea we have of these intentions depends essentially on what 
we know of the agents” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 301). For this reason, managing 
the initial impression an audience has of a rhetor can be fundamental for further rhetorical 
engagement – preventing audience from immediately dismissing or rejecting a rhetor’s 
arguments based on his perceived ethos. GamerGaters frequently discussed strategies for 
managing their image, realizing that as “gamers” they were working against a number of 
negative stereotypes from the beginning and even more so after the “Death of Gamers” 
narrative began circulating. As we saw earlier, preventing white straight men from 
masquerading as minority gamers using #NotYourShield and consequently being found 
out as a fake was one of these strategies, and similarly, many of these strategies were 
about mitigating damage to their already-compromised ethos. For example, when some 
GamerGaters proposed protesting the PAX gaming convention, PZT warned on the 
#burgersandfries IRC, “Please don’t do anything autistic or stupid. One video of a guy 
acting like a retard in public and we’re fucked. (Aug 28 07.21.33, 42). Similar warnings 
were posted regarding online discussions, with Crunchepillar posting in #burgersandfries, 
“Stop burning bridges on twitter…I’ve made good progress with a lot of SJWs and 
almost gotten them to change just to have some lolsorandum faggot pipe in about how all 
SJWs are fags” (Aug 28 09.35.18, 45). 
In addition to avoiding behaviors that would negatively affect their ethos, 
GamerGaters participated in and proposed “charitable” activities that would improve 
their reputation, since “the value we attribute to [an] act prompts us to attribute a certain 
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value to the person” which may result in “a modification of our conception of the person, 
to whom we shall explicitly or implicitly attribute certain new tendencies, aptitudes, 
instincts, or feelings” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 297). For example, when The Fine 
Young Capitalists, a Toronto-based non-profit group working to demonstrate that games 
by women could be economically viable, announced that they had a falling out with 
Quinn prior to the release of The Zoe Post, GamerGaters flocked to their IndieGoGo 
campaign and ensured they met their fundraising goal. GamerGaters then used this act to 
support their claims that they were not opposed to women in video games, only 
corruption, since “former acts, and the good reputation resulting from them, become a 
sort of capital incorporated in the person, an asset which one can rightfully invoke in 
one’s defense” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 299). While on the front, these actions 
appear to be spontaneous gestures, they were frequently debated behind the scenes as 
GamerGaters weighed in on the possible outcomes. For instance, when NewDCD 
proposed “Operation Virtuous Mission”16 to take “the PR angle even further” by having 
GamerGaters intervene when individuals harass SJWs online, Zachenen argues that it 
would look “like mansplaining.” NewDCD responds, “Doesn’t matter, though. The 
crazies are not our objective here. The objective is to cause infighting and doubt within 
SJW ranks” by offering evidence of a different character that the one SJWs shilled 
(Social Justice Bread).  
Managing their image was important to GamerGaters because it was vital to 
maintaining control of the narrative of GamerGate, especially once mainstream media 
                                                          
16. “Operation Virtuous Mission” is a reference to the 2004 game Metal Gear Solid 3: Snake 
Eater and appeared frequently in GamerGater conversation. Interestingly, the game prominently features 
issues of conspiracy and government-controlled narratives. 
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began covering it. Many GamerGaters understood themselves to be waging a war of 
narrative in which wining would mean completely discrediting the SJW narrative of evil 
white male gamers (and consequently discrediting Quinn and Sarkeesian) and putting 
their narrative of games journalism corruption in its place. However, as #burgersandfries 
IRC member Thidran notes, GamerGaters were “at a massive disadvantage due to [SJWs] 
having years to build up their narrative” (Aug 28 23.58.53). While GamerGaters felt that 
their evidence of corruption stood on its own, they needed to impress upon their audience 
the falsity of SJW representations of their character and priorities before they could 
present their version of events. At the same time, the tactics used to improve their ethos – 
charitable donations, active and visible defense of women in gaming, promoting minority 
voices – became part of their narrative as they described games journalists as only 
interested in including the voices of those in power (SJWs) instead of the minority voices 
they claimed to want to include. As the GamerGate event developed, narrative and ethos 
were recursively constituting for GamerGaters, as new parts of the narrative were drawn 
on to boost their ethos and actions taken to boost their ethos became part of their 
narrative. This recursive interaction encouraged the maintenance of a stable identity for 
the collective, and arguably, the strategies used by GamerGaters were geared toward the 
building of a coherent collective identity that would mediate the negative connotations of 
the collective terms “gamers.” 
 
The Stakes of the Game 
 Given the narratives that GamerGaters most prominently draw on in their 
discourse – narratives like The Matrix and Metal Gear Solid 3 that feature end-of-world 
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scenarios – it is unsurprising that they attributed so much weight to their cause. Perhaps 
the primary difference between the two sides of the GamerGate debate is exactly what 
was at stake for the participants. More than one person fled her home out of fear for her 
safety, and Sarkeesian canceled a speaking engagement at University of Utah when 
security could not prevent attendees from bringing firearms into the venue, despite the 
threats leveled against her. Meanwhile, GamerGaters were forced to confront the fact that 
their behavior and norms may no longer be socially acceptable. While GamerGaters 
frequently push back against the notion that they are racist, misogynistic, and 
homophobic, the #burgersandfries IRC, to take one example, is filled with instances of 
the kind of discourse that prompts the negative stereotyping of gamers, especially by 
SJWs. For instance, money is frequently referred to as “Jewgold” and one who lacks it is 
a “poorfag.” The participants in these conversations, though, see no discrepancy in their 
professed commitments to inclusion and their everyday language; as PaperDinosaur 
states, “calling someone a faggot isn’t being a dick” (Aug 28 08.33.17). It is unsurprising, 
then, that they seem unable to understand or even imagine the motivations of SJWs 
(beyond the desire to whine and/or receive special treatment). Complaining about how 
SJWs engage in “passive aggressive” tactics that limit genuine discussion, IRC member 
Keirnoth writes, “Another one was someone retweeting someone else saying ‘DEATH 
THREATS R BAD.’ Well no shit, but it’s the goddamn internet” (Aug 28 03.28.14, 24). 
For Keirnoth, and arguably many others (as no one debates his statement), death threats 
are inherent to the Internet, something to be overlooked like advertisements in the sidebar 
instead of actively opposed. User oxxo asks, “Why do you want to change the world? I 
give a shit when [the] world tries to change stuff I like” (Aug 28 08.29.41). And that, for 
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GamerGaters, is what is at stake: stuff they like. Not their livelihood, or emotional well-
being, or physical safety. Just stuff they like changing. 
 At the same time, GamerGaters showed themselves to be rhetorically savvy when 
it came to the manipulation and management of narrative. Much like the case of 
Savannah Dietrich, GamerGate demonstrates for rhetoricians the ways in which a 
personal narrative may be taken up by different groups for different rhetorical purposes. 
Moreover, we can see how larger cultural narratives – often substantial aspects of a 
group’s ideologics – influence what parts of a personal narrative are deemed noteworthy. 
However, unlike the Dietrich case, where different groups circulated the narrative with 
little interaction, in GamerGate we watch two groups wrestling for control of the 
narrative; while they debate with each other, they also make arguments to audiences 
outside of games culture about the appropriate interpretations of Gjoni’s story, the 
harassment that followed, and video games themselves. In addition, through the IRC chat 
logs, we can see the ways in which GamerGaters strategized the content and 
implementation of their narrative. In addition, the GamerGate case gives us insight into 
how rhetors plan for and react to circulation. Like Liza Long’s blog post, a great deal of 
GamerGater material was shared as the result of an emotional reaction, whether that was 
outrage directed at games journalists and/or SJWs or outrage directed at GamerGaters for 
the harassment of women. GamerGaters in fact planned on this circulation as a first step 
in inciting their audience to action against Quinn, Sarkeesian, and other SJWs. However, 
at first, circulation largely remained localized in the games community. Attention to the 
debate greatly increased after Adam Baldwin became involved, since, given his previous 
comments and public positions on media and culture, his ready-made audience of Twitter 
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followers were inclined to oppose SJWs. At the same time, the SJW side of the story was 
being circulated by the various “Death of Gamer” articles that appeared shortly after 
Baldwin initiated #GamerGate. As with Long’s and Dietrich’s narratives, the stories of 
GamerGate began reaching wider audiences after the intervention of a third party – 
coverage or republication by websites with audiences beyond the local context. 
 In addition to these questions regarding circulation, GamerGate prompts us to 
examine assumptions regarding credibility in a time of anonymous communication. The 
easy creation of so-called throw-away accounts – social media accounts created for short-
term uses with no intention to maintain them over the long term – raises questions about 
the constitution of collective movements, especially when the “trending” status that may 
further promote a particular hashtag or new story may be based on the number of 
individual usernames discussing it. What appears to be a collective of 100 individuals 
may in fact be a much smaller group with each individual posting to multiple accounts. In 
particular, the role of the screen capture in GamerGate calls attention to shifting notions 
of evidence and authenticity as rhetors seek to prove that artifacts – blog posts, tweets, 
and comments, for example – did exist even though these artifacts and the user who made 
them may have since disappeared. Furthermore, as we saw with Long’s case, a rhetor 
using her “real” name does not guarantee that she will be treated as credible by the 
audience while another anonymous rhetor may be, due the alignment of her argument 
with preexisting ideologics. In the concluding chapter, I will address some of these issues 
of authenticity, identity, and credibility, as well as the issue of circulation sponsorship in 




DIRECTIONS IN WHICH TO HOPE 
 
 
I began this project with the assumption that the circulation of personal narratives that 
give alternative accounts of the lived experiences of oppressed and disenfranchised 
groups could do important social and political work, regardless of the responses those 
narratives received. This assumption is summed up in the notion of the available means 
of imagination, in the idea that exposure to alternative narratives can shift our 
understandings of what is possible even if we are critical of the narratives themselves. 
With this starting point in mind, I aimed to understand how personal narratives by 
relatively unknown individuals could come to occupy space in the imagination of the 
American public through their circulation in social media, searching for particular 
features or strategies that may have contributed to these stories viral spread. In this course 
of this analysis, I came to focus on a few things: 
1. Emotion, positive or negative, fuels circulation by serving as motivation for 
individuals to share texts that they respond strongly to. In turn, strong emotion 
displayed in response to a particular text suggests to others that they share their 




2. Individual stories may be adapted or interpreted to fit into multiple ideologics, 
and a story that can be read as meaningful or important to multiple ideological 
groups will circulate more widely. 
3. Narratives that serve to shore up a group identity may circulate more widely as 
individuals both demonstrate their own identification with the narrative and as 
others argue that the group’s self-representation is flawed, dishonest, or 
hypocritical. 
In this concluding chapter, I explore some of the implications of this work, including 
what is suggests for future scholarship in circulation studies and in digital rhetoric, and 
suggest a few areas that may be ripe for investigation. 
In many ways, focusing on personal narrative to discuss the role of emotion in 
circulation reinscribes some of the more troubling assumptions about the genre, namely 
that it is inherently emotional (and consequently “feminine”) and therefore should be 
taken with a grain of salt in serious political deliberation. On the other hand, if all 
political discourse is always-already emotioned, as Crowley’s framework of ideologics 
and Chaput’s notion of affective economies suggest, the personal narrative is perhaps 
different from other, more “logical” modes only in that we anticipate having an emotional 
reaction to a personal narrative and if we don’t, we perceive some kind of breakdown in 
communication. Undoubtedly, the personal narrative is fraught with pitfalls, whether that 
is to shut down discussion entirely, as Segal argues, or to encourage individuals to 
evaluate the arguments of others based entirely on how those arguments line up with their 
own experiences, as Fisher writes. However, like most rhetorical strategies and tactics, 
these results are only “good” or “bad” insofar as they forward discourses or political 
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actions that we deem “good” or “bad.” The innumerable stories of rape, sexual assault, 
gender-based violence, and street harassment shared under #YesAllWomen successfully 
shut down #NotAllMen, and as a feminist, I think that is good. At the same time, I 
recognize how frequently personal narrative has been the end of productive discussion, 
often at one-on-one level when an individual reiterates an oft-repeated story that 
reinscribes her view of herself and the world in ways that are counter to the claims 
ostensibly under debate – such as someone dragging out the “I have black friends” card 
when confronted with accusations of racism and/or perpetuating a racist system. 
It would be easy, perhaps, to argue that it is dominant narratives that shut down 
conversations while alternative narratives open up new possibilities. While the concept of 
the available means of imagination focuses primarily on narratives that may be deemed 
“alternative” in some way, in reflecting on these case studies, we may question how far a 
personal story must deviate from the dominant cultural narrative to be “alternative.” 
While Liza Long’s narrative about her son’s mental illness illustrates substantial 
departures from standard stories, stories like Savannah Dietrich’s that call attention to the 
silencing of victims and the relatively minor punishments handed to sexual abusers have 
become increasingly common. The notion of alternative here, then, might have more to 
do with the audience’s perceptions of the relative dominance of the narrative. As 
discussed in both chapters 3 and 4, many who ascribe to patriarchal ideologies, men’s 
rights activist and GamerGaters for example, perceive stories like Dietrich’s as being 
dominant to the point that young men are suffering enormous losses every time a woman 
breathes a word about sexual assault. That these kinds of stories have suddenly become 
more visible only further entrench these groups’ beliefs that women have learned there is 
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something to be gained by employing them, as opposed to the notion that sexual assault 
has always been under-reported. In the case of the conspiracy rhetoric that structured 
parts of GamerGate discourse, the understanding of which narrative is “alternative” and 
which is “dominant” becomes especially important as the alternative narrative is read 
with increased credibility through the sheer fact of not being the story told by mainstream 
media. At the same time, an audience’s assumption regarding the dominant narrative an 
alternative narrative is working against deeply informs that audience’s interpretation of 
the narrative, as we can see in Dietrich’s case, where some audience members took of 
Dietrich’s story as proof that the dominant narrative of free speech rights in the U.S. is 
not entirely accurate. Because audiences need to understand alternative narratives in 
relation to dominant ones, alternative stories cannot be so alternative as to be 
incomprehensible to mainstream audiences if they are to circulate. While Liza Long’s 
narrative comes closest to foregoing dominant narratives altogether, she still paints her 
investment in a restructuring of the mental health care system in terms of motherhood, 
specifically her responsibility to her other children besides Michael.  
Another thing that becomes increasingly clear through these cases is how the 
identity of an individual – as much as we can understand individuals as having stable 
identities – and their ethos – or the rhetorical reading of that identity – are shaped by 
audiences’ reception of their texts, especially in the case of personal narratives. Liza 
Long, Savannah Dietrich, Zoe Quinn, and Anita Sarkeesian all found themselves 
suddenly cast into the role of experts on mental illness in children, sexual assault, and 
cyberbullying because their texts were read as persuasive by certain hegemonic forces, 
including mainstream media and government officials. While these are success stories 
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that I believe forward better, more nuanced conversations regarding gender issues in 
several arenas of life, it is worth remembering how many stories of mental illness in 
children, sexual assault, and cyberbullying did not attain this status. Moreover, naming 
these four as “successes” highlights significant omissions in who can attain this kind of 
expertise: all four are white17, all four are cis-gender, and only one (Quinn) openly 
identifies as queer. All had access to the technologies and time necessary to craft and 
circulate their messages, suggesting a certain class privilege, and all were able to leverage 
“eloquence” in the form of easy command of standard American English to their 
advantage. One potential step to address this disparity would be to examine in greater 
detail the circulation, limited or otherwise, of the stories of, for instance, transwomen of 
color or of non-native English speakers in order to propose strategies for bringing these 
voices into wider circulation. 
As I mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, one aspect digital circulation 
that warrants further consideration is the role of what we might call circulation sponsors, 
calling back to Debra Brandt’s sponsors of literacy, in pushing stories toward mainstream 
audiences. In the previous chapter, I pointed to Adam Baldwin’s creation of 
“#GamerGate” and recirculation of GamerGate texts as a primary reason that GamerGate 
arguments reached mainstream audiences as he used his celebrity to “signal boost” the 
voices of GamerGaters. In the case of Savannah Dietrich, her interview with Jason Riley 
of the Courier-Journal and its subsequent circulation by the Associated Press served to 
launch her story into a national spotlight, where it was further spread by commentary 
                                                          




from news aggregate sites like Slate, Salon, and Huffington Post. These same news 
aggregate sites, which are already well-integrated into social media, were also 
instrumental in the circulation of Liza Long’s “I Am Adam Lanza’s Mother,” where 
Long’s article was reproduced in full as well as commented upon by staff writers and 
others. While some sponsors, like Adam Baldwin or Jason Riley, perhaps viewed these 
stories as important information for the public, others stood to profit off the number of 
views a story received. That is, the motivations of circulation sponsors, much like those 
of literacy sponsors, are complex, political, and ideologically bound. As rhetoricians seek 
to understand digital circulation and even suggest strategies for political and social 
action, we should pay attention to role these circulation sponsors play in shaping both the 
messages they circulate and audiences’ perceptions of those messages. 
 The notion of circulation sponsors gives us another way of identifying and 
understanding the moving part of digital circulation, perhaps the most challenging aspect 
of circulation studies. In tracing these cases, one thing that remained difficult was 
accounting for the interplay between human and non-human actants. Web 2.0 is 
dominated by spaces in which actions made by humans are mediated by algorithms and 
programs which, despite being made by other humans, take on agencies of their own once 
they are set into motion. The role of these non-human actants in the cases I have 
documented here cannot be understated, even as I have largely left them in the 
background in lieu of focusing on the choices made by humans. I made this choice in part 
due to my own lack of expertise – while I know that algorithms govern every I do and see 
on the Internet, I lack the technical know-how to identify and analyze them. But I also 
made this choice because of my interest in how the emotional reactions of humans govern 
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how they interpret and subsequently circulate personal narratives. While algorithms may 
be programmed to pay attention to emotion – for example, the way that Facebook is more 
likely to display posts on others’ feeds if they contain highly emotional words or the 
linguistic markers of major life events – algorithms can only understand what is 
emotional by humans ascribing emotional weight to particular words, grammatical 
constructions, or visual items like emojis or gifs, meaning that is ascribed through the 
collective, cultural agreement, as Micciche reminds us, of what a particular set of bodily 
phenomenon signals about our relationships to others. 
 While I could sidestep questions of non-human actants to some degree in how I 
analyzed my case studies, I could not deny the effect that they had on how I collected 
artifacts for analysis. Gries comments on the problem of search algorithms that have 
become personalized what they think we want to see – the “filter bubble” of Eli Pariser – 
for the new materialist scholar, encouraging the use of multiple search engines and 
digging extensively into the results. I also took to heart her call to explore the 
“psychogeographical attractions” in a search, clicking links and finding new artifacts in a 
way that was not always necessarily systematic but that allowed me to move outside the 
proscribed bounds of the search algorithms that Google and others had designed for me 
(99). Moreover, my choice of case studies was deeply informed by my own social media 
practices. All three of these cases first came to my attention through my Facebook feed, 
and my initial impressions of them were directly shaped by what I saw there. For 
instance, because of the ideologics and arenas of circulation that I inhabit as a young, 
white feminist, I only knew of the Savannah Dietrich case as an example of rape culture, 
despite the fact that I was living in the city where it happened, when it happened. It 
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wasn’t until I began deliberately searching outside of the algorithm ascribed to me that I 
found the conversations regarding local class structures and free speech rights, 
conversations that my networks – with both human and non-human elements – did not 
include.  
 This network of human and non-human actants increasingly controls what 
individuals see of public and political debate, as many have pointed out with varying 
levels of paranoia, but these networks also influence the pathways between emotions and 
actions in our ideologics. If, as Edbauer argues, individuals believe that an expression of 
outrage is the ultimate political action, then social media has both been structured by and 
encouraged this view, with Facebook providing a list of trending issues and then asking 
users “What’s on your mind?”. Undeniably, these requests for emotional engagement 
often play out along troubling, hegemonic lines; terrorist attacks in Europe, for instance, 
are met with outpourings of sympathy and hashtags of solidarity while more horrific 
violence in the Middle East or Africa is often invisible, and the outrage in these latter 
situations is more often that Western media is so clearly biased rather than that these 
attacks happened in the first place – that is, people are outraged that no one is outraged. 
Perhaps a healthier practice for the good of democratic engagement would be to treat 
emotions like outrage as the precursor to and/or motivation for action, as Cooper argues 
is the case, rather than an end unto itself. But then we must consider what counts as 
action, especially in the age of digital democracy. The term “slacktivism” has been used 
to denounce the shallow ways Millenials understand political engagement and action as 
sharing a post, signing a petition, or documenting their opinions on their own social 
media accounts, as opposed to the physical and material enactments of political dissent of 
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previous generations (sit-ins, boycotts, marches, public demonstrations, etc.). While 
proponents of digital civic engagement often point out that discourse online often serves 
as a precursor simultaneous action to more “traditional” political action, we should also 
consider the ways in which digital civic engagement allows previously underrepresented 
groups to participate, for instance disabled people who may be unable to leave their 
homes and working class individuals may be unable to participate in marches or sit-ins 
without putting their incomes at risk. Many activists have come to consider signal-
boosting as an important and valid form of participation, and in some cases, it is a 
preferred form of participation because it allows privileged individuals to circulate and 
support the voices and viewpoints of minorities without mediation through hegemonic 
voices. Consequently, slacktivism – even through the most basic act of recirculation, of 
sharing another’s words on one’s own social media site – serves an important role in 
contemporary public rhetoric, and the available means of imagination is one way of 
lending validity to these practices that have been so frequently derided in the past. 
Perhaps it is because I am a Millenial myself that I have long been resistant to the 
idea that contributing to digital circulation was what people did when they were too lazy 
to do “real” political work. When I began this work, I was already committed to the idea 
that personal narratives matter, that they are key to how we understand the lives of others. 
I also began this work believing that the empathy that is developed through reading and 
listening to personal narratives could – and perhaps should – serve as the basis for 
collective, political action – that the way the stories we hear and the ways we interpret 
those stories deeply influence what we imagine as a “good” lives for ourselves, our 
contemporaries, and those who will follow us. I have come out on the other side of this 
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project a little more cynical (at least some days), finding, much like Segal, that the stories 
with the most potential for radical change are often the ones least circulated. At the same 
time, I feel I have a better sense of what directions in which to hope; while the networks 
that govern digital circulation remain subject to what I and others who share my 
ideologics might think of as regressive impulses, this dissertation suggests that there are 
ways to game the system, to circulate stories that can lead to more complicated, nuanced, 
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